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1 Environmental Quality Competition in Ver-
tically Diﬀerentiated Duopolies: An Overview
1.1 Introduction
There is abundant empirical evidence that consumers are willing to pay a
price premium for products with reduced environmental impacts (Farhar
and Houston 1996, Levin 1990, Roper Starch 2000, and Wasik 1996), and
there is anecdotal evidence that a social norm rewarding green purchases
is emerging. If this willingness to pay a price premium for products with
reduced environmental impacts is high enough, Þrms may respond by dif-
ferentiating their products in environmental quality, as this allows them to
mitigate competition and to charge higher prices for their green products.
The emergence of diﬀerentiation in environmental quality raises many
interesting questions. Is diﬀerentiation in environmental quality socially de-
sirable? What are its consequences for the environment? How does it af-
fect competition among Þrms and consumers surplus? Does environmental
quality competition make environmental policy unnecessary and if not, how
should environmental policies be designed so as to take the diﬀerentiation in
environmental quality into account? How do social norms modify the incen-
tives to diﬀerentiate in environmental quality? These are the issues explored
in this dissertation.
Economists have long been aware of the fact that consumers have idiosyn-
cratic preferences and are willing to pay more for variants that are closer to
their own tastes. As Chamberlin pointed out, a product is diﬀerentiated in
the eye of consumers if a signiÞcant basis exists for distinguishing the goods
(or services) of one seller from those of another. Such a basis may be real
or fancied. Diﬀerentiation may be based upon certain characteristics of the
product itself... It may also exist with respect to the conditions surround-
ing its sale. When these two aspects are held in mind it is it is evident
that virtually all products are diﬀerentiated, at least slightly, and that, over
a wide range of economic activity, diﬀerentiation is of considerable impor-
tance.(Chamberlin 1933, pp. 56-57).
Starting from the pioneering work of Hotelling (1929) several frameworks
have been developed to analyze product diﬀerentiation.1 A commodity is
1For an in-depth review of the diﬀerent approaches to the analysis of product diﬀeren-
tiation see Anderson, de Palma, and Thisse (1992).
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generally viewed as a bundle of characteristics and is represented by a vec-
tor whose components indicate how much of each characteristic is embodied
in one unit of the product (Lancaster 1966, 1971, 1979). Often the dis-
tinction is made between vertical and horizontal diﬀerentiation According
to Anderson, de Palma, and Thisse (1992, p. 109): Products are said to
be vertically diﬀerentiated if, when oﬀered at the same price, all consumers
choose to purchase the same one, the one of highest quality. Of course, in
equilibrium, assuming that consumers diﬀer in their willingness to pay for
quality improvement, products will sell at diﬀerent prices with the higher
quality product being sold at a premium over the price of rival lower quality
products. Products are horizontally diﬀerentiated if, when priced at the
same level, the demand for each is positive.2 Thus vertical diﬀerentiation
implies that consumers have the same ranking over the products character-
istics while horizontal diﬀerentiation implies a diﬀerent ranking. Although
products are generally diﬀerentiated both vertically and horizontally, in the
economic literature vertical and horizontal diﬀerentiation have been usually
analyzed separately.3
As the purpose of this thesis is to analyze competition in environmental
quality, we restrict our attention to the case of vertical diﬀerentiation and
assume that the products are identical in all characteristics but one, envi-
ronmental quality, which consumers rank in the same way. A simple model
to characterize preferences for a vertically diﬀerentiated product was devel-
oped by Mussa and Rosen (1978) and applied to the analysis of vertically
diﬀerentiated product markets by Gabszewics and Thisse (1989), Moorthy
(1988) and Tirole (1988).4 An abundant literature developed from these
Þrst applications and was extended to the analysis of vertical diﬀerentiation
in environmental quality by Arora and Gangopahyay (1995) and Moraga-
Gonzales and Padron-Fumero (1998). This dissertation represents a further
extension of this literature, which provides a useful benchmark and makes it
possible to study how vertical diﬀerentiation in environmental quality diﬀers
from vertical diﬀerentiation in other dimensions of quality.
2The distinction between horizontal and vertical diﬀerentiation was Þrst introduced by
Lancaster (1979), ch. 2.
3For references to models which combine vertical and horizontal diﬀerentiation see, for
instance, Anderson, de Palma and Thisse 1992, Canoy and Peitz 1997, Degryse 1996, Dos
Santos Ferreira and Thisse 1996, Neven and Thisse 1987.
4An alternative model with similar qualitative properties was developed by Gabsewicz
and Thisse (1979, 1980) and extended by Shaked and Sutton (1982, 1983).
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Before proceeding, we could ask how justiÞed it is to extend the vertical
diﬀerentiation model to describe competition in environmental quality. Can
lower levels of environmental pollution be regarded as quality in the mean-
ing of the vertical diﬀerentiation framework? Survey evidence suggests that
consumers perceive environmental quality as a positive characteristic of the
product they buy. There is also evidence that consumer diﬀer in their will-
ingness to pay for environmental quality, so that both green and brown prod-
ucts will be sold, with the green product selling at a higher price.5 (Farhar
and Houston 1996, Green Gauge Report 2000, Levin 1990, Wasik 1996.) It
is therefore reasonable to assume that they will prefer an environmentally
friendlier product to an identical but more polluting one when both are sold
at the same price.
Models of vertical product diﬀerentiation generally assume that con-
sumers are fully informed about the products quality. In reality, however,
there is an asymmetric information problem regarding its quality, which is
known to producers but not to consumers. Moreover, in the case of envi-
ronmental quality the products quality cannot even be assessed after the
purchase is made: environmental quality is a credence characteristic (Darby
and Karni, 1973). One could therefore ask whether the vertical diﬀerentia-
tion framework is appropriate to study environmental quality competition.
We believe it is. In the last two decades, the introduction of several third-
party eco-labeling schemes has greatly mitigated this asymmetric information
problem.6 Consequently assuming full information about the environmental
quality of the product can be regarded as an acceptable Þrst step toward the
approximation of reality.7
1.2 The Basic Framework of Vertical Product Diﬀer-
entiation
The literature on vertical diﬀerentiation bloomed with the application of the
model of preferences developed by Mussa and Rosen (1978) to the analysis of
5For an alternative approach to the analysis of green consumption see Johanna
Moisander (2001) Representation of Green Consumerism: A Constructionist Critique.
6Eco-labeling schemes have been studied using the vertical diﬀerentiation framework
by Nimon and Beghin (1999a and 1999b).
7Given the assumption of full information, this thesis does not touch upon the issues
related to the signalling of (environmental) quality. On this topic see, for instance, Albano
and Lizzeri (2001), Gabszewicz and Grilo (1993) and Lizzeri (1999).
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vertically diﬀerentiated product markets by Gabszewics and Thisse (1989),
Moorthy (1988) and Tirole (1988). Since then, this model has become the
model of choice of much of subsequent research. We present it following
Tirole (1988).
There are two Þrms, Þrm 1 and Þrm 2. Firm i produces a good of quality
qi, where q2 > q1. There is an upper and a lower bound to quality q and
q, respectively. The unit cost of production is the same for both qualities.
There is a continuum of consumers whose taste for quality is identiÞed by θ,
which is uniformly distributed over [θ, θ¯] with θ¯ = θ+ 1. The indirect utility
of a consumer of type θ who buys a one unit of quality qi at price pi is given
by8
Ui = θqi − pi with i = 1, 2, (1)
and by U = 0 if he does not buy.
Note that the assumption of additive separability of the indirect utility
function is reasonable as long as the expenditure on the product has only
a small impact on the total budget of the consumer. The assumption of a
uniformly distributed taste parameter θ guarantees that market demand is
linear for each single quality.9 All consumers buy either one unit of variant
1 or one unit of variant 2.
The consumer is indiﬀerent between buying variant 1 and 2 when θq2 −
p2 = θq1 − p1, that is, when he has a taste parameter
θ2 =
(p2 − p1)
(q2 − q1) . (2)
8The Shaked and Sutton model (1982) used a multiplicatively separable utility function
of the form U = qm, where q is the quality of the vertically diﬀerentiated product and m
the quantity of an outside good.
9θ can also be interpreted as the marginal rate of substitution between income and
quality, so that the higher θ is, the lower the marginal utility of income and the higher
the income (Tirole, 1988, p. 96):
U = qi − pi
θ
with i =H,L
In this case consumers have identical tastes but diﬀerent incomes, so that the marginal
utility from an extra unit of quality is the same among individuals, while the marginal
rate of substitution between income and quality diﬀers. As a result, because of income
diﬀerences, there will be diﬀerent valuations of the net surplus at the same level of quality
and price. The demand for quality will be determined by aﬀordability, measured by 1θ .
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This yields the following demand functions
x2(p2, p1) = θ¯ − θ2 (3)
and
x1(p2, p1) = θ2 − θ. (4)
The duopolists play a two-stage game. In the Þrst stage, Þrms simulta-
neously maximize proÞts in quality. In the second stage, they compete in
prices.
Tirole (1988) shows that in equilibrium the high-quality Þrm is the leader
both in proÞts and market share. When the choice of quality is costless,
there are two pure-strategy Nash equilibria both characterized by maximal
diﬀerentiation. One equilibrium is at location {q1 = q and q2 =q}. The other
equilibrium is obtained by reversing the Þrms indices.
The literature on vertical product diﬀerentiation has maintained the focus
on pure-strategy equilibria, with one Þrm always choosing high quality and
the other low quality. In these models, the question remains open as to why,
under simultaneous quality choice, any Þrm would want to choose low quality,
given that the Þrm choosing high quality reaps a larger proÞt in equilibrium.
A notable exception to the focus on pure strategies is given by Wang and
Zang (2001), who allow for mixed strategies in a model with costless quality.
They show that the two-stage quality-price game has an inÞnite number of
mixed strategy equilibria, in which maximal quality diﬀerentiation does not
occur. Consumers surplus is higher under the mixed strategies equilibria
than under pure strategy equilibria and proÞts are lower.
In the subsequent literature several assumptions made in Tirole (1988)
were relaxed, most notably those of full market coverage and costless quality.
Choi and Shin (1992) assumed that some consumers may not purchase the
diﬀerentiated commodity, that is, they assumed exogenous partial market
coverage. They showed that in such a case the low-quality Þrm chooses a
quality level which is a Þxed proportion of the high-quality Þrms choice.
Consumers buy the diﬀerentiated commodity only if they obtain a positive
surplus from the purchase, that is, if
U1 = θq1 − p1 ≥ 0. (5)
The taste parameter at which the consumer is indiﬀerent between buying
low quality or not participating in the market is therefore
θ1 =
p1
q1
. (6)
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Market coverage was later endogenized for the case of costless quality by
Wauthy (1996).
The most recent applications of Tiroles model of vertical diﬀerentiation
usually assume quadratic costs of quality,10 which were Þrst introduced by
Moorty (1988). It is either assumed that all quality-dependent costs are
Þxed costs (e.g. Lehman-Grube 1997, Motta 1993, Ronnen 1991, Rosenkranz
1996, Scarpa 1998) or that the marginal cost of production is independent
of quantity but strictly increasing and convex in quality (e.g. Crampes and
Hollander 1995, Cremer and Thisse 1994). The former assumption is often
coupled with the assumption of partial market coverage and the latter with
that of full market coverage.
In the case of Þxed quality-dependent costs, the Þrms proÞts are given
by
πi = pixi − c
2
q2i i = 1, 2. (7)
When the marginal cost of production is independent of quantity but
strictly increasing and convex in quality, the Þrms proÞts are
πi = (pi − c
2
q2i )xi i = 1, 2. (8)
Which of these two ways to characterize the duopolists cost functions is
more appropriate depends on the characteristics of the product described.
When products quality is enhanced by Þxed cost investments in production
technologies and/or in research and development, then the assumption that
all quality-dependent costs are Þxed is preferable. Whenever quality can be
increased by choosing certain materials rather than others, by using a more
skillful labor force, etc., then it is appropriate to assume that the marginal
cost of production is independent of quantity but strictly increasing and
convex in quality.
In the case of Þxed quality-dependent costs, the Þrms simultaneously
maximize proÞts in prices in the Þrst stage and compete in prices in the
second stage. At this point, the cost of quality has already been sunk and
constant zero unit costs of production are incurred.
When all quality-dependent costs are Þxed and the market partially cov-
ered, the model of vertical product diﬀerentiation predicts that at equilibrium
the high-quality Þrm is the leader both in terms of market share and proÞts
(Lehman-Grube 1997). As Kuhn (2000) points out, this result is at odds
10More rarely, linear costs are assumed, as in Kunh (2000).
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with intuition. Anecdotal evidence suggests that high-quality Þrms are not
generally leaders in market share. This is, for instance, the case for cars,
consumer electronics, furniture, and clothing. Kuhn (2000) shows that if
one assumes that all quality-dependent costs are linear and that there is a
baseline beneÞt from the consumption of the diﬀerentiated commodity, it
is possible to obtain an equilibrium with the low-quality Þrm being leader
either in market share or in both market share and proÞt.
When the marginal cost of production is independent of quantity but
strictly increasing and convex in quality, there is neither proÞt nor market
share leadership if full coverage is assumed.
Cournot competition and Stackelberg competition have also been ana-
lyzed within this framework by Motta (1993), who shows that even though
Þrms also diﬀerentiate when they Cournot compete, they do so to a lower
degree. High quality is lower and low quality is higher under Cournot compe-
tition than under Bertrand competition. This is due to the fact that, given
the same qualities, Cournot competition is less intense, so that duopolists
have less incentive to diﬀerentiate as a means of mitigating competition. So-
cial welfare, deÞned as the sum of consumers and producers surplus, is lower
under Cournot competition.
Stackelberg competition, characterized by the sequential choice of quality,
leads to lower levels of quality, higher industry proÞts and lower social welfare
than simultaneous choice (Aoki and Prusa 1997).11 The leader always chooses
the high level of quality (Lehmann-Grube 1997) since the high-quality Þrm
always earns higher proÞts than the low-quality Þrm.
Whether it is more appropriate to model quality choice as sequential or
simultaneous depends on the type of industry being described. Sequential
quality choice is more apt to describe those industries in which new products
are usually pioneered by a single Þrm, as in the case of the pharmaceutical
industry. Industries in which multiple Þrms develop a new generation of
products, e.g. the automobile industry, are better modeled by simultaneous
quality choice.
11A more recent paper by Lambertini (1998), cast doubts on Aoki and Prusas (1997)
results by showing that under an extended game with observable delay, only simultaneous
equilibria can arise.
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1.3 Policy Intervention in Vertically Diﬀerentiated Duopolies
The standard model of vertical product diﬀerentiation shows that Þrms al-
ways have an incentive to diﬀerentiate their products in quality so as to ease
competition and earn higher proÞts. This leads Þrms to diﬀerentiate too
much, with high quality being too high and low quality too low (Cremer and
Thisse 1994, Motta 1993). There is therefore scope for quality regulation poli-
cies, of which minimum quality standards have been the most researched.12 It
has been shown that in the absence of quality externalities, appropriately set,
an unanticipated minimum quality standard increases welfare (Crampes and
Hollander 1995 and Ronnen 1991), as it enhances competition by decreasing
the degree of product diﬀerentiation.13 Both levels of quality increase in the
standard, and output expands.14 Collusion in prices becomes more diﬃcult
after the introduction of a minimum quality standard (Ecchia and Lambertini
1997). These results are based on the assumption that costs are quadratic
in quality. When the cost function is linear in quality, then the standard
decreases both welfare and producers surplus (Kuhn 2000). If the minimum
quality standard is anticipated, that is, if the high-quality Þrm can commit
to a quality level before the standard is chosen, then the high-quality Þrm
chooses a level of quality below its optimal response to the standard it antici-
pates will be preferred by the regulator. This induces the welfare-maximizing
regulator to set a weaker standard and, as a result, the high-quality Þrms
proÞts increase and social welfare falls (Lutz, Lyon, and Maxwell, 2000).
Scarpa (1998) examines the impact of a minimum quality standard when the
industry is composed by three Þrms, all quality-dependent costs are Þxed,
and the market is partially covered. He Þnds that social welfare decreases
after the introduction of a minimum quality standard. While in a duopoly,
the low-quality Þrm beneÞts from the introduction of a mild standard, in a
three-Þrm oligopoly all Þrms suﬀer from it. The equilibrium levels of low
quality and intermediate quality increase while the equilibrium level of high
quality decreases. Given that the high-quality Þrm has the largest market
share, average quality drops. The reduction in producer surplus exceeds the
12For an excellent review of the literature on standards in vertically diﬀerentiated
oligopolies see Ecchia, Lambertini and Scarpa (2001).
13This result stems from the assumption that, following the introduction of the mini-
mum quality standard, the high-quality Þrm plays the duopoly equilibrium strategy and
does not engage in predatory behavior.
14This eﬀect is observed in the models with ex-ante partial market coverage, as in
Ronnen (1991).
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increase in consumer surplus, and social welfare decreases.
The impact of ad valorem taxes has also been examined in the literature.
Models suggest that this impact crucially depends on the Þrms cost function.
When the marginal production cost is independent of quantity but strictly
increasing and convex in quality, a suﬃciently small uniform ad valorem tax
rate increases welfare and decreases the level of high quality, while it may or
may not decrease the level of low quality. When all quality-dependent costs
are Þxed costs, both levels of quality decrease with a uniform ad valorem
tax (Arora and Gangopadhyay 1995) and so does social welfare (Moraga-
Gonzales and Padron-Fumero, 1998). Constantatos and Sartzetakis (2001)
Þnd that when entry is allowed, a uniform ad valorem tax may induce the
entry of a large number of Þrms. Their model suggests that while within
a given market structure average quality decreases monotonically with the
uniform ad valorem tax rate, average quality jumps upwards at tax rates
that cause a change in market structure.
Lambertini and Mosca (2000) examine the impact of quality taxation.
They Þnd that an appropriately set quality taxation/subsidization scheme
can induce the choice of the socially optimal levels of quality.15
1.4 Vertical Diﬀerentiation in Environmental Quality
The framework of vertical product diﬀerentiation has been increasingly ap-
plied to analyze Þrms environmental quality choices (Arora and Gangopad-
hyay 1995, Cremer and Thisse 1999, Lutz, Lyon, and Maxwell 2000, and
Moraga-Gonzales and Padron-Fumero 1998).
The presence of externalities from quality makes the analysis of vertical
diﬀerentiation in environmental quality diﬀer from that of vertical diﬀer-
entiation as analyzed in most industrial organization models. When Þrms
diﬀerentiate in environmental quality, there are two countervailing eﬀects on
social welfare. On the one hand, by competing in environmental quality,
Þrms increase their abatement eﬀort and thus reduce the pollution external-
ity. On the other hand, as with vertical diﬀerentiation in general, diﬀeren-
tiation in environmental quality reduces competition and increases a Þrms
market power. So vertical diﬀerentiation exacerbates one source of market
15Their analysis is restricted to the case when all consumers buy the diﬀerentiated
commodity, the marginal production cost is independent of quantity but strictly increasing
and convex in quality, and there are no externalities from quality.
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failure, namely market power, and mitigates another: the pollution exter-
nality. It is therefore interesting to ask whether and how the presence of
an externality from quality alters the optimal regulation policies of vertical
diﬀerentiated oligopolies. An answer is suggested by Moraga-Gonzales and
Padron-Fumero (1998) in a model with partial market coverage, quadratic
Þxed costs of quality and a baseline utility from the commodity. They study
the impact of an exogenous unit emission standard set close to the unreg-
ulated equilibrium and show that it increases aggregate emissions and may
decrease social welfare. This is because the standard has two countervailing
eﬀects on emissions: on the one hand it decreases average emissions per unit
of production, on the other hand it increases output. The former eﬀect dom-
inates, and emissions increase. If the marginal damage from pollution is high
enough then welfare decreases with the emission standard. A uniform ad
valorem tax increases both emissions per unit of production and aggregate
emissions. Welfare decreases with the uniform ad valorem tax. When market
structure is endogenous in the model, however, a uniform ad valorem tax can
increase welfare and induce the Pareto eﬃcient allocation of environmental
qualities. This is because such a tax aﬀects the number of Þrms active on the
market: as the tax rate increases, the market shifts from oligopoly to perfect
competition and vice-versa (Cremer and Thisse 1999).
1.5 The Subject Matter of the Thesis
In this collection of essays we look at vertical diﬀerentiation in environmental
quality. The most fundamental research questions can be formulated as fol-
lows: Does vertical diﬀerentiation in environmental quality reduce the need
for policy intervention? If not, how do emission taxes aﬀect competition,
environmental quality and welfare in a duopoly that is vertically diﬀerenti-
ated in environmental quality? How should the regulator design an optimal
emission and commodity tax policy when Þrms diﬀerentiate in environmental
quality? What is the impact of an endogenous emission standard? Does it
reduce aggregate emissions and increase social welfare? How do social norms
rewarding the purchase of the high environmental quality variant aﬀect Þrms
choice of quality and social welfare?
We know that diﬀerentiation in environmental quality not only reduces
the pollution externality from production but that it also increases market
power. Therefore it is far from clear whether vertical diﬀerentiation in en-
vironmental quality reduces the need for policy intervention. If there is still
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need of intervention, it is interesting to ask how it should be designed so as
to take diﬀerentiation in environmental quality into account. As a typical
instrument for the internalization of pollution externalities, we look at the
use of emission taxes to regulate vertically diﬀerentiated duopolies. To the
best of our knowledge, there are no studies of emission taxes in the frame-
work of vertical product diﬀerentiation, even though such taxes are examined
extensively in models of imperfect competition with homogeneous goods.16
We also consider the use of emission standards set by the regulator so as to
maximize social welfare. Finally, given the anecdotal evidence of the emer-
gence of social norms that reward consumers who choose the environmental
friendlier products, we ask if such norms modify the incentives to diﬀerentiate
in environmental quality and the need for policy intervention.
1.6 Essay 1. Emission Taxes in a Duopoly that is Ver-
tically Diﬀerentiated in Environmental Quality
In the Þrst essay of this dissertation we study how an exogenous emission
tax aﬀects competition, aggregate emissions, and social welfare. In order to
render our analysis of the emission tax comparable to the existing results on
the adoption of emission standards in vertically diﬀerentiated duopolies, we
use a tax on emissions per unit of production rather than a tax on aggregate
emissions. In fact, in the literature of vertical product diﬀerentiation the
standard is modeled as a unit emission standard rather than as a standard
on aggregate emissions.17 We conduct our analysis within the framework of
a model of vertical product diﬀerentiation where all quality-dependent costs
are Þxed and the market is partially covered.
We show that the emission tax increases the products environmental
quality and enhances competition. As a result output expands. Although
these eﬀects are analogous to those of a unit emission standards as found by
16These models suggest that in a second-best setting, when the only policy instrument
available to the regulator is an emission tax and the number of Þrms is exogenous, the
emission tax should be set below the marginal external damage rather than equal to it
(Barnett 1980, Ebert 1992, Levin 1985, Requate 1993a and 1993b). This is because under
imperfect competition Þrms not only generate pollution but also restrict output so as to
charge a higher price for their product. A smaller output implies also lower emissions as
compared to the perfect competitive equilibrium, which in turn calls for an emission tax
that is lower than the full marginal external damage.
17See Moraga-Gonzales and Padron-Fumero (1998).
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Moraga-Gonzales and Padron-Fumero (1998), the emission tax diﬀers cru-
cially from the emission standard in that it decreases aggregate emissions
while the standard increases them. As a result, social welfare unambigu-
ously increases in the emission tax. The regulators choice of the emission
tax is restricted to tax rates that are low enough to allow the low-quality
Þrm to earn positive proÞts. These results suggest that there are some cru-
cial diﬀerences in those channels via which an emission tax aﬀects vertically
diﬀerentiated duopolies relative to homogeneous goods oligopolies. Full com-
parability of our results to those relating to homogeneous good oligopolies
would, however, require the analysis of a tax on total emissions rather than
on emissions per unit of production.
1.7 Essay 2. Taxation Policy in a Duopoly that is Ver-
tically Diﬀerentiated in Environmental Quality
In the second essay of this dissertation we analyze the use of emission taxes
and ad valorem taxes when Þrms compete in environmental quality. We as-
sume that the duopolists marginal production cost is independent of quan-
tity, but is strictly increasing and convex in quality.18
We Þnd that if the government has an ad valorem tax and an emission tax
available, the Þrst-best levels of quality can be obtained by a combination of
a uniform ad valorem tax and an emission tax (or a subsidy for buying green
products). However, if the government is restricted to the use of one instru-
ment, only the second-best optimum can be reached. This is true even for
the case in which the regulator can charge non-uniform ad valorem tax rates.
An emission tax, when used alone, always increases welfare and induces the
second-best optimum when set equal to the social valuation of the positive
externality associated with average environmental quality. This result does
not contradict the main result in the environmental economics literature that
under imperfect information, homogeneous goods and oligopolies with sym-
metric Þrms, the optimal Pigouvian tax should be smaller than the marginal
external damage so as to balance the output contraction eﬀect of the emis-
sion tax. In the model, in fact, full market coverage is assumed so that Þrms
cannot restrict output in order to increase prices. Finally we Þnd that an
18Arora and Gangopadhyay (1995) and Moraga-Gonzales and Padron-Fumero (1998)
analyze the impact of a uniform ad valorem tax for the case in which the cost of quality
is sunk. They Þnd that such a tax decrease both the Þrms choice of quality and welfare.
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appropriately set, uniform ad valorem tax increases welfare only if the social
valuation of the positive externality associated with average environmental
quality is low enough.
1.8 Essay 3. Endogenous Emission Standards in a
Duopoly that is Vertically Diﬀerentiated in En-
vironmental Quality
In the third essay of this dissertation we endogenize the choice of a unit
emission standard in a duopoly where Þrms compete in environmental qual-
ity by abating pollution from emissions. We ask whether an endogenous
unit emission standard increases pollution and how it should be set so as
to maximize social welfare. To answer these questions, we introduce an en-
dogenous standard into a model of vertical diﬀerentiation.19 We assume that
the government chooses the emission standard for the low-quality Þrm in
a simultaneous game with the high-quality Þrm so as to maximize the so-
cial welfare function. We show that the optimal unit emission standard is
the slacker the more polluting the diﬀerentiated commodity and the higher
the marginal damage from emissions. When the diﬀerentiated commodity is
very polluting or the marginal damage from pollution is very high, no opti-
mal binding standard exists. This result stems from the assumption in this
model that consumers care about the unit emissions of the product they buy,
but do not care about how their decision whether to purchase the commod-
ity or not aﬀects aggregate emissions. As the emission standard makes the
commodity cheaper, some consumers, who in the unregulated equilibrium
would not have bought the commodity, now purchase it. Output expands
and this pushes up emissions. Only if the product is not very polluting to
start with and abatement relatively cheap, the output expansion eﬀect on
aggregate emissions is more than oﬀset by the reduction in unit emissions,
leading to a smaller pollution externality. Otherwise, the pollution external-
ity increases and, depending on the marginal damage from pollution, welfare
either increases or decreases in the standard.
19The model has the same set-up as in Arora and Gangopahdyays model (1995), while
the standard is endogenized following Ecchia and Lambertini (1997).
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1.9 Essay 4. Buying Green: The Social Reward Trap
In the fourth essay of this dissertation, we introduce interdependent prefer-
ences into a model of vertical diﬀerentiation in environmental quality and
study the impact on quality choice and aggregate emissions of two social
norms.20 The Þrst norm socially rewards consumers who choose the environ-
mentally friendlier, green variant of the diﬀerentiated commodity, while the
second punishes those consumers who purchase the more polluting, brown
variant.
By tailoring Akerlofs model (1980), we assume that the higher the so-
cial support for the social norm (as measured by the demand for the green
variant) and the higher the diﬀerence in environmental quality between the
green and the brown variant, the higher the social reward for buying the
green variant. Social rewards are also an increasing function of an exogenous
parameter measuring the strength of the social norm. We investigate how
changes in the strength of the social norm aﬀect aggregate emissions. Our
results suggest that the impact of a social norm that rewards the purchase
of environmentally friendlier products and disregards consumption reduction
depends crucially on whether the market for the diﬀerentiated commodity is
fully or partially covered. It it is partially covered, the norm may be detri-
mental to the environment in that it may induce an increase in aggregate
emissions and lead to deterioration of the environment. We show that ag-
gregate emissions increase at the margin with social rewards. We call this
phenomenon the social reward trap. Market power also increases. A social
norm which punishes the consumers who purchase the brown variant always
decreases aggregate emissions regardless of the degree of market coverage.
Under partial market coverage, demand contracts under such a norm.
20Although interdependent preferences have been introduced before in models of vertical
product diﬀerentiation (e.g. Baake and Boom 2001, Grilo, Shy and Thisse 2001, and
Lambertini and Orsini 2001), to the best of my knowledge the role of social norms in
regulating pollution externalities has not been examined. Even though in the last few years
the economic literature on social norms has ßourished, the attention paid by environmental
economists to them has been relatively scarce, with few authors focusing mainly on the
relationship between environmental policy instruments and social norms (Rauscher 1997,
Hess 1998, Bratt 1999, Rege 2000, Wedner 2000).
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2 Essay 1. Emission Taxes in a Duopoly that
is Vertically Diﬀerentiated in Environmen-
tal Quality
Chiara Lombardini-Riipinen
Abstract Consumers increased willingness to pay a price premium for
greener products stimulates Þrms to compete in environmental quality. This
paper uses a model of vertical product diﬀerentiation to study how an emis-
sion tax aﬀects environmental quality competition, aggregate emissions and
social welfare. By means of comparative statics it is shown Þrst that the
emission tax increases the products environmental quality, enhances com-
petition, increases output and decreases aggregate emissions. The welfare
eﬀects of the emission tax are analyzed in the neighborhood of the duopoly
equilibrium. It turns out that as the emission tax increases, social welfare un-
ambiguously increases. Key Words: environmental quality, emission taxes,
imperfect competition, vertical diﬀerentiation. JEL ClassiÞcation: D62,
H21, L13, L15.
2.1 Introduction
There is abundant empirical evidence that a signiÞcant number of consumers
is willing to pay a price premium for products with reduced environmental
impacts (Farhar and Houston 1996, Levin 1990, Wasik 1996). If the price
premium is high enough, Þrms may respond by increasing their products
environmental quality. Does environmental quality competition lead to so-
cial optimum and thus remove the need for environmental regulation? The
answer is that it does not. Analyses within the conÞnes of product quality
competition in duopoly models of vertical diﬀerentiation21 (Gabszewicz and
Thisse 1979, Shaked and Sutton 1982) suggest that one important force driv-
ing diﬀerentiation is the Þrms desire to mitigate competition. This leads to
excessive diﬀerentiation from a social welfare point of view: low quality is
21A product is vertically diﬀerentiated when it can be ranked in terms of some quality
index so that, when several variants of the product are oﬀered on the market at the same
price, only the one with the highest quality is bought.
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too low and high quality is too high (Motta 1993, Cremer and Thisse 1994).
There is thus scope for quality regulation policies.
Most of the literature focuses on the use of minimum quality standards
and ad valorem taxes as a means to regulate vertically diﬀerentiated oligopolies.
In the case when no externalities are linked to products quality, an unan-
ticipated minimum quality standard increases both levels of quality, reduces
product diﬀerentiation, expands output and increases social welfare (Cram-
pes and Hollander 1995, Ecchia and Lambertini 1997, Ronnen 1991).22
When there are externalities from quality and the minimum quality stan-
dard takes the form of a unit emission standard, an exogenous unit emission
standard set just below the level of unit emission of the Þrm producing the
variant with lowest environmental quality decreases unit emissions but in-
creases aggregate emissions. This is due to the competition-enhancing eﬀect
of the standard, which makes the diﬀerentiated commodity more aﬀordable
and leads to an increase of the share of consumers purchasing the commod-
ity. If the social valuation of the environmental damage caused by emissions
is high enough, then the standard may decrease welfare (Moraga-Gonzales
and Padron-Fumero 1998.)
As for ad valorem taxes, the literature has shown their impact to crucially
depend on the Þrms cost function. When the marginal production cost
is independent of quantity but strictly increasing and convex in quality, a
suﬃciently small uniform ad valorem tax rate increases welfare and decreases
the level of high quality, while it may or may not decrease the level of low
quality (Cremer and Thisse 1994). When all quality-dependent costs are
Þxed costs, both levels of quality and social welfare decrease (Arora and
Gangopadhyay 1995, Moraga-Gonzales and Padron-Fumero 1998).
In the case of environmental quality competition, the use of an emission
tax is an alternative to ad valorem taxes or unit emission standards. Surpris-
ingly, there are no analyses of emission taxes in the duopoly models of vertical
product diﬀerentiation, even though emission taxes have been examined ex-
tensively in the case of a homogenous good under oligopolistic competition.
By assuming that there is an exogenous number of symmetric Þrms and that
the government has no other policy instruments available, these models sug-
gest that the emission tax should not be set equal to the marginal external
22If the standard is endogenous and anticipated, so that the high-quality Þrm can commit
to a quality level before its introduction, the regulator is induced to weaken the standard,
and welfare falls (Lutz, Lyon, and Maxwell, 2000). In a three-Þrm oligopoly, aggregate
emissions increase and social welfare decreases with an exogenous standard (Scarpa, 1998).
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damage, but below it (Barnett 1980, Ebert 1992, Levin 1985, Requate 1993a,
1993b, 1997). This is because, under imperfect competition, Þrms not only
generate pollution but also hold down output. A smaller output implies also
lower emissions as compared to the perfect competitive equilibrium, which in
turn calls for an emission tax lower than the full marginal external damage.
In this paper we ask several questions. How does an emission tax aﬀect
environmental quality competition as well as price competition in a duopoly
vertically diﬀerentiated in environmental quality? Does the use of emission
tax improve social welfare? How do these eﬀects compare with the results
obtained in duopoly models with homogeneous goods? Thus the research
problems are related to both the vertical diﬀerentiation literature and the
models of emission taxes under imperfect competition.
Because in the existing literature emission standards are modeled as stan-
dards on emissions per unit of production, in this Þrst essay we analyze a
tax on emissions per unit of production. This makes our results compa-
rable to those of the existing literature on unit emission standards (Arora
and Gangopadhyay 1995, Moraga-Gonzales and Padron-Fumero 1998), where
standards are expressed as the maximum amount of emissions per unit of
production allowed rather than as the maximum amount of total emissions
allowed.
Note that the tax we examine is not a true Pigouvian emission tax since
it is independent of the Þrms output level. The duopolist is not taxed on
the basis of aggregate emissions, but only according to the level of emission
per unit of production.23
To this end we construct a duopoly model of vertical product diﬀerentia-
tion where the duopolists take part in a two-stage game. Given the emission
tax, they choose the level of environmental quality of their product in the Þrst
stage and compete in prices in the second stage. The Þrms are identical in all
respects. In particular, each of them is constrained to oﬀer only one quality,
and each of them faces the same cost of pollution abatement that enables
the provision of environmental quality. The pollution abatement costs and
their respective marginal costs are increasing functions of the environmental
quality level chosen. We assume that there are no unit production costs.
The market is, by assumption, ex-ante partially covered, that is, con-
23Examining a truly Pigouvian tax would be of even greater interest than analyzing a
tax on emission per unit of production, as it would allow our result to be compared with
the results obtained in the large literature on Pigouvian taxes in oligopoly. Unfortunately
such an analysis proved analytically too complex.
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sumers either purchase one unit of the diﬀerentiated commodity or none.
This assumption enables us to analyze the impact of the emission tax on
aggregate emissions through both the changes induced in the products en-
vironmental quality and in the level of output.
To anticipate the results, we show that the emission tax increases the
products environmental quality, enhances competition by decreasing the de-
gree of product diﬀerentiation, and increases social welfare. Interestingly,
aggregate emissions decrease, even though the emission tax induces an ex-
pansion of output. However, if the emission tax is high enough, it may drive
the low-quality Þrm out of the market by pushing its proÞts below zero.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section two describes the
model, while section three characterizes the regulated equilibrium. Section
four presents the comparative statics of the model. Section Þve analyzes the
social welfare impact the emission tax. Section six concludes.
2.2 The Model
Consider a duopoly model of vertical product diﬀerentiation under complete
information.24 Each Þrm produces one variant of a good that is vertically dif-
ferentiated in environmental quality.25 Production generates polluting emis-
sions per unit of production at level e¯ > 0. Producers can increase their
products environmental quality by investing in less-polluting technologies,
product design or abatement devices so as to reduce the level of emissions
associated with each unit of production by ei with eH > eL. Thus the net
level of emissions per unit of production is (e¯ − ei). We assume that e¯ is
always large enough so that (e¯ − ei) > 0 always holds.26 In order to abate
24The assumption of full information, although common to the models of vertical prod-
uct diﬀerentiation, warrants some justiÞcation, as one characteristic of green products is
that their level of environmental quality, known to the producers, cannot be assessed by
the consumer by inspection or ordinary use: environmental quality is a credence char-
acteristic (Darby and Karni 1973). The introduction of several third-party eco-labeling
schemes greatly mitigates this asymmetric information problem for some important classes
of goods. Thereby assuming full information about the environmental quality of the prod-
uct can be regarded as an acceptable Þrst step toward the approximation of reality.
25In this model we assume that the number of Þrms is given. We do not consider the
impact of the emission tax on market structure. For an analysis of the impact of ad
valorem taxes on market structure see Cremer and Thisse (1999).
26This same setting is used in Arora and Gangopadhyay (1995). They do not assume
that e¯ > 0, nor they check whether e¯ is always large enough to ensure that (e¯− ei) > 0
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emissions, Þrms must incur the cost C(e − ei) = C(ei) = c2e2i , with C 0,
C > 0, and C(0) = 0 for all feasible qualities. Once they have incurred
the cost to ensure the provision of a product of environmental quality ei,
production takes place at a marginal cost that is independent of the level of
emissions chosen by the Þrm and is normalized to zero.
Duopolists face an exogenous tax on emissions per unit of production,
which we refer to as an emission tax, te.
27 The emission tax revenues are re-
distributed to consumers as a lump sum at zero costs. The proÞt of duopolist
i selling variant i at price pi is
πi = pixi − c
2
e2i − te(e¯− ei), (1)
where xi indicates the total demand for variant i, with i = H , L.28
Competition between the duopolists takes place in two stages. In the Þrst
stage, the duopolists simultaneously choose the investment in environmental
quality ei, with ei > 0. In the second stage, they compete in prices. At
this stage the cost of environmental quality has already been sunk and zero
unit costs of production are incurred. The two-stage modelling is motivated
by the fact that changes in the products environmental quality are typically
long-run as opposed to price-setting decisions, which are short-run and easier
to modify.
There is a continuum of consumers whose taste for environmental quality
is identiÞed by parameter θ, which is uniformly distributed over [0, 1]. The
number of consumers is normalized to unity. Each consumer either buys
one unit of the diﬀerentiated commodity or nothing. All consumers are
27Note that te is not a true Pigouvian emission charge since it is independent of the
Þrms output level. The duopolist is not taxed on aggregate emissions, but only on the
level of emissions per unit of production. A truly Pigouvian tax would enter the proÞt
function as − te(e¯ − ei)xi. We chose such an emission tax so as to be able to compare
our results to those relating to the use of standards in vertically diﬀerentiated duopolies,
because the vertical diﬀerentiation literature studies unit emission standards rather than
standards on aggregate emissions.
28Equation (1) can be rewritten as
πi = te[
pixi
te
− ce
2
i
2te
− (e− ei)].
This shows that the unit emission tax is analytically equivalent to a combination of an
ad valorem tax, a subsidy to quality improvement, and a tax on unit emissions Þxed to
unity.
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fully informed about the environmental quality of the two variants of the
diﬀerentiated commodity. Modifying Mussa and Rosen (1978) and Cremer
and Thisse (1999), the indirect utility of a consumer of type θ with income
y who buys variant i of environmental quality ei at price pi is given by
U = y + θei − pi − γE, (2)
where γE is the negative pollution externality originated from the duopoly.29
Parameter γ > 0 measures the marginal damage from pollution and E rep-
resents emissions with
E = (e¯− eH)xH + (e¯− eL)xL. (3)
Note that equation (2) implies that the impact on the individual of the
pollution externality does not depend on the individuals taste for environ-
mental quality. In other words, we assume that pollution aﬀects the utility
of consumers in the same way regardless of the diﬀerences in willingness to
pay for environmental quality.
The assumption that pollution damage is a linear function of aggregate
emissions allows us to disregard the emissions of the same pollutant produced
by other agents in the economy, for instance by other industries, and to con-
centrate on how the tax policy aﬀects the pollution damage caused by the
duopoly. The individual consumer cannot aﬀect total emissions signiÞcantly,
29The use of this utility function may appear somewhat problematic in the context of
environmental quality competition when partial coverage is assumed, because it leads to
the result that the consumers with the lowest taste for environmental quality, that is those
with θ < θL, are the one causing the smallest amount of emissions.
This problem does not emerge in an analytically equivalent re-interpretation of the
same utility function (Tirole, 1988, p. 96) which assumes that consumers have identical
tastes but diﬀerent incomes so that their marginal utility of income is 1θ , with θ uniformly
distributed over [0, 1] and
U =
y
θ
+ ei − pi
θ
− γE.
This utility function leads to the same demand functions for low and high quality as
utility function (2) and therefore to the same duopoly equilibrium levels of quality. Under
such a utility function, the poor and the rich pollute less than the middle-income people.
Interestingly, this relationship between income and emissions is similar to the Environ-
mental Kutznets Curve, a inverted-U relationship between environmental quality and per
capita income Þrst suggested by Grossman and Krueger (1995).
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so that the pollution externality is a constant in the individuals maximiza-
tion problem. The pollution externality, however, aﬀects the calculation of
the level of social welfare.
To deÞne the demand for the low- and the high-quality variants, we deÞne
the critical taste parameter θH at which the consumer is indiﬀerent between
buying the high- and low-quality variant, and the taste parameter θL at
which the consumer is indiﬀerent between purchasing the low-quality variant
or not buying at all. The taste parameter θH is given as the solution to the
indiﬀerence relation y − θeH − pH − γE = y − θeL − pL − γE, which is
θH =
pH − pL
eH − eL . (4)
Parameter θL is given by the solution to the indiﬀerence relation y−θeL−
pL − γE = y − γE, which is
θL =
pL
eL
. (5)
Consumers whose taste parameter θ is such that θH ≤ θ ≤ 1 purchase the
high-quality variant, while consumers whose taste parameter θ is such that
θL ≤ θ < θH purchase the low-quality variant. The rest of the consumers
buy nothing. Therefore, the demand for the high-quality variant is
xH = 1− θH = 1− pH − pL
eH − eL (6)
and the demand for the low-quality variant is
xL = θH − θL = pH − pL
eH − eL −
pL
eL
. (7)
2.3 The Quality and the Price Games
The model is solved by backward induction starting from stage two. At this
stage the levels of quality have already been chosen and the cost of quality has
already been sunk. Firms compete in prices, given the exogenous emission
tax rate, and choose pH and pL so as to maximize proÞts. ProÞts correspond
to sales revenue since the costs in the price game are zero by assumption.
We substitute for xi0s and θ0is in the duopolists proÞt functions and have
max
pH
πH = pH [1− (pH − pL)
(eH − eL) ] (8)
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and
max
pL
πL = pL[
(pH − pL)
(eH − eL) −
pL
eL
]. (9)
From the Þrst-order conditions we obtain the following reaction functions
pH =
eH − eL + pL
2
, pL =
eL
2eH
pH . (10)
The solutions of the system of equations (10) give the equilibrium prices
pH =
2(eH − eL)eH
(4eH − eL) , pL =
(eH − eL)eL
(4eH − eL) . (11)
As expected, the price of the high-quality variant is higher than the price
of the low-quality variant. Following Ronnen (1991) we deÞne the degree of
product diﬀerentiation, a, as the ratio of high quality to low quality, a = eH
eL
.
An increase in the degree of diﬀerentiation decreases competition, irrespective
of how it is measured, since both pH
pL
= 2a and pH − pL = (2a−1)(a−1)(4a−1) are
increasing in the degree of diﬀerentiation a.
Let us now analyze the duopolists choice of quality. Anticipating that
the equilibrium prices is given by equations (11), the high-quality duopolist
chooses eH to maximize
ΠH =
4e2H(eH − eL)
(4eH − eL)2 −
c
2
e2H − te(e¯− eH). (12)
The low-quality duopolist chooses eL to maximize
ΠL =
eHeL(eH − eL)
(4eH − eL)2 −
c
2
e2L − te(e¯− eL), (13)
where Πi indicates the indirect proÞt function of Þrm i obtained by substitut-
ing the equilibrium prices in (11) into equations (8) and (9).30 The Þrst-order
conditions of the duopolists maximization problem are
∂ΠH
∂eH
=
4eH(4e
2
H − 3eHeL + 2e2L)
(4eH − eL)3 − (ceH − te) = 0 (14)
30Note that the duopolists revenues would be zero if they oﬀered variants of the same
level of quality, since then (eH − eL) = 0.
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and
∂ΠL
∂eL
=
e2H(4eH − 7eL)
(4eH − eL)3 − (ceL − te) = 0. (15)
To obtain some more insight into equations (14) and (15) we apply the
envelope theorem to analyze the components of the Þrst-order conditions
evaluated at equilibrium. The indirect proÞt function can be written as
πH = π[θH(eH , eL), eH , eL] and πL = π[θH(eH , eL), θL(eH , eL), eH , eL]. It
follows that
∂πH
∂eH
=
∂π
∂eH
+
+
∂π
∂θH
∂θH
∂eH−
=
4(a− 1)a
(4a− 1)3 −
4(a− 1)a
(4a− 1)3 = 0 (16)
and
∂πL
∂eL
=
∂π
∂eL−
+
∂π
∂θH
∂θH
∂eL−
+
∂π
∂θL
∂θL
∂eL
+
= − (a− 1)a
(4a− 1)3−
2(a− 1)a
(4a− 1)3+
3(a− 1)a
(4a− 1)3 = 0.
(17)
The above equations show that, when choosing the proÞt-maximizing
level of quality, the high-quality Þrm takes into account that higher quality
has a positive direct eﬀect and a negative strategic eﬀect on proÞts. Anal-
ogously, the low-quality Þrm takes into account that a higher choice of low
quality has a negative direct eﬀect and a positive strategic eﬀect on proÞts.
At the optimum the duopolists set the marginal revenue equal to their net
marginal cost of environmental quality, which is given by the marginal cost of
the investment in pollution abatement net of the emission tax. The emission
tax decreases the marginal cost of the investment in pollution abatement. We
would therefore expect that the emission tax would increase the equilibrium
levels of quality. This is in fact the case as we show in section four of this
paper. The second-order conditions and the suﬃcient condition for local
stability are satisÞed. These are presented in Appendix 1. The reaction
functions of the high- and low-quality Þrms are
RH(eL) = − ∂
2ΠH
∂eH∂eL
/
∂2ΠH
∂e2H
=
8eHeL(5eH + eL)
8e2L(5eH + eL) + c(4eH − eL)4
> 0 (18)
and
RL(eH) = − ∂
2ΠL
∂eL∂eH
/
∂2ΠL
∂e2L
=
2eHeL(8eH + 7eL)
2e2H(8eH + 7eL) + c(4eH − eL)4
> 0. (19)
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It is easy to see that, since ∂2πi/∂eiej > 0, the reaction functions are both
positively sloped. Qualities are thus strategic complements: each duopolist
reacts to an increase in the quality of the competitors product by increasing
the quality of its own product. Stability requires that Þrms L reaction curve
RL(eH) be steeper than Þrms H reaction curve RH(eL).
The solutions of the quality game are analytically quite complex. These
are reported in Appendix 2.
2.4 Comparative Statics Analysis
Next we study the qualitative properties at the duopoly equilibrium by means
of comparative statics. More speciÞcally, we examine how an increase in the
emission tax aﬀects quality, prices, demand and proÞts. This information is
of interest per se and useful for the welfare analysis in the next section.
Let us Þrst ask how an increase in the emission tax aﬀects the duopolists
provision of quality. By standard comparative statics analysis, one can im-
mediately establish that
Result 1 An increase in the emission tax increases both equilibrium
levels of quality and reduces the degree of diﬀerentiation.
Proof. See Appendix 3.
The emission tax decreases the net marginal cost of pollution abatement
per unit of production and promotes environmental quality, as shown in the
Þrst-order conditions. Even though the emission tax increases the abatement
eﬀort of both Þrms, the abatement eﬀort of the high-quality Þrm increases
proportionally less than that of the low-quality Þrm so that the degree of
diﬀerentiation, measured as the ratio of high quality to low quality, decreases.
This is because the emission tax hits the low-quality Þrm harder than the
high-quality Þrm and thus gives the former a greater incentive to increase
its level of quality. The emission tax hits the low-quality Þrm harder for
two reasons. First, its emissions per unit of production are higher than
those of the high-quality Þrm, so that it pays a higher amount in taxes to
the regulator. Second, as the tax on emissions per unit of production is
independent of the amount of units produced and, given that the low-quality
Þrms output is smaller than that of the high-quality Þrm (see (A5.2) in
Appendix 5), the low-quality Þrms ratio of taxes paid to output is much
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higher.31
Since a decrease in the degree of diﬀerentiation enhances competition, we
would expect the quality-deßated price to fall with the emission tax. We Þnd
that this is the case. Following Ronnen (1991) we deÞne the quality-deßated
price of Þrm i as the ratio of the price of variant i to the quality of variant i,
ρi =
pi
ei
. Quality-deßated prices tell us how expensive one unit of quality is
for the consumer. We Þnd that
Result 2 An increase in the emission tax decreases the quality-deßated
prices of both the high- and the low-quality variants.
Proof. See Appendix 4.
Result 2 implies that the introduction of the emission tax clearly beneÞts
all consumers since it makes both low and high quality less expensive to pur-
chase. Since the quality-deßated price of the low-quality Þrm is equal to the
taste parameter θL at which the consumer is indiﬀerent between purchasing
the low-quality variant or not buying at all, Result 2 also implies that the
degree of market coverage increases.
As to the impact of a higher emission tax on demand and on market
coverage of the emission tax, we have
Result 3 An increase in the emission tax increases the share of con-
sumers actually buying the good. The demand for both variants increases,
with the demand for the high-quality variant increasing proportionally more
than that for the low-quality variant.
Proof. See Appendix 5.
The intuition behind Result 3 is that as the cost of both levels of quality,
measured by the quality-deßated price decreases in the emission tax, more
consumers participate in the market. However, as shown in Appendix 4,
the quality-deßated-price of the high-quality variant decreases faster in the
emission tax than that of the low-quality variant, which induces a greater
increase in demand for the high-quality variant.
In Appendix 7 we show that both Þrms proÞts are positive under the
emission tax, provided that the pre-abatement level of unit emissions is not
31The ratio of tax paid to total output of the low-quality Þrm is TL =
t(e−eL)(4a−1)
a
, and
that of the high-quality Þrm is TH =
t(e−aeL)(4a−1)
2a with TL > TH .
34
too high, that is, provided that
e < − a(12a
2 − 5a+ 8)(16a2 − 7a+ 6)
2c(a− 1)(4a− 1)3(4a3 − 23a2 + 12a− 8) . (20)
Clearly, the higher the pre-abatement level of unit emissions e is, the
higher the emission tax te(e − ei) the Þrms have to pay and the lower the
Þrms proÞts. Therefore, above a critical level of e , which diﬀers among
Þrms and which is lower for the Þrm producing the low-quality variant, an
increase in the emission tax may push proÞts below zero. This critical level
of e can be expressed as a function of c and te by substituting into (20)
the equilibrium solution for a as reported in equation (A.2.1) in Appendix
2. Equation (20) thus implies that the range of values of the emission tax
compatible with duopoly equilibrium is restricted by the fact that under an
excessively high emission tax, the proÞts of producing the low-quality variant
are negative.
So far, we have shown that an emission tax has two eﬀects on aggregate
emissions. On the one hand, it decreases emissions per unit of production
(Result 1), which in turn decreases aggregate emissions; on the other hand,
the emission tax increases output (Result 3), which in turn decreases aggre-
gate emissions. Which eﬀect dominates? Do aggregate emissions increase or
decrease in the emission tax? The answer is given by
Result 4 An increase in the emission tax unambiguously decreases ag-
gregate emissions.
Proof. See Appendix 6.
Result 4 implies that the reduction in aggregate emissions due to the
increase of the equilibrium levels of quality more than compensates for the
increase in aggregate emissions due to the expansion of output.
It is interesting to compare Results 1, 3, and 4 regarding the impact of
the emission tax with the impact of a minimum quality standard derived
in the previous literature, as this highlights many similarities and a crucial
diﬀerence between these two instruments. Ronnen (1991) shows that such
a standard increases the equilibrium levels of quality, decreases the degree
of diﬀerentiation, and expands output. Results 1 and 3 suggest that a unit
emission tax has the same qualitative eﬀects. However, the emission tax and
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the standard diﬀer in their impact on aggregate emissions. Moraga-Gonzales
and Padron-Fumero (1998) Þnd that an exogenous unit emission standard
set arbitrarily close to but below the emission per unit of production of the
low quality Þrm increases aggregate emissions, while Result 4 shows that an
emission tax reduces aggregate emissions.
2.5 Taxation and Social Welfare
In this section, we study the welfare impacts of the emission tax. From the
comparative statics, we know that an emission tax enhances competition
by decreasing the degree of diﬀerentiation, expands output, and decreases
aggregate emissions. This implies that it contributes to correct for market
power and for the pollution externality associated with the diﬀerentiated
commodity. There is therefore good reason to suspect that such an emission
tax may increase welfare. We show that this is always the case.
Social welfare is assumed to be utilitarian and is deÞned as the sum of
consumer and producer surplus augmented by the damage function from
aggregate emissions, that is, by
W = CS[eH(te), eL(te)] + PS[ei(te)]− γE[eH(te), eL(te)],
where PS indicates producer surplus and is given by the sum of equations
(12) and (13), that is, the sum of the duopolists proÞts. It is assumed that
the emission tax revenues are redistributed to all consumers, including those
who do not purchase the diﬀerentiated commodity, as a lump sum L at zero
cost with
L = te[
Z θH
θL
(e− eL)dθ +
Z 1
θH
(e− eH)dθ]. (21)
In equilibrium, consumer surplus is
CS =
Z θH
θL
(θeL − pL)dθ+
Z 1
θH
(θeH − pH)dθ+L = e
2
H(4eH + 5eL)
2 (4eH − eL)2
+L. (22)
The total eﬀect of the emission tax on social welfare is given by
dW
dte
=
dPS
dte
+
dCS
dte
− γdE
dte
, (23)
with
dPS
dte
=
∂PS
∂te
+
∂PS
∂eH
deH
dte
+
∂PS
∂eL
deL
dte
, (24)
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dCS
dte
=
∂CS
∂te
+
∂CS
∂eH
deH
dte
+
∂CS
∂eL
deL
dte
, (25)
and
dE
dte
=
∂E
∂te
+
∂E
∂eH
deH
dte
+
∂E
∂eL
deL
dte
. (26)
Rearranging, the impact of emission taxes on social welfare can be rewrit-
ten as
dW
dte
=
∂CS
∂te
+
∂PS
∂te
+ (
∂ΠH
∂eH
+
∂ΠL
∂eH
+
∂CS
∂eH
)
deH
dte
(27)
+(
∂ΠL
∂eL
+
∂ΠH
∂eL
+
∂CS
∂eL
)
deL
dte
− γdE
dte
.
Evaluating (27) at market equilibrium implies that due to the Þrst-order
conditions of the quality game, ∂ΠH
∂eH
= ∂ΠL
∂eL
= 0. The assumption that the
regulator redistributes the tax revenues to consumers as a lump sum at zero
costs implies that the decrease in producer surplus ∂PS/∂te < 0 is oﬀset
by an equal increase in consumer surplus due to the lump-sum transfer,
∂CS/∂te > 0. Moreover, it is easy to show that
∂ΠH
∂eL
+
∂CS
∂eL
=
3e2H
2 (4eH − eL)2
> 0 (28)
and
∂ΠL
∂eH
+
∂CS
∂eH
=
(2eH + eL) (4e
2
H − 5eHeL + eL)
(4eH − eL)3
> 0. (29)
From Result 1 we know that deH/dte > 0 and deL/dte > 0, while Result
4 tells us that aggregate emissions decrease in the emission tax, so that
γ dE
dte
< 0. In sum, we have
dW
dte
=(
∂ΠL
∂eH
+
∂CS
∂eH
)
+
deH
dte
+
+ (
∂ΠH
∂eL
+
∂CS
∂eL
)
+
deL
dte
+
− γ dE
dte
+
> 0. (31)
Consequently the impact of the emission tax on social welfare is given as
Proposition 1 An emission tax increase welfare unambiguously.
Proposition 1 suggests that there is scope for the use of emission taxation
to regulate oligopolies, which are vertically diﬀerentiated in environmental
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quality. As the emission tax may decreases the proÞts of the low-quality
Þrm, there is likely a limit on the emission tax rate that the regulator can
choose and still retain duopolistic competition. In Appendix 7 we establish
a suﬃcient condition for both Þrms proÞts to be positive and we show that
the high-quality Þrm retains proÞt leadership in the unregulated duopoly.
While the basic message of Proposition 1 is similar to that of oligopoly
models with homogeneous goods, comparative statics results suggest that
there are some diﬀerences in those channels via which an emission tax af-
fects vertically diﬀerentiated duopolies relative to them. Unlike the case of
homogenous goods oligopolies, an emission tax now induces an expansion
rather than a contraction in output. Aggregate emissions decrease regardless
of such an increase in output, which is caused by the competition enhancing
eﬀect of the emission tax. This eﬀect is peculiar to an emission tax used to
regulate oligopolies that are vertically diﬀerentiated in environmental quality
and it constitutes a new Þnding in the literature.
2.6 Concluding Remarks
During the last two decades, an increase in the number of consumers willing
to pay a price premium for products with reduced environmental impacts
has induced Þrms to vertically diﬀerentiate their products with respect to
environmental quality. So far, the impact of emission taxes under imperfect
competition has been widely analyzed in the literature by assuming that the
oligopoly produces an homogeneous product. This paper adds to the litera-
ture by looking at the impact of a tax on emissions per unit of production
on social welfare, aggregate emissions, and competition when the duopoly
produces a heterogeneous good, namely a commodity that is vertically dif-
ferentiated in environmental quality. The choice of this somewhat unusual
tax was dictated by the analytical intractability of a truly Pigouvian tax
in the partial coverage, Þxed-cost framework and by the desire to make our
results comparable with those of the literature on unit emission standards in
vertically diﬀerentiated markets.
Our analysis is based on a modiÞed version of Tiroles (1988) model of
vertical product diﬀerentiation where the market is partially covered and all
quality-related costs are Þxed costs.
Two sets of results are derived. First, by means of comparative statics
analysis, the model shows that when Þrms compete in environmental quality
so as to exploit consumers willingness to pay a price premium for products
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with reduced environmental impacts, an emission tax increases the environ-
mental quality of both variants of the diﬀerentiated commodity, enhances
competition, expands output, and decreases aggregate emissions. Second,
the paper demonstrates that social welfare unambiguously increases under
the emission tax.
There are many avenues for further study. Comparative statics results
suggest that there are some crucial diﬀerences in those channels via which
an emission tax aﬀects vertically diﬀerentiated duopolies relative to homo-
geneous goods oligopolies. However, comparability of our results to those
relating to homogeneous good oligopolies would require study of a tax on
total emissions rather than on emissions per unit of production.
As for further research topics, the assumption that all quality-dependent
costs are Þxed could be relaxed because it leads to the prediction that the Þrm
producing the high-quality variant leads both in market share and proÞts.
This contradicts anecdotal evidence, which suggests that Þrms producing the
high-quality variant are usually leaders in proÞt while those producing low-
quality variants are leaders in market shares (Kuhn 2000). Predictions in line
with such anecdotal evidence can be obtained by assuming that the duopolist
cost function is quadratic in quality and linear in quantity. Modifying the
model in this way may lead to more robust results.
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Appendix 1: Second-Order Conditions
The second-order conditions of the duopoly game with ad valorem and
emission taxes are
∂2πH
∂e2H
= −8e
2
L(5eH + eL)
(4eH − eL)4 − c < 0 (A.1.1)
and
∂2πL
∂e2L
= −2e
2
H(8eH + 7eL)
(4eH − eL)4 − c < 0, (A.1.2)
which are both negative for any eH > eL.
The suﬃcient condition for local stability is that the determinant of the
Jacobian be positive, that is, that DetJ > 0 with
J =
 ∂2πH∂e2H ∂2πH∂eH∂eL
∂2πL
∂eL∂eH
∂2πL
∂e2L
 , (A.1.3)
that is,
J =
 −8e2L(5eH+eL)(4eH−eL)4 − c 8eHeL(5eH+eL)(4eH−eL)4
2eHeL(8eH+7eL)
(4eH−eL)4 −
2e2H(8eH+7eL)
(4eH−eL)4 − c
 (A.1.4)
and
DetJ =
c[c(4eH − eL)2 + 2(8e3H + 7e2HeL + 20eHe2L + 4e3L)]
(4eH − eL)4 > 0. (A.1.5)
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Appendix 2: Solutions of the Quality Game
a = − j
16
+
1
2
vuut j2
64
+ k − 2(1 + 5te)
(1 + 16te)
+
z
g
+
1
2
vuuuut j
2
32
− k − 4(1 + 5te)
1 + 16te
− z
g
− j
3(1 + 16te)2 + 64[53 + te(399 + 1264te)]
256(1 + 16te)2
r
j2
64
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(A.2.1)
with
k = −(1 + 48te + 768t
2
e + 4096t
3
e)
1
3 (699te + 136)
2 ∗ 223 ∗ 3 13 (1 + 16te)2z
, (A.2.2)
z = (−3168− 10899te − 33048t2e
+
√
3
q
13407232 + 178163136te + 906790275t2e + 1606255164t
3
e + 364056768t
4
e)
1
3 ,
(A.2.3)
g = 4 ∗ 213 ∗ 3 23 (1 + 48te + 768t2e + 4096t3e)
1
3 , (A.2.4)
and
j = −23 + 112te
1 + 16te
. (A.2.5)
In Figure 1 we have plotted the degree of diﬀerentiation as a function of
the unit emission tax. As can be seen, the degree of diﬀerentiation, although
decreasing in the tax, remains greater than 1.
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Appendix 3: Proof of Result 1
Solve the system ∂2πH∂e2H ∂2πH∂eH∂eL
∂2πL
∂eL∂eH
∂2πL
∂e2L
Ã deH
deL
!
=
 − ∂2πH∂eH∂te 0
0 − ∂2πL
∂eL∂te
Ã dte
dte
!
. (A.3.1)
Substitute −8e2L(5eH+eL)(4eH−eL)4 − c 8eHeL(5eH+eL)(4eH−eL)4
2eHeL(8eH+7eL)
(4eH−eL)4 −
2e2H(8eH+7eL)
(4eH−eL)4 − c
Ã deH
deL
!
=
Ã −1 0
0 −1
!Ã
dte
dte
!
.
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Let
MH =
 −1 8e2HeL(5eH+eL)(4eH−eL)4
0 −2e2H(8eH+7eL)
(4eH−eL)4 − c
 (A.3.2)
and
ML =
 −8e2L(5eH+eL)(4eH−eL)4 − c 0
2eHeL(8eH+7eL)
(4eH−eL)4 −1
 . (A.3.3)
It is easy to show that DetMH > 0 and DetML > 0. Recall from Ap-
pendix 2 that DetJ > 0, from which it follows that deH
dte
= detMH
det J
> 0 and
deL
dte
= detML
detJ
> 0.
We substitute eH = a ∗ eL into the Þrst-order conditions of the qual-
ity game, equations (14) and (15), where a is the degree of diﬀerentiation,
expressed as the ratio of high to low quality. By assumption a > 1. This
gives
∂ΠH
∂eH
=
4a(4a2 − 3a+ 2)
(4a− 1)3 − (caeL − te) = 0 (A.3.4)
and
∂ΠL
∂eL
=
a2(4a− 7)
(4a− 1)3 − (ceL − te) = 0. (A.3.5)
We then solve for eL from equation (A.3.5), obtaining
eL =
1
c
[
a2(4a− 7)
(4a− 1)3 + te]. (A.3.6)
We substitute eL into (A.3.4) and simplify. This gives
∂ΠH
∂eH
=
a[8− a(4a2 − 23a+ 12)]
(4a− 1)3 + (1− a)te = 0. (A.3.7)
Finally, we calculate the total derivative of the degree of diﬀerentiation
as a function of the emission tax by applying the implicit function theorem
to equation (A.3.7). We obtain that the degree of diﬀerentiation decreases
in the emission tax as shown in equation (A.3.8)
da
dte
= − ∂
2ΠH
∂eH∂te
/
∂2ΠH
∂eH∂a
=
1− a
8+a[40+a(16a2−16a+21)]
(4a−1)4 + te
< 0. (A.3.8)
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Notice that this result holds even if we assume a quadratic emission tax,
in which case
da
dte
=
2(1− a)e¯
8+a[40+a(16a2−16a+21)]
(4a−1)4 + 2e¯te
< 0. (A.3.9)
Appendix 4: Proof of Result 2
We Þrst express the quality-deßated prices in terms of the degree of dif-
ferentiation, a, by substituting eH = a ∗ eL into the solutions of the price
game as in equation (11), and by dividing each price by the respective level
of quality. This gives
pH
eH
=
2(a− 1)
4a− 1 and
pL
eL
=
a− 1
4a− 1 . (A.4.1)
The impact of the emission tax on quality-deßated prices is given by
d(pi
ei
)
dte
=
∂(pi
ei
)
∂te
+
∂(pi
ei
)
∂a
da
dte
. (A.4.2)
We know from Result 2 that the degree of diﬀerentiation decreases in
tewith a, that is, that
da
dte
< 0. From equation (11) is easy to see that
∂(
pi
ei
)
∂te
= 0.
Respectively, from (A.4.1) and (A.4.2) we have
∂(pH
eH
)
∂a
=
6
(4a− 1)2 > 0 (A.4.3)
and
∂(pL
eL
)
∂a
=
3
(4a− 1)2 > 0, (A.4.4)
from which it is immediately apparent that both quality-deßated prices de-
crease in the emission tax, with the price of the high-quality variant decreas-
ing faster under the emission tax than that of the low-quality variant.
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Appendix 5: Proof of Result 3
The impact of emission taxes on market shares and market coverage can
be assessed by calculating
dxi
dte
=
∂xi
∂a
da
dte
, with i = H,L. (A.5.1)
We substitute the solutions of the price game and eH = a ∗ eL into the
demand equations (6) and (7). Simplifying, we obtain
xH =
2a
(4a− 1) and xL =
a
(4a− 1) . (A.5.2)
We diﬀerentiate with respect to the degree of diﬀerentiation a. This gives
∂xH
∂a
= − 2
(4a− 1)2 < 0 (A.5.3)
and
∂xL
∂a
= − 1
(4a− 1)2 < 0. (A.5.4)
Equations (A.5.3) and (A.5.4) together with Result 2 (da/dte < 0) imply
that equation (A.5.1) is positive for i = H,L, that is, that an increase in the
emission tax rate increases the demand for both variants of the diﬀerentiated
commodity. Note that
∂xH
∂a
= 2
∂xL
∂a
, (A.5.5)
from which it follows that the increase in the demand of the high-quality
variant is greater than the increase in the demand of the low-quality variant.
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Appendix 6: Proof of Result 4
Result 4 can be proved by substituting into equation (3), which represents
aggregate emissions, the equilibrium qualities expressed as functions of the
degree of diﬀerentiation, that is, eL =
1
c
[a
2(4a−7)
(4a−1)3 + te] (see A.3.6) and eH =
a∗ eL, as well as the equilibrium demands from equations (A5.2). Simplifying,
this gives
E =
a
(4a− 1){3e−
1
c
[
a2(4a− 7)
(4a− 1)3 + te](2a+ 1)}. (A.6.1)
The total eﬀect of the emission tax on total emissions is given by
dE
dte
=
∂E
∂te
+
∂E
∂a
da
dte
< 0, (A.6.2)
with
∂E
∂te
= −a(2a+ 1)
c(4a− 1) (A.6.3)
and
∂E
∂a
da
dte
=
1
c(4a− 1)5 [32a
5− 40a4 + 68a3 +21a2 +3ce(64a3− 48a2 +12a− 1)
+te(512a
5 − 640a4 + 224a3 − 8a2 − 8a+ 1)] da
dte
. (A.6.4)
Recall that c > 0. The sign of dE/dte is thus equal to sign(c ∗ dE/dte).
The inequality c ∗ dE/dte < 0 is always satisÞed for any ce > 0, te > 0 and
a > 1.
Appendix 7: Eﬀect of a Change in the Emission Tax of the Firms
ProÞts and ProÞt Leadership
The eﬀect of the unit emission tax on Þrms proÞts is ambiguous. This
can be seen by calculating the total diﬀerentiation of both Þrms proÞts w.r.t.
the unit emission tax. These are given by
dπL
dte
=
∂πL
∂te
+
∂πL
∂eL
deL
dte
+
∂πL
∂eH
deH
dte
. (A.7.1)
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and
dπH
dte
=
∂πH
∂te
+
∂πL
∂eL
deL
dte
+
∂πH
∂eH
deH
dte
, (A.7.2)
with
∂πL
∂te
= −e+ eL < 0 and ∂πH
∂te
= −e+ eH < 0, (A. 7.3)
and
∂πL
∂eH
=
e2L(2eH + eL)
(4eH − eL)3 > 0 and
∂πH
∂eL
=
e2H(2eH + eL)
(4eH − eL)3 > 0. (A 7.4)
Recalling from Result 1 that both deH
dte
and deL
dte
are positive and that, at
equilibrium, ∂πH
∂eH
= ∂πL
∂eL
= 0, we have that the sign of A.7.1 and A.7.2 is
ambiguous.
Finally, observe that the emission tax does not aﬀect proÞt leadership,
which remains in the hands of the Þrm producing the high-quality variant as
in the unregulated equilibrium, regardless of the emission tax level. We take
the indirect proÞt functions as in equations (14) and (15) and substitute
eH = aeL and eL =
1
c
[a
2(4a−7)
(4a−1)3 + te] as in equation (A.3.6) into them. At
equilibrium it must also be the case that
te =
a[8− a(4a2 − 23a+ 12)]
(4a− 1)3(a− 1) . (A.7.5)
It is easy to verify that such a tax is positive for those values of the degree
of diﬀerentiation which are smaller than that of the unregulated duopoly equi-
librium (recall that the emission tax reduces the degree of diﬀerentiation).
The emission tax as a function of the degree of diﬀerentiation is obtained by
solving in te equation (A.3.7), the reduced Þrst-order condition of the Þrm
producing the high-quality variant . Substituting the expression for te as
in (7.5) into the proÞt function and calculating the diﬀerence between the
proÞts of the two Þrms, we obtain
πH − πL = 3a
2(4a2 + a− 2)(12a2 − 5a+ 8)
2(4a− 1)6c > 0. (A.7.6)
Finally we deÞne the suﬃcient condition for both Þrms to earn positive
proÞts in the regulated equilibrium. Having established the proÞt leadership
of the Þrm producing the high-quality variant, it is suﬃcient to assess under
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what conditions the proÞts of the Þrms producing the low-quality variant are
positive. We do so by solving the low-quality Þrm reduced proÞt function in
e. This gives
e < − a(12a
2 − 5a+ 8)(16a2 − 7a+ 6)
2c(a− 1)(4a− 1)3(4a3 − 23a2 + 12a− 8) . (A.7.7)
Figure 2 below shows the plot of the critical value of e.
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List of Symbols
a Degree of product diﬀerentiation measured as the ratio of high
quality to low quality, that is, eH
eL
.
CS Consumer surplus
C(ei) =
c
2
e2i Cost of environmental quality
E Aggregate emissions
ea Average environmental quality
e¯ Unabated level of emissions per unit of production
ei Pollution abatement per unit of production, proxy of environ-
mental quality of variant i
(e¯− ei) Net emission for unit of production of variant i
L Emission tax revenues redistributed to consumers as a lump
sum at zero cost
pi Price of variant i
ρi =
pi
ei
Quality-deßated price of variant i
PS Producer surplus
θ Consumers taste for quality
πi ProÞts of Þrm i
Πi Indirect proÞts of Þrm i
te Emission tax rate
U Consumers indirect utility
W Social welfare
xi Demand for variant i of the diﬀerentiated commodity
γ Marginal damage from emission
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3 Essay 2. Optimal Taxation Policy in a Duopoly
that is Vertically Diﬀerentiated in Environ-
mental Quality
Chiara Lombardini-Riipinen
Abstract This paper studies the socially optimal emission and commod-
ity tax policy in a duopoly that is vertically diﬀerentiated in environmental
quality. We show that if the government has an ad valorem tax and an
emission tax available, the Þrst-best levels of quality can be obtained by a
combination of a uniform ad valorem tax and an emission tax (or a subsidy for
buying green products). If only one instrument is available, only the second-
best optimum can be achieved. An emission tax, when used alone, always
increases welfare and induces the second-best when set equal to the social
valuation of the positive externality associated with average environmental
quality. An appropriately set, uniform ad valorem tax increases welfare only
if the social valuation of the positive externality associated with average
environmental quality is low enough. Key Words: ad valorem taxes, emis-
sion taxes, environmental quality, subsidies, vertically diﬀerentiated duopoly.
JEL ClassiÞcation: D62, H21, L13, L15.
3.1 Introduction
Abundant empirical evidence shows that Þrms increasingly compete in en-
vironmental quality in response to consumers growing willingness to pay
a price premium for green, environmentally friendlier goods.32 The litera-
ture on vertical product diﬀerentiation suggests that Þrms diﬀerentiate their
products in quality as a way to mitigate competition and increase proÞts
(Gabszewicz and Thisse 1979, Shaked and Sutton 1982). In doing so they
choose suboptimal levels of quality, with high quality being too high and low
quality being too low (Motta 1993, Cremer and Thisse 1994). This leaves
scope for policy intervention in order to reduce the market power that derives
32Recall that a product is vertically diﬀerentiated when it can be ranked in terms of
some quality index so that, when all variants of the product are oﬀered on the market at
the same price, only the one with the highest quality is bought.
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from excessive quality diﬀerentiation. Existing analyses focus on minimum
quality standards and ad valorem taxes.33
Environmental quality competition diﬀers from conventional quality com-
petition in a crucial way: it always implies externalities from quality. Thus,
when Þrms diﬀerentiate in environmental quality, there are two countervailing
eﬀects on social welfare. The Þrst, which is peculiar of vertical diﬀerentia-
tion in environmental quality, is that by competing in environmental quality,
Þrms increase their abatement eﬀort and thus reduce the pollution external-
ity. The other eﬀect, common to all types of vertical diﬀerentiation, is that
diﬀerentiation mitigates competition and increases Þrms market power.
Diﬀerentiation in environmental quality raises the question of how market
power may interact with the pollution externality and of how to correct for
such an externality taking market power into account. To the best of our
knowledge, there are no studies of emission taxes in the framework of vertical
product diﬀerentiation, even though such taxes are examined extensively in
the models of oligopolistic competition with homogeneous goods.34
In this paper we analyze the use of emission taxes and ad valorem taxes
when Þrms compete in environmental quality. We assume that the duopolists
marginal production cost is independent of quantity, but is strictly increasing
and convex in quality and that the market is fully covered.35 While the
emission tax has not been studied in the literature,36 Cremer and Thisse
(1994) have studied the properties of an ad valorem tax, although in the
33An unanticipated minimum quality standard expands output and increases social wel-
fare (Crampes and Hollander 1995, Ecchia and Lambertini 1997, Ronnen 1991). However,
if the minimum quality standard is anticipated, social welfare decreases with the standard
(Lutz, Lyon, and Maxwell 2000).
34These models suggest that, under imperfect competition and with an exogenous num-
ber of Þrms, an emission tax should not be set equal to the marginal external damage
but below it, if no other policy instruments are available to be used jointly with the tax
(Barnett 1980, Ebert 1992; Katsoulacos, Y. and A. Xepapadeas 1995, Levin 1985, Re-
quate 1993a, 1993b, and 1997). This is because under imperfect competition Þrms not
only generate pollution, but also hold down output. A smaller output implies also lower
emissions as compared to the perfect competitive equilibrium, which in turn calls for an
emission tax that is lower than the full marginal external damage.
35Arora and Gangopadhyay (1995) and Moraga-Gonzales and Padron-Fumero (1998)
analyze the impact of a uniform ad valorem tax for the case in which the cost of quality
is sunk. They Þnd that such a tax decreases both the Þrms choice of quality and welfare.
36The closest instrument to an emission tax analyzed in the literature is the quality tax-
ation/subsidization scheme studied by Lambertini and Mosca (1999) under the assumption
of zero externalities from quality.
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absence of an externality from environmental quality.37 Thus their analysis
provides an interesting benchmark for this paper.
We identify two policies that can induce the socially optimal levels of
quality and the social optimal allocation of consumers across qualities. The
Þrst policy couples an emission tax to a uniform ad valorem tax, while the
second policy couples a uniform ad valorem tax to a subsidy to the consumers
choosing high quality. If the emission tax is the only instrument available,
then it increases welfare and induces the second-best when set equal to the
social valuation of the positive externality associated with average environ-
mental quality. When used alone, an appropriately set, uniform ad valorem
tax increases welfare only if the social valuation of the positive externality
associated with average environmental quality is low enough. We also discuss
the impact of administrative costs on the above results.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we introduce
the model. In section 3 we solve for equilibrium prices and qualities in the
regulated duopoly. Section 4 characterizes the social optimum. Section 5
and 6 present the analysis of the impact of the emission tax and the ad
valorem tax when used separately, while section 7 characterizes two policies
that achieve the social optimum. Section 8 concludes.
3.2 The Model
We consider a duopoly model of vertical product diﬀerentiation under full
information.38 Each Þrm produces one variant of a good that is vertically
diﬀerentiated in environmental quality. The production technology involves
variable costs which are convex in quality and linear in quantity and it is
represented by the expression C(ei) = ce2ixi with i = H,L, where xi indicates
37Cremer and Thisse (1994) show that a suﬃciently small uniform ad valorem tax rate
may increase welfare when the market is fully covered and the cost function is linear in
quantity and quadratic in quality. Note however, that when all quality-dependent costs
are Þxed and the market partially covered, a uniform ad valorem tax decreases both the
Þrms choice of quality (Arora and Gangopadhyay, 1995) and welfare (Moraga-Gonzales
and Padron-Fumero 1998).
38The assumption of full information is common to the models of vertical product dif-
ferentiation. Even though environmental quality is a credence characteristic (Darby and
Karni, 1973), the introduction of several third-party eco-labeling schemes greatly mitigates
the asymmetric information problem that results when the level of quality is known to
producers but not to consumers. Thus, assuming full information on the environmental
quality of the product is, as a Þrst step, an acceptable approximation of reality.
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the output level of Þrm i.39 Without loss of generality we assume that eH ≥
eL, where H indicates the green, high environmental quality variant, while L
indicates the brown, low environmental quality variant of the diﬀerentiated
commodity. The proÞt function of the duopolist is
πi = [(1− ta)pi − ce2i − te(e¯− ei)]xi with i = H,L, (1)
where pi is the price of variant i , te is the emission tax, and ta is the uniform
ad valorem tax rate, with 0 ≤ ta ≤ 1.40
There is a continuum of consumers whose willingness to pay for environ-
mental quality is measured by the parameter θ, which is uniformly distributed
over [θ, θ¯] with θ¯ − θ = 1.41
Each consumer buys one unit of the diﬀerentiated commodity, that is,
we assume that the market is fully covered. The total number of consumers
is normalized to 1. Adapting from Cremer and Thisse (1999), the indirect
utility of a consumer of type θ who buys the variant i of environmental quality
ei at price pi is given by
Ui = θei − pi + dB + γea, (2)
where θei measures the intrinsic utility a consumer of type θ derives from
consuming one unit of variant i; B = b(eH − eL) is a subsidy paid to the
39Cremer and Thisse (1999, footnote 7, p. 579) write: In several instances, the quality
unit is deÞned up to a monotonic transformation so that convexity or concavity of the cost
function is diﬃcult to interpret. By contrast, the environmental quality is based more on
objective grounds so that the convexity of the cost function can be given a standard
interpretation.
40Equation (1) can be rewritten as
πi = (1− ta)te[pi
te
− ce
2
i
(1− ta)te −
e− ei
(1− ta) ]xi.
This shows that the ad valorem tax is analytically equivalent to a combination of a
tax on quality improvement and a tax on emissions, while the emission tax is analytically
equivalent to a subsidy to quality improvement, an ad valorem tax and a tax on emissions
Þxed to unity.
41Theta may diﬀer among consumers for several reasons. It may reßect diﬀerent a diﬀer-
ent degree of environmental consciousness (Moraga Gonzales and Padron-Fumero 1998),
diﬀerent individual personal norms about how much to contribute to environmental qual-
ity, or diﬀerent beliefs about the eﬀectiveness of this mode of contributing to environmental
quality.
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consumer who purchases variant H ; and d is a dummy variable with d = 1
if i = H and d = 0 if i = L.
γea indicates the positive externality from average environmental quality,
where γ ≥ 0 measures the social valuation of the positive externality associ-
ated with average environmental quality and ea is the average environmental
quality, with
ea =
Z θ¯
θH
eH(θ)f(θ)dθ+
Z θH
θ¯−1
eL(θ)f (θ)dθ = eH(θ¯− θH)+ eL(θH − θ¯+1). (3)
We assume that the individual consumer cannot aﬀect average quality
signiÞcantly. It follows that the externality term does not aﬀect the duopoly
equilibrium since it is constant in any individuals maximization problem.
The externality term, however, aﬀects social welfare and is therefore of in-
terest to the regulator.
We also assume that even though consumers have diﬀerent thetas, that
is, diﬀerent degrees of environmental consciousness, they are aﬀected by the
quality externality in the same way. As an example, consider the case of air
pollution. Our assumption implies that if air quality improves, the decrease
in the expected cost of pollution-induced respiratory diseases will be the same
for all consumers regardless of their personal attitudes toward green buying.
The consumer is indiﬀerent between purchasing the high- and the low-
quality variant when UH = UL, that is, when he has a taste parameter
θH =
pH − pL − b(eH − eL)
eH − eL . (4)
Equation (4) thus identiÞes the marginal willingness to pay for quality
at which the low- and the high-quality variant yield the same utility to the
consumer. All consumers with marginal willingness to pay higher than θH
demand the high-quality variant. The demand for the high-quality variant
is therefore xH = (θ¯ − θH). All consumers with marginal willingness to pay
lower than θH demand the low-quality variant. Thus, the demand for the
low-quality variant is xL = (θH − θ¯ + 1).
The model consists of two games: a Stackelberg game in which the regu-
lator moving Þrst sets the tax policy so as to maximize social welfare given
the reaction functions of the Þrms, and a game among the duopolists. The
duopolists game takes place in two stages. In the Þrst stage, given the policy
chosen by the regulator in the Stackelberg game, the duopolists simultane-
ously choose the level of pollution abatement, ei, with ei > 0. In the second
stage, they compete in prices.
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3.3 The Price and Quality Games
We start with the analysis of the duopoly game with all three instruments:
the emission tax, the ad valorem tax and the subsidy to green consumption.
As usual, we solve the game backwards starting from stage two, the price
game. The duopolists, having chosen the levels of quality, maximize their
proÞts in prices by solving the maximization problem
max
pH
πH = [(1− ta)pH − ce2H − te(e¯− eH)]xH (5)
and
max
pL
πL = [(1− ta)pL − ce2L − te(e¯− eL)]xL, (6)
where xL and xH are deÞned above. The Þrst-order conditions of the
price game are
∂πH
∂pH
=
1
eH − eL{(1−ta)[(θ¯+b)(eH−eL)−2pH+pL]+te(e¯−eH)+ce
2
H} = 0 (7)
and
∂πL
∂pL
=
1
eH − eL{(1−ta)[−(θ¯+b−1)(eH−eL)+pH−2pL]+te(e¯−eL)+ce
2
L} = 0.
(8)
These can be solved for the equilibrium prices under Bertrand competi-
tion. The equilibrium prices are
pH =
1
3(1− ta)[(1−ta)(θ¯+b+1)(eH−eL)+c(2e
2
H+e
2
L)+te(3e¯−2eH−eL)] (9)
and
pL =
1
3(1− ta) [(1− ta)(θ¯+ b−2)(eH − eL)+ c(e
2
H +2e
2
L)+ te(3e¯− eH −2eL)],
(10)
with pH − pL = (eH−eL)[(1−ta)(2θ¯−2b−1)+c(eH+eL)−te]3(1−ta) . Note that the price diﬀer-
ence increases in the quality gap. In other words, as environmental compe-
tition intensiÞes and the diﬀerence between high and low quality increases,
price competition is mitigated, which, of course, increases Þrms proÞts.
In stage two, duopolists maximize their proÞts with respect to quality.
Substituting the optimal prices into the proÞt functions (5) and (6), one can
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express the indirect proÞt functions as a function of environmental qualities
as
max
eH
ΠH =
(eH − eL)[(1− ta)(θ¯ + b+ 1) + te − c(eH + eL)]2
9(1− ta) (11)
and
max
eL
ΠL =
(eH − eL)[(1− ta)(θ¯ + b− 2) + te − c(eH + eL)]2
9(1− ta) . (12)
Choosing eH and eL so as to maximize proÞts yields the following Þrst-
order conditions for the quality game
∂ΠH
∂eH
=
1
9(1− ta){[c(3eH − eL)− (θ¯ + b+ 1)(1− ta)− te]
[c(eH + eL)− (θ¯ + b+ 1)(1− ta)− te]} = 0 (13)
and
∂ΠL
∂eL
= − 1
9(1− ta){[c(eH − 3eL) + (θ¯ + b− 2)(1− ta) + te]
[c(eH + eL)− (θ¯ + b− 2)(1− ta)− te]} = 0. (14)
Solving the system of the Þrst-order conditions gives several sets of solu-
tions. The optimal solution has to satisfy the second-order conditions. Only
one set of quality levels satisÞes them.42 This unique combination is given
by
eNH =
(1− ta)(4θ¯ + 4b+ 1) + 4te
8c
; eNL =
(1− ta)(4θ¯ + 4b− 5) + 4te
8c
, (15)
with an equilibrium quality dispersion eNH − eNL = 3(1−ta)4c , where the super-
script N stands for Nash equilibrium. One can see immediately that both
levels of quality increase in the emission tax rate and the subsidy rate, while
they decrease in the ad valorem tax rate.
To get some more insight into equations (13) and (14), we apply the
envelope theorem to analyze the components of the Þrst-order conditions
42The second-order conditions are reported in Appendix 4.
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evaluated at equilibrium. The indirect proÞt function can be written as
πi = π[θH(eH , eL), eH , eL]. It follows that
∂πH
∂eH
=
∂π
∂eH
+
+
∂π
∂θH
+
∂θH
∂eH−
=
1− ta
8
− 3(1− ta)
2
8c
c
3(1− ta) = 0 (16)
and
∂πL
∂eL
=
∂π
∂eL−
+
∂π
∂θH
+
∂θH
∂eL
+
= −1− ta
8
+
3(1− ta)2
8c
c
3(1− ta) = 0. (17)
The above equations show that when choosing the proÞt-maximizing level
of quality, the Þrm producing the high-quality variant takes into account the
fact that higher quality has a positive direct eﬀect and a negative strategic
eﬀect on proÞts. Analogously, the Þrm producing the low-quality variant
takes into account the fact that a higher choice of low quality has a negative
direct eﬀect and a positive strategic eﬀect on proÞts.
The equilibrium prices are
pH =
[8θ¯(2θ¯ + 4b+ 1) + 8b(1 + 2b) + 25](1− ta)2 + 64ce¯te − 16t2e
64c(1− ta) (18)
and
pL =
[8θ¯(2θ¯ + 4b− 5)− 8b(5− 2b) + 49](1− ta)2 + 64ce¯te − 16t2e
64c(1− ta) , (19)
with a price diﬀerence
pH − pL = 3(1− ta)(2θ¯ − 2b+ 1)
8c
. (20)
Both the quality gap and the price gap decrease in the ad valorem tax,
while they are independent of the emission tax. The ad valorem tax thus
reduces the quality gap and intensiÞes price competition. Both Þrms proÞts
decrease in the ad valorem tax as shown by equation (21), which represents
the equilibrium proÞts,43
πNi =
3(1− ta)2
16c
. (21)
43The equality of duopolists proÞts is typical of the models of vertical product diﬀeren-
tiation that assume full coverage and marginal production costs independent of quantity,
but is strictly increasing and convex in quality.
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Interestingly, the emission tax does not aﬀect the duopolists proÞts since
the increase in costs due to the emission tax is exactly compensated by
an equal increase in prices, while demand is unaﬀected by the emission tax.
The equilibrium taste parameter at which the consumer is indiﬀerent between
buying high and low quality, is found by substituting into (4) the equilibrium
price gap as in (18) and the quality dispersion eNH − eNL = 3(1−ta)4c . This gives
θNH = θ¯ −
1
2
, (22)
which is unaﬀected by either taxes or by the subsidy rate.
3.4 The First-Best Allocation
Determination of the socially optimal policy requires that the social optimum
be Þrst characterized. This is then used as a benchmark against which to
compare the regulated duopoly equilibrium. Following Cremer and Thisse
(1994), given the number of variants that are supplied, the optimal allocation
of consumers requires that the taste parameter at which the consumer is
indiﬀerent between the high- and low-quality variants is the index of the
marginal consumer when both variants are sold at marginal cost. As quality
externalities are added to the model, these drive a wedge between Þrms
private marginal cost and societys marginal cost, where the marginal social
cost of quality is given by the marginal private cost ce2i of Þrm i net of the
marginal social beneÞt from pollution abatement γ ∗ ei, that is,
θ∗H =
(ce2H − γeH)− (ce2L − γeL)
eH − eL = c(eH + eL)− γ. (23)
The optimal qualities, e∗H and e
∗
L can then be obtained by solving the problem
max
eH ,eL
Z θ∗H
θ¯−1
(θeL − ce2L + γeL)dθ +
Z θ¯
θ∗H
(θeH − ce2H + γeH)dθ. (24)
The Þrst-order conditions are
∂W
∂eH
=
1
2
[θ¯ + γ − c(3eH − eL)][θ¯ + γ − c(eH + eL)] = 0 (25)
and
∂W
∂eL
= −1
2
[θ¯ − 1 + γ − c(3eL − eH)][θ¯ − 1 + γ − c(eH + eL)] = 0. (26)
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The optimal level of quality (solved from (23)-(24), together with the
optimal allocation of consumers between the two variants, allows us to char-
acterize the social optimum in a similar way as Cremer and Thisse (1994)
by
e∗H =
4θ¯ + 4γ − 1
8c
; e∗L =
4θ¯ + 4γ − 3
8c
(27)
and
θ∗H = θ¯ −
1
2
, (28)
with e∗L > 0 and e
∗
H > e
∗
L for all γ.
44 Both optimal qualities are increasing
in the intensity of the quality externality. Let us now compare the socially
optimal levels of quality with the unregulated duopoly equilibrium levels
of quality. These can be calculated by setting ta = te = b = 0 in (17),
which gives. eNUH =
4θ¯+1
8c
and eNUL =
4θ¯−5
8c
. It is immediately clear that
[eNUH −e∗H ] = 1−2γ4c > 0 and [eNUL −e∗L] = −1+2γ4c < 0. The duopoly equilibrium
level of high quality, although too high, is less so than in the case with no
quality externality. On the other hand, the duopoly equilibrium level of low
quality is too low, and even more so when the quality externality is taken
into account.
Interestingly, the taste parameter θ∗H , which identiÞes the optimal alloca-
tion of consumers across qualities, is identical to the taste parameter at which
the consumers are indiﬀerent between purchasing the high- and low-quality
variant in the duopoly equilibrium, that is, it is identical to θNH as given in
equation (22). This implies that the unregulated duopoly equilibrium yields
the optimal allocation of consumers between Þrms, even though it does not
yield the optimal levels of quality. In other words, the quantities produced
of the high- and low-quality variant are optimal in the unregulated duopoly
equilibrium even though the levels of quality themselves are not.
In a similar model, lacking the quality externality, Cremer and Thisse
(1994) also found that the duopoly equilibrium produces the optimal alloca-
tion of consumers across variants.
The socially optimal level of welfare is obtained by integrating expression
(24) and then substituting into it the optimal levels of quality as reported in
(27). This gives
W ∗ =
16[θ¯(θ¯ − 1) + γ(2θ¯ + γ − 1)] + 5
64c
. (29)
44The second-order conditions of the Þrst-best allocation problem are presented in Ap-
pendix 5.
61
Let us now compare the level of welfare at the social optimum with
the social welfare under the unregulated duopoly equilibrium. Comparing
this with social welfare under the unregulated duopoly equilibrium WUN =
16θ¯
2−16θ¯+1+32θ¯γ−16γ
64c
shows that
WUN −W ∗ = −1 + 4γ
2
16c
< 0. (30)
As expected, the duopoly yields suboptimal welfare. There is thus scope
for policy intervention.
3.5 The Optimal Policy
Having characterized the social optimum, we now ask whether an ad valorem
and emission tax policy can induce such a social optimum. The duopoly al-
ready induces the optimal allocation of consumers across qualities. However,
it induces suboptimal levels of quality due to two sources of market failure:
market power and the quality externality. We thus need a policy combining
two instruments. We consider two policies: a uniform ad valorem tax coupled
either to an emission tax or to a subsidy paid to consumers who purchase
the green variant.45
The optimal policy is identiÞed by solving the system of equations given
by e∗i − eNi with i = L,H, e∗i as in (27), and eNi as in (15). We thus solve
e∗H − eNH =
4θ¯ + 4γ − 1
8c
− (1− ta)(4θ¯ + 4b+ 1) + 4te
8c
= 0, (31)
and
e∗L − eNL =
4θ¯ + 4γ − 3
8c
− (1− ta)(4θ¯ + 4b− 5) + 4te
8c
= 0. (32)
When we set b = 0 and solve (31) and (32), we obtain the optimal ad
valorem and emission tax policy
(t∗a, t
∗
e) = [
2
3
,γ +
2
3
(θ¯ − 1
2
)],
with a lump sum equal to S∗ = 48θ¯+72γ−1+48[2ce¯(2θ¯+3γ−1)−(θ¯+2γ)(θ¯+γ)]
96c
redis-
tributed to consumers. The lump sum is equal to the sum of the ad valorem
and emission tax revenues.
45The use of a non-uniform ad valorem tax is discussed in Appendix 2.
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Note that the optimal emission tax is higher than the marginal beneÞt
from environmental quality. This is because, in addition to having to correct
for the quality externality, the emission tax must counterbalance the negative
impact on quality of the ad valorem tax, which reduces Þrms equilibrium
levels of quality.46
The optimal ad valorem tax/green subsidy policy is analogously calcu-
lated. We set te = 0 and solve (31) and (32) in ta and b. This gives
(t∗a, b
∗) = [
2
3
, 3γ + 2(θ¯ − 1
2
)],
with a lump sum redistributed to consumers S∗ = 48θ¯
2−72θ¯+48γ(2θ¯+γ)−84γ+35
96c
,
which is given by the ad valorem tax revenues net of the subsidy to consumers
buying the green variant. We can now state Result 1.
Result 1. When there are zero administrative costs, the social optimum
can be reached either by a uniform ad valorem tax/emission tax policy
[t∗a, t
∗
e] = [
2
3
, γ +
2
3
(θ¯ − 1
2
)],
or by a uniform ad valorem tax/green subsidy policy
[t∗a, b
∗] = [
2
3
, 3γ + 2(θ¯ − 1
2
)].
The channels through which the policy instruments aﬀect social welfare
at equilibrium can be assessed by analyzing the Þrst-order conditions of the
regulators game. Let the utilitarian social welfare function be
W [eH(te, ta, b), eL(te, ta, b), te, ta, b] = πH + πL + CS + S + γea, (33)
where CS indicates consumer surplus without the quality externality, and S
the tax revenues redistributed as a lump sum.47 In the case of the uniform ad
valorem tax/emission tax policy, at the duopoly equilibrium the Þrst-order
conditions are
∂W
∂te
=(
∂πH
∂te
+
∂πL
∂te
)
=0
+ (
∂CS
∂te
+
∂S
∂te
)
−
+
∂γea
∂te
+
= 0 (34)
46Recalling that θNH = θ
∗
H , the emission tax can be expressed as te = γ +
2
3
θ∗H .
47See Appendix 3 for the complete equations.
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and
∂W
∂ta
=(
∂πH
∂ta
+
∂πL
∂ta
)
−
+ (
∂CS
∂ta
+
∂S
∂ta
)
+
+
∂γea
∂ta−
= 0. (35)
Equations (34) and (35) show that the two taxes have opposite eﬀects on
the externality from quality: as known from the literature, an ad valorem tax
decreases both levels of quality and decreases the products average quality,
which implies, given the assumption of full market coverage, that aggregate
emissions decrease. Consumer surplus increases in the ad valorem tax and
producer surplus decreases thanks to the competition-enhancing eﬀect of the
tax Consumer surplus decreases in the emission tax, as the products quality
now exceeds consumers desired qualities.
The impact of the taxes on proÞts can be further decomposed into direct
and indirect eﬀects as follows
∂πH
∂te
=
∂π
∂te
+
+
∂π
∂eL
∂eL
∂te−
= 0 and
∂πL
∂te
=
∂π
∂te−
+
∂π
∂eH
∂eH
∂te
+
= 0 (36)
∂πH
∂ta
=
∂π
∂ta−
+
∂π
∂eL
∂eL
∂ta
+
< 0 and
∂πL
∂ta
=
∂π
∂ta
+
+
∂π
∂eH
∂eH
∂ta−
< 0 (37)
It can be observed that the direct eﬀect of the emission tax is positive
for the Þrm producing the high-quality variant and negative for the Þrm
producing the low-quality variant, while the indirect eﬀect is negative for
former and positive for the latter. The opposite is true for the ad valorem
tax: the direct eﬀect is negative for the Þrm producing the high-quality
variant and positive for the Þrm producing the low-quality variant, while the
indirect eﬀect is positive for the former and negative for the latter.
The same analysis can be made for the case of the uniform ad valorem
tax/green subsidy policy. The analysis shows that the emission tax and
the subsidy to green consumers have qualitatively the same eﬀect, while the
impact of the ad valorem tax is the same in the two policies. We can thus
say that a subsidy to consumers choosing the green variant and an emission
tax are perfect policy substitutes.48
The regulators Þst-order conditions evaluated at duopoly equilibrium are
∂W
∂b
=(
∂πH
∂b
+
∂πL
∂b
)
=0
+ (
∂CS
∂b
+
∂S
∂b
)
−
+
∂γea
∂b
+
= 0 (38)
48However, these two instruments have diﬀerent distributional impacts.
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and
∂W
∂ta
=(
∂πH
∂ta
+
∂πL
∂ta
)
−
+ (
∂CS
∂ta
+
∂S
∂ta
)
+
+
∂γea
∂ta−
= 0. (39)
The impact on proÞts can be further decomposed into
∂πH
∂b
=
∂π
∂b
+
+
∂π
∂eL
∂eL
∂b
−
= 0 and
∂πL
∂b
=
∂π
∂b−
+
∂π
∂eH
∂eH
∂b
+
= 0 (40)
∂πH
∂ta
=
∂π
∂ta−
+
∂π
∂eL
∂eL
∂ta
+
< 0 and
∂πL
∂ta
=
∂π
∂ta
+
+
∂π
∂eH
∂eH
∂ta
< 0.
−
(41)
Now we ask how Result 1 changes in the presence of administrative costs.
In such a case, part of the tax revenues is dissipated and is not returned
to consumers as a lump sum. This implies that social welfare under the
regulated equilibrium falls short of the social optimum for the amount of the
administrative costs. Thus
Corollary 1 If there are positive administrative costs, the social optimum
can never be obtained.
ProÞts under both policies are given by substituting t∗a into (21). These
are πH = πL =
1
48c
. ProÞts decrease as compared to the unregulated equilib-
rium, as both optimal policies decrease the quality gap and enhance compe-
tition.
3.6 The Second-Best Policy
Our model suggests that when the regulator has the possibility of coupling
ad valorem and emission taxes or ad valorem and quality subsidies, then
it is possible to induce Þrst-best levels of quality. What if the regulator is
restricted to the use of only one policy instrument? Can the social optimum
be attained? Following Cremer and Thisse (1994), it is immediately apparent
that the Þrst-best cannot be reached by the use of an emission tax alone, as
no emission tax rate solves the system of equations
e∗H − eNH =
4θ¯ + 4γ − 1
8c
− 4θ¯ + 1 + 4te
8c
= 0 (42)
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and
e∗L − eNL =
4θ¯ + 4γ − 3
8c
− 4θ¯ − 5 + 4te
8c
= 0. (43)
Equation (42) is satisÞed for te = γ− 12 , while equation (43) requires that
te = γ +
1
2
.
It can be shown however that the emission tax is nevertheless welfare-
increasing. Let the regulator maximize social welfare in the emission tax,
given price and quality competition, and assume that the emission tax rev-
enues are redistributed to consumers as a lump sum at a cost of redistribution
equal to fraction κ of all tax revenues. Then social welfare is given by49
WN =
16[θ¯(θ¯ − 1 + 2γ) − γ + te(2θ¯ + 2γ − 4ce− 1 + te)]− 11
64c
+(1− κ) [2ce− (θ¯ +
1
2
)− te]
2c
te. (44)
The Þrst term of equation (44) is the sum of producer and consumer surplus
inclusive of the externality from environmental quality. The second term is
the lump-sum redistributed to consumers net of administrative costs.
Diﬀerentiating the social welfare function w.r.t.. te gives us the Þrst-order
condition of the regulators game, that is,
∂WN
∂te
=
γ − te + κ(θ¯ − 12 − 2ce+ 2te)
2c
. (45)
The Þrst-order condition has a solution for
te =
γ + κ(θ¯ − 1
2
− 2ce)
(1− 2κ) . (46)
The second-order condition is
∂2WN
∂t2e
=
−1 + 2κ
2c
< 0 for κ <
1
2
. (47)
49When κ = 0 then
WN =
16(θ¯(θ¯ − 1+ 2γ) + (2γ − te)te − γ) + 1
64c
.
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This implies that the emission tax is welfare-increasing provided that the
share of tax revenues lost through administrative costs is not too high, that
is, that κ < 1
2
.
When there are no administrative costs, that is, when κ = 0, the emission
tax is equal to the social valuation of the positive externality associated
with average environmental quality: te = γ. This result does not contradict
the main result in the environmental economics literature that under full
information, homogeneous goods and oligopolies with symmetric Þrms, the
optimal Pigouvian tax should be smaller than the marginal external damage
so as to balance the output contraction eﬀect of the emission tax (Ebert
1992, Levin 1985, Requate 1993a, 1993b). Our model, in fact, assumes full
market coverage so that Þrms cannot hold down output. In such a case,
the second-best emission tax policy induces the equilibrium levels of quality
eNH =
4θ¯ + 4γ + 1
8c
and eNL =
4θ¯ + 4γ − 5
8c
, (48)
and the second-best level of social welfare is
WN =
16[θ¯(θ¯ − 1 + 2γ) + γ2 − γ] + 1
64c
. (49)
Welfare increases with the policy as compared to the unregulated equilib-
rium by γ
2
4c
. The increase is the result of an increase in the positive externality
from environmental quality by γ
2
2c
, which more than compensates for the de-
crease by −γ2
4c
in consumer surplus net of the externality. Producer surplus is
not aﬀected by the policy. We can thus state Result 2.
Result 2. When there are zero administrative costs, the second-best emis-
sion tax te is always welfare-increasing and it is equal to the social valuation
of the positive externality, γ, associated with average environmental quality .
As for the case with administrative costs, we have that
Corollary 2 When some share κ of the tax revenues is dissipated in
administrative costs, the second-best emission tax is welfare-increasing only
if κ < 1
2
.
Next we study the second-best tax policy when the only instrument avail-
able to the regulator is an ad valorem tax. First, when we check whether
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the system of equations e∗H − eNH = 4θ¯+4γ−18c − (1−ta)(4θ¯+1)8c = 0 and e∗L − eNL =
4θ¯+4γ−3
8c
− (1−ta)(4θ¯−5)
8c
= 0 has a solution in the ad valorem tax rate, we Þnd
that it does not. We then study the second-best ad valorem tax policy. The
regulator maximizes social welfare in the emission tax, given price and qual-
ity competition. Social welfare under the regulated equilibrium when only
the uniform ad valorem tax is used is
WN =
(1− ta)
64c
{[16θ¯((1+ta)(θ¯−1)+2γ)−16γ+13ta+1]−κta[16θ¯(θ¯−1)+37]}.
(50)
Diﬀerentiating the social welfare function w.r.t.. ta gives us the Þrst-order
condition of the regulators game, that is,
∂WN
∂ta
= −16θ¯[ta(θ¯ − 1) + γ]− 8γ + 12ta − 6
32c
+
κ(1− 2ta)[16θ¯(θ¯ − 1) + 37]
64c
= 0.
(51)
This has a solution for
ta=
16θ¯[κ(θ − 1) + 2γ]− 4(3 + 4γ) + 37κ
2[16θ¯(θ¯ − 1)(κ− 1) + 37κ− 13] . (52)
The second-order condition is
∂2WN
∂t2a
= −32θ¯(θ¯ − 1)(1− k)− 74κ+ 26
64c
< 0 for κ < 1− 24
16θ¯(θ¯ − 1) + 37 .
(53)
Inequality (53) implies that the ad valorem tax is welfare-increasing pro-
vided that administrative costs are not excessive. When there are no admin-
istrative costs, so that κ = 0, then the second-best ad valorem tax is
ta =
6− 8γ(2θ¯ − 1)
16θ¯(θ¯ − 1) + 13 , (54)
which is positive for
γ <
3
4(2θ¯ − 1) . (55)
Recall that Cremer and Thisse (1994) demonstrate that in the absence
of quality externalities a suﬃciently small ad valorem tax increases welfare.
Inequality (55) suggests that once we introduce quality externalities, this may
not be the case any more if the intensity of the quality externality is high
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enough. The intuition behind this result is the following. The ad valorem
tax has two opposing eﬀects on social welfare. On the one hand it reduces
the quality gap and enhances competition, on the other hand, it reduces the
equilibrium levels of quality thus decreasing the positive externality from
quality. Only if the social valuation of the positive externality from quality
is low enough can the ad valorem tax increase welfare.50
Note that the greater the willingness to pay for environmental quality in
the population, as measured by θ, and the greater the social valuation of the
positive externality from quality, γ, the lower the optimal ad valorem tax.
The second-best emission tax policy with zero administrative costs in-
duces the equilibrium levels of quality and
eNH =
(4θ¯ + 1)[16θ¯(θ¯ − 1 + γ)− 8γ + 7]
8c[16θ¯(θ¯ − 1) + 13] , e
N
L =
(4θ¯ − 5)[16θ¯(θ¯ − 1 + γ)− 8γ + 7]
8c[16θ¯(θ¯ − 1) + 13] ,
(56)
and the level of social welfare
WN =
[16θ¯(θ¯ − 1 + γ)− 8γ + 7]2
64c[16θ¯(θ¯ − 1) + 13] (57)
with a welfare increase as compared to the unregulated equilibrium of
16γ2[4θ(θ−1)+1]−24γ(2θ+1)+9
16c[16θ(θ−1)+13] . We can now state Result 3
Result 3. When there are zero administrative costs, a uniform ad val-
orem tax increases welfare provided that the social valuation of the positive
externality associated with average environmental quality is not too high, that
is, provided that γ < 3
4(2θ¯−1) .
In the case of the ad valorem tax policy as well, the presence of positive
administrative costs alters our result so that
Corollary 3 When some share κ of the tax revenues is dissipated in
administrative costs, the second-best ad valorem tax increases welfare only if
κ < 1− 24
16θ¯(θ¯−1)+37 .
50Inequality (55) can be rewritten as
θH <
3
8γ
.
This implies that the ad valorem tax is welfare-increasing only if there are enough people
purchasing the high-quality variant, that is, only if θH is low enough.
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Finally, one could also consider the use of the quality subsidy b Þnanced by
a lump-sum tax levied on consumers. It can be shown that in such a case the
subsidy would be welfare increasing and equal to b = γ.51 This implies that
in the absence of administrative costs also the second-best quality subsidy
should be set equal to the intensity of the quality externality.52
3.7 Concluding Remarks
In the last two decades, an increase in the number of consumers willing
to pay a price premium for products with reduced environmental impacts
has induced Þrms to vertically diﬀerentiate their products in environmental
quality. Environmental quality competition diﬀers from conventional quality
competition in that it implies externalities from quality. This calls for the
adoption, along with ad valorem taxes, of emission taxes, which are yet to be
examined in the literature on vertical product diﬀerentiation. To study the
optimal emission tax (quality subsidy) and uniform ad valorem tax policy,
we formulated a model of vertical product diﬀerentiation with full market
coverage and a cost function which is quadratic in the level of environmental
quality and linear in quantities.
The model showed that when Þrms compete in environmental quality so
as to exploit consumers willingness to pay a price premium for products
with reduced environmental impacts, a combination of a uniform ad valorem
tax and an emission tax can induce the social optimum. The same results
was also obtained by coupling a uniform ad valorem tax with a subsidy to
consumers choosing the green variant.
When only one policy instrument is available and there are no adminis-
trative costs, the emission tax increases welfare and induces the second-best
when set equal to the intensity of the positive externality associated with
average environmental quality. An appropriately set, uniform ad valorem
tax increases welfare only if the social valuation of the positive externality
associated with average environmental quality is low enough.
There are many avenues for further study and reÞnements. Most im-
portantly, the assumption of full market coverage could be relaxed for two
reasons. First, as Kuhn (2000) points out, the model with full market cov-
erage implies that no Þrm is the leader in either proÞts or market shares.
51b = γ + 34κ when there are positive administrative costs.
52Proof is available from the author upon request.
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Anecdotal evidence suggests, however, that Þrms producing the high-quality
variant are usually leaders in proÞt while Þrms producing the low-quality
variant are leaders in market shares. Assuming partial instead of full mar-
ket coverage produces an unregulated duopoly equilibrium in line with such
anecdotal evidence. Second, in a model with full market coverage the out-
put level is Þxed. This leaves no scope for checking the robustness of the
important result presented in the environmental economics literature that,
under perfect information, imperfect competition, and an exogenous number
of symmetric Þrms, the optimal Pigouvian tax should be smaller than the
marginal external damage.
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Appendix 1: Social Welfare under Regulated Equilibrium
Equilibrium consumers surplus net of the quality externality and of the
lump-sum transfer is, for the low-quality and high-quality segment,
CSNL =
(1− ta)2[8θ¯(2θ¯ − 3) + 16b(1− b)− 19] + 8[4(1− ta)θ¯ + 8ce+ 3(1− ta)]te − 16t2e
128c(1− ta)
(A.1.1)
and
CSNH =
(1− ta)2[8θ¯(2θ¯ − 1) + 16b(2− b)− 27] + 8[(1− ta)(4θ¯ − 1)− 8ce]te + 16t2e
128c(1− ta) .
(A.1.2)
The quality externality is
γea = γ
(1− ta)(2θ¯ + 2b− 1) + 2te
4c
. (A.1.3)
Total tax revenues to be redistributed to consumers as a lump sum are
S =
1
64c(1− ta){(1− ta)
2[(37− 16(1− b)b]ta + 16taθ¯(θ¯ + 2b− 1)− 24b)
−16te[(1− ta)2(2θ¯ + 2b− 1) + (2− ta)te − 4ce]}. (A.1.4)
Equilibrium total consumers surplus is given by CSN = CSNH + CS
N
L +
γea + S, and social welfare by WN = CS + PS. The unregulated duopoly
equilibrium of social welfare is
WUN =
16θ¯
2 − 16θ¯ + 1 + 32θ¯γ − 16γ
64c
. (A.1.5)
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Appendix 2: The Nonuniform Ad Valorem Tax
In this appendix we investigate whether the Þrst-best can be achieved by
using a nonuniform ad valorem tax and, if yes, what the optimal nonuniform
tax rates would be. We modify the model as follows. We set the emission
and subsidy rates equal to zero, that is te = b = 0, and we let the duopolists
proÞt function be
πi = [(1− ti)pi − ce2i ]xi with i = H,L, (A.2.1)
where ti is the nonuniform tax rate of Þrm i, with 0 ≤ ti ≤ 1.
Cremer and Thisse (1994) show that under such a model the equilibrium
levels of quality are, for tH 6= tL,
eNUH =
θ − 1
6cτH
+
7τH − 4τL −
√
D
12cτH(τH − τL) ; e
NU
L =
θ − 1
6cτL
+
5τL − 2τH −
√
D
12cτL(τH − τL)
(A.2.2)
with
D = 4(θ−1)2(τ2L−2τHτL+τ2H)+8(θ−1)(2τ 2L−2τHτL−τ2H)+16τ2L−11τHτL+4τ2H
(A.2.3)
and τ i =
1
1−ti with i = H,L. We verify whether nonuniform ad valorem
taxes can induce the Þrst-best by solving the systems of equations
e∗H − eNUH =
4θ¯ + 4γ − 1
8c
− θ − 1
6cτH
+
7τH − 4τL −
√
D
12cτH(τH − τL) = 0 (A.2.4)
and
e∗L − eNUL =
4θ¯ + 4γ − 3
8c
− θ − 1
6cτL
+
5τL − 2τH −
√
D
12cτL(τH − τL) = 0. (A.2.5)
Solving the system gives
τH =
28θ¯ + 24γ − 5 + 2√2√G
3(4θ¯ + 4γ − 1) ; τL =
28θ¯ + 24γ − 23 + 2√2√G
3(4θ¯ + 4γ − 3) (A.2.6)
and
τH =
28θ¯ + 24γ − 5− 2√2√G
3(4θ¯ + 4γ − 1) ; τL =
28θ¯ + 24γ − 23− 2√2√G
3(4θ¯ + 4γ − 3) (A.2.7)
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with
G = 34γ2 − 28γ + 5− θ[8θ¯(2θ¯ + 4γ − 5) + 8γ(2γ − 9) + 27]. (A.2.8)
It is possible to show that G is negative for θ ≥ 9
4
. Recall that full market
coverage requires that θ¯ ≥ 9
4
, from which it follows that the system has no
solution: there is no nonuniform ad valorem tax that induces the Þrst-best
in a fully covered market.
Appendix 3: Decomposition of the First-Order Conditions of the
Regulators Game
Let the utilitarian social welfare function be
W [eH(te, ta, b), eL(te, ta, b), te, ta, b] = πH + πL + CS + S + γea. (A.3.1)
In the case of the uniform ad valorem tax / emission tax policy at the
duopoly equilibrium, the Þrst-order conditions are
∂W
∂te
= 0 +
ta(2θ − 1)− 2te
4c
+
γ
2c
= 0 (A.3.2)
and
∂Wi
∂ta
= −3(1− ta)
4c
− ta[16θ(θ − 1) + 37]− 30− 8te(2θ − 1)
32c
− γ 2θ − 1
4c
= 0.
(A.3.3)
The impact on proÞts can be further decomposed into
∂πH
∂te
=
∂π
∂te
+
∂π
∂eL
∂eL
∂te
=
1− ta
4c
− (1− ta)
2
1
2c
= 0, (A.3.4)
∂πL
∂te
=
∂π
∂te
+
∂π
∂eH
∂eH
∂te
= −1− ta
4c
+
(1− ta)
2
1
2c
= 0, (A.3.5)
∂πH
∂ta
=
∂π
∂ta
+
∂π
∂eL
∂eL
∂ta
= −(1− ta)(4θ + 1)
16c
− (1− ta)
2
(−4θ − 5
8c
), (A.3.6)
and
∂πL
∂ta
=
∂π
∂ta
+
∂π
∂eH
∂eH
∂ta
=
(1− ta)(4θ − 5)
16c
+
(1− ta)
2
(−4θ + 1
8c
). (A.3.7)
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Substituting for the socially optimal taxes we have
∂W
∂te
= 0− γ
2c
+
γ
2c
= 0 (A.3.8)
and
∂Wi
∂ta
= − 1
4c
+
1 + γ(2θ − 1)
4c
− γ(2θ − 1)
4c
= 0. (A.3.9)
Analogously in the case of the uniform ad valorem tax / quality subsidy
policy the regulators Þrst-order conditions evaluated at duopoly equilibrium
are
∂W
∂b
= 0 +
(1− ta)[ta(2θ + 2b− 1)− 2b]
4c
+
γ(1− ta)
2c
= 0 (A.3.10)
and
∂W
∂ta
=
30− 8b+ 16b(b+ θ)− ta(37− 16θ + 16((b− 1)b+ 2bθ + θ2))
32c
(A.3.11)
−3
4
(1− ta)
c
+−γ 2θ + 2b− 1
4c
= 0.
The impact on proÞts can be further decomposed into
∂πH
∂b
=
∂π
∂b
+
∂π
∂eL
∂eL
∂b
=
(1− ta)2
4c
− (1− ta)
2
(1− ta)
2c
= 0, (A.3.12)
∂πL
∂b
=
∂π
∂b
+
∂π
∂eH
∂eH
∂b
= −(1− ta)
2
4c
+
(1− ta)
2
(1− ta)
2c
= 0, (A.3.13)
∂πH
∂ta
=
∂π
∂ta
+
∂π
∂eL
∂eL
∂ta
= −(1− ta)(4θ + 4b+ 1)
16c
− (1− ta)
2
(−4θ + 4b− 5
8c
),
(A.3.14)
and
∂πL
∂ta
=
∂π
∂ta
+
∂π
∂eH
∂eH
∂ta
=
(1− ta)(4θ + 4b− 5)
16c
+
(1− ta)
2
(−4θ + 4b+ 1
8c
).
(A.3.15)
Substituting for the socially optimal taxes we have
∂W
∂b
= 0− γ
6c
+
γ
6c
= 0 (A.3.16)
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and
∂W
∂ta
= − 1
4c
+
3γ(2θ + 2γ − 1) + 1
4c
− 3γ(2θ + 2γ − 1)
4c
= 0. (A.3.17)
Appendix 4: Second-Order Conditions of the Quality Game
The second-order conditions of the duopoly game with ad valorem and
emission taxes are
∂2πH
∂e2H
= −2c[2(1− t)(θ + 1 + b)− c(3eH + eL) + 2te]
9(1− t) < 0 (A.4.1)
and
∂2πL
∂e2L
=
2c[2(1− t)(θ − 2 + b)− c(eH + 3eL) + 2te]
9(1− t) < 0. (A.4.2)
When we substitute the solutions of the quality game as in (15) into (A.4.1)
and (A.4.2), we obtain
∂2πH
∂e2H
=
∂2πL
∂e2L
= − c
2
< 0. (A.4.3)
The suﬃcient condition for local stability is that the determinant of the
Jacobian matrix
J =
 ∂2πH∂e2H ∂2πH∂eH∂eL
∂2πL
∂eL∂eH
∂2πL
∂e2
L
 , (A.4.4)
with
∂2πH
∂eH∂eL
=
∂2πL
∂eL∂eH
=
2c2(eH − eL)
9(1− t) , (A.4.5)
is positive. When we substitute the solutions of the quality game as in (15)
into (A.4.5) we obtain
∂2πH
∂eH∂eL
=
∂2πL
∂eL∂eH
=
c
6
. (A.4.6)
The Jacobian thus is J =
Ã − c
2
c
6
c
6
− c
2
!
with
DetJ =
c2
12
> 0. (A.4.7)
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Appendix 5: Second-Order Conditions of the First-Best
Allocation
The second-order conditions of the duopoly game with ad valorem and
emission taxes are
∂2W
∂e2H
= c[c(3eH + eL)− 2(θ + γ)] < 0 (A.5.1)
and
∂2W
∂e2L
= c[2(θ + γ − 1)− c(eH + 3eL)] < 0. (A.5.2)
When we substitute the optimal levels of quality as in (27) into (A.5.1) and
(A.5.2) , we obtain
∂2πH
∂e2H
=
∂2πL
∂e2L
= −3c
4
< 0. (A.5.3)
The suﬃcient condition for local stability is that the determinant of the
Jacobian matrix
J =
 ∂2W∂e2H ∂2W∂eH∂eL
∂2W
∂eL∂eH
∂2W
∂e2L
 , (A.5.4)
with
∂2W
∂eH∂eL
=
∂2W
∂eL∂eH
= c2(eH − eL), (A.5.5)
is positive. When we substitute the optimal levels of quality as in (27) into
(A.4.5), we obtain
∂2W
∂eH∂eL
=
∂2W
∂eL∂eH
=
c
4
. (A.5.6)
The Jacobian thus is J =
Ã −3c
4
c
4
c
4
−3c
4
!
with
DetJ =
c2
2
> 0. (A.5.7)
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List of Symbols
b Subsidy rate
B Subsidy
CS Consumer surplus
C(ei) =
c
2
e2i Cost of environmental quality
ea Average environmental quality
e¯ Unabated level of emissions per unit of production
ei Pollution abatement per unit of production, proxy of environ-
mental quality of variant i
(e¯− ei) Net emission for unit of production of variant i
κ Administrative costs as a share of tax revenues with 0 ≤ κ ≤ 1.
pi Price of variant i
PS Producer surplus
θ Consumers taste for quality
πi ProÞts of Þrm i
Πi Indirect proÞts of Þrm i
S Tax revenues redistributed to consumers as a lump sum at zero
cost
ta Ad valorem tax rate
te Emission tax rate
U Consumers indirect utility
W Social welfare
xi Demand for variant i of the diﬀerentiated commodity
γ Social valuation of the quality externality
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4 Essay 3. Endogenous Emission Standards
in a Duopoly that is Vertically Diﬀerenti-
ated in Environmental Quality
Chiara Lombardini-Riipinen
Abstract We endogenize the choice of a unit emission standard in a
duopoly that is vertically diﬀerentiated in environmental quality. The gov-
ernment sets the standard in a simultaneous game with the Þrm producing
the high-quality variant so as to maximize social welfare. With the introduc-
tion of the standard the amount of emissions per unit of production decrease
and output expands. Aggregate emissions may increase or decrease. The
optimal standard is slacker the more polluting the diﬀerentiated commodity
initially is and the higher the marginal damage from emissions is. When
the diﬀerentiated commodity is very polluting or the marginal damage from
pollution is very high, no optimal binding standard exists. Key Words:
environmental quality, emission standards, imperfect competition, vertical
diﬀerentiation. JEL ClassiÞcation: D62, H21, L13, L15.
4.1 Introduction
The regulation of vertically diﬀerentiated oligopolies often takes the form of
a minimum quality standard.53 The literature suggests that the introduction
of a minimum quality standard in a duopoly setting increases social welfare,
as it enhances competition by reducing product diﬀerentiation (Crampes and
Hollander 1995, Ecchia and Lambertini 1997, Ronnen 1991).54
53According to Anderson, de Palma, and Thisse (1992, p. 109) Products are said to
be vertically diﬀerentiated if, when oﬀered at the same price, all consumers choose to
purchase the same one, the one of highest quality. Of course, in equilibrium, assuming
that consumers diﬀer in their willingness to pay for quality improvement, products will
sell at diﬀerent prices with the higher quality product being sold at a premium over the
price of rival lower quality products.
54However, if the endogenous minimum quality standard is anticipated by the high-
quality Þrm, social welfare unambiguously decreases (Lutz, Lyon, and Maxwell 2000).
In a three-Þrm oligopoly, where all quality-dependent costs are Þxed and the market is
partially covered, an exogenous minimum quality standard reduces the average quality of
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One possible dimension along which oligopolists can diﬀerentiate their
product is that of environmental quality, interpreted as a reduction in the pol-
lution externality arising from production (Arora and Gangopahdyay 1995).
This externality is higher the lower the average environmental quality of the
diﬀerentiated commodity and the higher the share of consumers purchas-
ing the commodity. Moraga-Gonzales and Padron-Fumero (1998) suggest
that when products are diﬀerentiated in environmental quality, an exoge-
nous standard on emissions per unit of output (from here onwards called a
unit emission standard) set just below the level of unit emissions of the more
polluting Þrm increases emissions and, depending on the social valuation of
the marginal damage from emissions, it may either increase or decrease social
welfare (Moraga-Gonzales and Padron-Fumero 1998).55
As the unit emission standard in Moraga-Gonzales and Padron-Fumero
(1998) was exogenous, we could ask the following question: Does an endoge-
nous unit emission standard increase pollution? How does it aﬀect social
welfare? How should it be set in order to maximize social welfare? We do not
know the answers to these questions, as the issues have not yet been analyzed
in the literature. To answer them, we introduce an endogenous standard into
Arora and Gangopahdyays (1995) model of vertical diﬀerentiation and thus
extend Ecchia and Lambertini (1997) to the case when the duopoly produces
a pollution externality and the market is partially covered. We show that the
optimal unit emission standard is the slacker the more polluting the diﬀeren-
tiated commodity and the higher the marginal damage from emissions. The
standard may or may not increase aggregate emissions. This result holds also
for the case of an exogenous standard. The fact that the model we use diﬀers
from Moraga-Gonzales and Padron-Fumero (1998),56 implies that their result
that an exogenous standard always increases polluting emissions is sensitive
to the way vertical diﬀerentiation in environmental quality is modeled.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section two the model is
the diﬀerentiated commodity and expands output. As a result, the pollution externality
unambiguously increases. This eﬀect dominates the competition-enhancing eﬀect of the
minimum quality standard, and social welfare decreases (Scarpa, 1998).
55A review of environmental regulations shows a wide array of diﬀerent ways to set up
emission standards: ...standards are set in terms of such units as the total level of emis-
sions per unit of time, the amount of emissions per unit of output or input, requirements
for certain pollution-control technologies, and restrictions on polluting inputs. (Helfand
1991, p. 622) .
56The two models share the same assumptions regarding market coverage and abatement
costs.
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presented and in section three the welfare-maximizing emission standard is
characterized. Section four concludes the paper.
4.2 The Model
Consider a duopoly where each Þrm sells a single good to a unit mass of
consumers indexed by parameter θ, which is uniformly distributed over [0, 1]
and represents the marginal willingness to pay for environmental quality.
Production generates polluting emissions per unit of production at level e¯ > 0
and these can be abated by ei by investing in a Þxed-cost less-polluting
technology or abatement device at a cost C(e− ei) = C(ei) = c2e2i , with C 0,
C > 0, and C(0) = 0 for all feasible qualities. Net emissions per unit of
production of variant i are therefore (e− ei). Production then takes place at
zero marginal cost. The proÞt of duopolist i selling variant i at price pi is
πi = pixi − c
2
e2i , (1)
where xi indicates the total demand for variant i, with i = H, L.
The indirect utility of a consumer of type θ with income y who buys
variant i of environmental quality ei at price pi is given by
U = y + θei − pi − γE, (2)
where γE is the negative pollution externality originating from the duopoly.57
Parameter γ > 0 measures the marginal damage from pollution and E de-
notes aggregate emissions with
E = (e¯− eH)xH + (e¯− eL)xL. (3)
The individual consumer cannot aﬀect total emissions signiÞcantly, so
that the pollution externality is a constant in the individuals maximization
problem.58 The pollution externality, however, aﬀects the calculation of the
57Note that equation (2) implies that the impact of the pollution externality on the
individual does not depend on his taste for environmental quality. In other words, we
assume that pollution aﬀects the utility of consumers in the same way, regardless of the
diﬀerences in willingness to pay for environmental quality.
58The use of this utility function may appear somewhat problematic in the context of
environmental quality competition when partial coverage is assumed. In fact, it leads to
the result that the consumers with the lowest taste for environmental quality, that is, those
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level of social welfare. Each consumer is fully informed about the quality
of the good and either buys one unit of the diﬀerentiated commodity or
nothing.59
The demand for the low- and the high-quality variants is, respectively,
xH = 1− θH = 1− pH − pL
eH − eL (4)
and
xL = θH − θL = pH − pL
eH − eL −
pL
eL
. (5)
4.3 The Optimal Unit Emission Standard
The endogenous unit emission standard is obtained as part of the Nash equi-
librium of a simultaneous game between the regulator, who maximizes so-
cial welfare in the low-level of quality under the constraint that both Þrms
remain in the market, and the high-quality Þrm, which simultaneously max-
imizes its proÞts in the high-level of quality. Once the quality levels are set,
with θ < θL, are the ones causing the smallest amount of emissions.
This problem does not emerge in an analytically equivalent re-interpretation of the same
utility function (Tirole, 1988, p. 96) which assumes that consumers have identical tastes
for environmental quality and diﬀerent incomes, such that their marginal utility of income
is 1θ , with θ uniformly distributed over [0, 1] and
U = ei − pi
θ
− γE,
This utility function leads to the same demand functions for low and high quality as
utility function (2) and therefore to the same duopoly equilibrium levels of quality. Under
such a utility function, the poor and the rich pollute less than middle-income people. In-
terestingly, this relationship between income and emissions is similar to the Environmental
Kutznets Curve, a inverted-U relationship between environmental quality and per capita
income Þrst suggested by Grossman and Krueger (1995).
59The assumption of full information, although common to models of vertical prod-
uct diﬀerentiation, warrants some justiÞcation, as one characteristic of green products is
that their level of environmental quality, known to the producers, cannot be assessed by
the consumer by inspection or ordinary use. Environmental quality is a credence char-
acteristics (Darby and Karni 1973). The introduction of several third-party eco-labeling
schemes greatly mitigates this asymmetric information problem for some important classes
of goods. Thereby assuming full information on the environmental quality of the product
can be regarded as an acceptable Þrst step toward the approximation of reality.
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the duopolists compete in prices. Social welfare is deÞned as the sum of
consumer and producer surplus net of the damage from pollution.60
As usual, we solve the model backwards, starting from the price game. It
is straightforward to solve for the pricing equilibrium, which is identical to
that of Ronnen (1991). The equilibrium prices are
pH =
2(eH − eL)eH
(4eH − eL) , pL =
(eH − eL)eL
(4eH − eL) . (6)
Given (6), the indirect proÞt functions are
ΠH =
4e2H(eH − eL)
(4eH − eL)2 −
c
2
e2H , (7)
and
ΠL =
eHeL(eH − eL)
(4eH − eL)2 −
c
2
e2L. (8)
Consumer surplus is
CS =
Z θH
θL
(θeL − pL)dθ +
Z 1
θH
(θeH − pH)dθ = e
2
H(4eH + 5eL)
2 (4eH − eL)2
, (9)
and aggregate emissions are
E = (e− eH) 2eH
4eH − eL + (e− eL)
eH
4eH − eL . (10)
In the Þrst stage, the regulator maximizes social welfare, deÞned as the
sum of producer surplus and consumer surplus net of the social valuations
of the pollution externality subject to the condition that proÞts of the Þrms
producing the low-quality variant are positive, that is, that
max
eL
ΠH +ΠL + CS − γE s.t. ΠL ≥ 0. (11)
In other words we assume that for political reasons the regulator wants
to ensure a minimum degree of competition and to prevent the market from
developing into a monopoly.
60In Appendix 1 and 2, we present the unregulated duopoly equilibrium and the impact
on aggregate emissions of an exogenous unit emission standard.
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Simultaneously to the regulator maximizing social welfare in the emission
standard, the Þrm producing the high-quality variant maximizes proÞts in
the level of high quality
max
eH
ΠH =
4e2H(eH − eL)
(4eH − eL)2 −
c
2
e2H . (12)
The high-quality Þrm maximization problem yields the Þrst-order condi-
tion. First, we diﬀerentiate its proÞts in eH . This gives
∂ΠH
∂eH
=
4eH(4e
2
H − 3eHeL + 2e2L)
(4eH − eL)3 − ceH = 0. (13)
We then substitute eH = a ∗ eL into (13) and solve it in eL.61 This gives
4(4a2 − 3a+ 2)
c(4a− 1)3 − ceL ⇔ eL =
4(4a2 − 3a+ 2)
c(4a− 1)3 . (14)
From equation (14) one can show that
deL
da
= −16(a− 1)a+ 21
c (4a− 1)4 < 0 when a > 1. (15)
This means that any degree of diﬀerentiation above the duopoly equilib-
rium degree of diﬀerentiation implies a non-binding standard.
The Lagrangian of the regulators problem is
L = ΠH + (1 + λ)ΠL + CS − γE (16)
and the Kuhn-Tucker conditions are
∂L
∂eL
= 0 (17)
λΠL = 0
λ ≥ 0.
We diﬀerentiate the Lagrangian in eL and then substitute for eH = a ∗ eL
and (14). This gives
∂L
∂eL
= −4a
2(2a+ 1)
(4a− 1)3 + (1 + λ)
{−8 + a[12 + a(4a− 23)]}
(4a− 1)3 (18)
+
a2(28a+ 5)
2(4a− 1)3 − γ
3a{−8a[2 + a(4a− 3)] + (4a− 1)3ce}
4(4a− 1)2[2 + a(4a− 3)] 0.
61It is easy to show that the second-order condition of the high-quality Þrm is always
satisÞed.
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We perform the same substitutions on the second Kuhn-Tucker condition
and obtain
λΠL = λ
4[2 + a(4a− 3)]{4 + a[7 + a(4a− 13)]}
c(4a− 1)6 = 0. (19)
Solving for equations (18) and (19) for a and λ with the aid of Mathe-
matica 4.1 gives 8 pairs of solutions.
Two pairs of solutions are not real numbers and are discarded. One pair
is
as = 2.745 and λs = 0.71898 + γ(6.87592− 13.0198ce), (20)
which corresponds to the case when the proÞt constraint is binding, that is,
when λ > 0 and ΠL = 0.
In such a case, λ > 0 provided that ce < ce∗ with
ce∗ = 0.5281 +
0.0552
γ
. (21)
Under this solution, the second-order condition of the regulator
∂2L
∂e2L
= c[2.26869 + γ(9.07477− 17.1834γ) (22)
is satisÞed if
ce < 0.5281 +
0.1320
γ
, (23)
a condition, which is less restrictive than ce < ce∗.
The Þnal Þve pairs of solutions give λ = 0 and a expressed with the aid of
pure functions.62 These solutions can nevertheless be interpreted by means
of graphical analysis, with the aid of which it can be seen that only one
solution of the Þve is a real root with a > 1 for at least some values of ce
and γ. This is the solution for the optimal degree of diﬀerentiation, aU , when
the proÞt constraint is not binding, that is, when ce∗ ≤ ce. Given that the
unregulated equilibrium degree of diﬀerentiation is ac = 5.271, for a binding
standard it must be the case that 2.745 < aU < 5.271. Figure 1 plots aU as
a function of ce when γ = 1 and 2.745 < aU < 5.271.
62This indicates that the analytical complexity of the equation system was too great to
allow Mathematica to give analytical solutions.
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Optimal degree of diﬀerentiation when the proÞt constraint is not
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As can be seen clearly from Figure 1, the optimal degree of diﬀerentiation
increases in ce, which implies, given that deL
da
< 0, that the optimal emission
standard decreases in ce (See equation (15)). Above a certain value of ce
however, the optimal degree of diﬀerentiation becomes larger than that of
the unregulated equilibrium, and the emission standard is not binding.
The value of ce above which the emission standard is no longer binding
can be found by solving in ce the equation aU(γ, ce) = 5.271. This gives
ce∗∗ = 0.5065 + 0.1269
γ
.
Note that ce∗ < ce∗∗ requires that the marginal damage of emissions is
not too high, that is, that γ < 3.3291, otherwise no optimal emission standard
exists. The intuition is that when the marginal damage from emissions is high
( γ ≥ 3.3291), the decrease in social welfare due to the increase in emissions
driven by output expansion more than counterbalances the positive welfare
eﬀects of greater competition and lower unit emissions, so that it is never
optimal to set an emission standard.
The second-order condition of the regulators problem when the proÞt
constraint of the low-quality Þrm is not binding, that is, when λ = 0, is
∂2L
∂e2L
= c
−3(4a− 1)4aceγ + 2[2 + a(4a− 3)][8 + a(−44 + a(47− 12γ + a(−68 + 48γ)))]
8(4a− 1)[2 + a(4a− 3)]2 ,
(24)
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which can be expressed as c ∗Q(a, ce, γ). Diﬀerentiating Q(a, ce, γ) w.r.t. ce
yields
∂(
∂2L
∂e2L
)/∂ce = − 3(4a− 1)
4aγ
8(4a− 1)[2 + a(4a− 3)]2 < 0. (25)
Equation (25) implies that if we want to ensure that the second-order con-
dition holds in the range ce(ce∗, ce∗∗), it is enough that it holds for ce∗. We
substitute into (24) ce∗ and plot it as a function of the regulated degree
of diﬀerentiation aU and of the marginal damage from pollution γ, where
2.745 < aU < 5.271 and γ < 3.3291. The function is clearly negative, as
shown in Figure 2.
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We summarize our results in Proposition 1
Proposition 1. Existence of the optimal emission standard
There exists an optimal emission standard, provided that both the marginal
damage from pollution, γ, and the marginal cost of abating the very last unit
of emissions, ce, are not too high, the exact conditions being: γ < 3.3291
and ce < ce∗∗, with ce∗∗ = 0.5065 + 0.1269
γ
.
The condition concerning the marginal cost of abating the very last unit
of emissions implies that either the diﬀerentiated commodity is not very pol-
luting (e is relatively low), or the abatement technology is not too expensive
(c is relatively low). The intuition of proposition 1 is the following. By re-
ducing the degree of diﬀerentiation, a stricter emission standard enhances
competition, decreases producers surplus, increases consumers surplus and
decreases unit emissions. However, aggregate emissions may increase due to
the output-expanding eﬀect of a stricter standard. Whether emissions in-
crease and how damaging to social welfare such an increase is depends on
1) how polluting the diﬀerentiated commodity is prior the abatement eﬀort
as measured by e, 2) on how expensive pollution abatement is as measured
by c, and 3) on how damaging emissions are as measured by the marginal
damage from emissions, γ.
Given Proposition 1, we can characterize the setting of the optimal stan-
dard as follows. When the diﬀerentiated commodity is not very polluting
or the abatement technology not very expensive, that is, when ce < ce∗ <
ce∗∗ with ce∗ = 0.5281 + 0.0552
γ
, there is a welfare-maximizing emission stan-
dard at which the proÞts of the Þrm producing the low-quality variant are
zero. The emission standard is esL =
0.096
c
and the degree of diﬀerentiation
is as = 2.745. When the diﬀerentiated commodity is relatively more pollut-
ing or the abatement technology relatively more expensive, that is, when
ce∗ ≤ ce < ce∗∗, the optimal degree of diﬀerentiation is within the range
as < aU < aD, with aD = 5.271 being the unregulated degree of diﬀerentia-
tion, and the emission standard is 0.096
c
< eUL <
0.048
c
.
When choosing the optimal standard, the regulator balances the stan-
dards positive welfare eﬀects (increased consumer surplus and decreased unit
emissions) and the negative welfare eﬀects (lower producers surplus and, po-
tentially, higher aggregate emissions due to output expansion). He does so
by choosing a lower emission standard the more polluting the diﬀerentiated
commodity is and the more expensive abatement is.
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While it is clear that the more costly the abatement eﬀort is (as measured
by c), the lower the optimal standard should be, it might surprise the reader
that the more polluting a unit of production is, the slacker the unit emission
standard should be. This peculiar result stems from the assumption of the
model that consumers care about the unit emissions of the product they
buy, but do not care about how their decision on whether to purchase the
commodity or not aﬀects aggregate emissions. As the emission standard
makes the commodity cheaper, some consumers, who in the unregulated
equilibrium would not have bought the commodity, now purchase it. Output
expands and this pushes up emissions. If the product is not very polluting
to start with, abatement is relatively cheap, then the output expansion eﬀect
on aggregate emissions may be more than counterbalanced by the reduction
in unit emissions. Even if aggregate emissions increase, the welfare beneÞt
of greater competition may dominate the welfare cost of a greater pollution
externality if the marginal damage from pollution is low enough. But if
the product is very polluting and the cost of abatement and the marginal
damage from emissions are relatively high, then welfare decreases with the
introduction of a unit emission standard.
4.4 Impact of the Emission Standard on Aggregate
Emissions
Next we look closer at the impact of the emission standard on aggregate
emissions. Having substituted (4), (5), (6) and (15) into (3), we have that
aggregate emissions in the regulated duopoly are
E =
3ae
4a− 1 −
4a(8a3 − 2a2 + a+ 2)
(4a− 1)4 . (29)
In the unregulated duopoly aggregate emissions are ED = 0.787e −
0.146
c
.When the proÞt constraint is binding, aggregate emissions are Es =
0.825e− 0.172
c
and are lower than under the unregulated equilibrium if
0.825e− 0.172
c
< 0.787e− 0.146
c
, (30)
that is, if ce < 0.684.63
63This implies that the abatement eﬀort of the high-quality Þrm must be substantial,
that is, that esH ≥ 38% e
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When the proÞt constraint is not binding, aggregate emissions are lower
under the unit emission standard as opposed to the unregulated equilibrium
if
3ae
4a− 1 −
4a(8a3 − 2a2 + a+ 2)
(4a− 1)4 < 0.787e−
0.146
c
, (31)
that is, if ce < ce# with
ce# =
0.5676(a− 5.1759)(a− 0.0143)(a2 − 0.2741a+ 0.3665)
(a− 5.3176)(a− 0.25)3 (32)
In Figure 3 we plotted ce#.
Figure 3
2 3 4 5
a
1
2
3
4
5
6
ce#
Critical value ce#, above which the standard increases aggregate emissions
To summarize, an endogenous standard does not necessarily increase ag-
gregate emissions because the standard aﬀects emissions in two opposite
directions. On the one hand it increases emissions by expanding output and
on the other hand it decreases them by decreasing emission per unit of pro-
duction. When ce is low enough, the second eﬀect dominates and aggregate
emissions decrease. The impact of the unit emission standard on the degree
of competition, welfare and aggregate emissions is shown in Table 1 for the
case when the proÞt constraint is binding.
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Table 1
Unit emission standard Unregulated equilibrium
a 2.745 5.271
eH 0.264/c 0.253/c
eL 0.096/c 0.048/c
pH
eH
− pL
eL
0.175 0.214
πH 0.016/c 0.024/c
πL 0 0.001/c
CS 0.058/c 0.043/c
E 0.825e− 0.172/c 0.787e− 0.146/c
The impact of the standard on the degree of competition is captured by
the diﬀerence between the quality-deßated price of the high-quality variant
and the low-quality variant pH
eH
− pL
eL
, which is higher in the unregulated equi-
librium. Consumer surplus increases while producer surplus decreases with
the standard. The sum of consumer and producer surplus is higher under
the standard. Whether aggregate emissions increase or decrease with the
introduction of the binding standard depends on the values of c and e.
4.5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we analyzed the impact of an endogenous unit emission stan-
dard on aggregate emission and social welfare when Þrms diﬀerentiate in
environmental quality. We showed that the optimal unit emission standard
will be the slacker not only, as it is usually the case, the more costly the
abatement technology, but also the more polluting the diﬀerentiated com-
modity and the higher the marginal damage from emissions. This somewhat
counterintuitive result depends on the fact that in a vertically diﬀerentiated
market a unit emission standard aﬀects the externality from aggregate emis-
sion in two opposite directions: it decreases emissions per unit of output and
it expands output. The higher the unit emission standard is, the greater
the output expansion eﬀect, so that it is optimal to set a slacker standard
the more polluting the diﬀerentiated commodity and the more damaging the
pollution.
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In Appendix 2, we also discuss the impact of an exogenous unit emission
standard on aggregate emissions. We Þnd that when vertical diﬀerentiation in
environmental quality is modeled following Arora and Gangopadhyay (1995),
the introduction of a unit emission standard does not necessarily increase
aggregate emissions.
In the model we restricted our attention to emission standards. An inter-
esting extension to the paper would be to examine whether and how endoge-
nous emission standards could be combined with other policy instruments,
such as ad valorem taxes. 64
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Appendix 1: The Unregulated Duopoly Equilibrium
The solution for the quality game of the unregulated duopoly equilibrium
is reproduced from Motta (1993). Firms maximize
max
eH
ΠH =
4e2H(eH − eL)
(4eH − eL)2 −
c
2
e2H , (A.1.1)
and
max
eL
ΠL =
eHeL(eH − eL)
(4eH − eL)2 −
c
2
e2L. (A.1.2)
The Þrst-order conditions are
∂πH
∂qH
=
4eH(4e2H − 3eHeL + 2e2L)
(4eH − eL)3 − ceH = 0 (A.1.3)
and
∂πL
∂qL
=
e2H(4eH − 7eL)
(4eH − eL)3 − ceL = 0. (A.1.4)
Solving in the equilibrium quality levels gives
eH =
0.2533
c
; eL =
0.0482
c
(A.1.5)
with
ac =
eH
eL
= 5.271. (A.1.6)
The equilibrium proÞts are
πH =
0.0244
c
and πL =
0.0015
c
, (A.1.7)
while the equilibrium demands for the two products are
xH = 0.525 and xL = 0.263. (A.1.8)
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Appendix 2: Introduction of an Exogenous Emission Standard
From Arora and Gangopadhyay (1995) we know that from the Þrst-order
conditions of the quality game it is possible to show that when both Þrms
operate and for an exogenous emission standard be > eL, then it is always the
case that
deL
dbe = 1 (A.2.1)
and
deH
dbe = deHdeL = 8eHeL(5eH + eL)8e2L(5eH + eL) + c(4eH − eL)4 > 0. (A.2.2)
The change in aggregate emissions, E, induced by an exogenous standard
is given by
dE
dbe = ∂E∂eL deLdbe + ∂E∂eH deHdeL deLdbe , (A.2.3)
with E = (e¯− eH)xH + (e¯− eL)xL as in equation (3). Substituting for prices
and demands, aggregate emissions are, as in equation (10),
E = (e− eH) 2eH
4eH − eL + (e− eL)
eH
4eH − eL (A.2.4)
with
dE
dbe = (e− 2eH)eH(4eH − eL)2 −[8e
2
H + eL(3e− 4eH − eL)
(4eH − eL)2
8eHeL(5eH + eL)
8e2L(5eH + eL) + c(4eH − eL)4
].
(A.2.5)
Setting eH = a ∗ eL in the high-quality Þrms Þrst-order condition of the
quality game (A3) and solving in eL gives
eL =
4(4a2 − 3a+ 2)
(4a− 1)3c . (A.2.6)
We substitute eH = a ∗ eL and (A14) into (A13) and obtain
dE
dbe = (4a− 1)
3(16a3 − 16a2 − 9a− 6)ce− 8(4a2 − 3a+ 2)(4a3 + 3a2 − 9a− 1)
4(4a− 1)2(4a2 − 3a+ 2)(16a2 − 16a+ 21) .
(A.2.7)
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It is immediately apparent that aggregate emissions increase, that is,
dE
dbe > 0, if
ce >
8(4a2 − 3a+ 2)(4a3 + 3a2 − 9a− 1)
(4a− 1)3(16a3 − 16a2 − 9a− 6) . (A.2.8)
Figure 4 below shows the critical value of ce above which aggregate emis-
sions increase with the exogenous standard as a function of the degree of
diﬀerentiation a. Intuitively the higher the degree of diﬀerentiation a is, the
lower the critical value ce# is.65
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Finally, we give a numerical example. Let the unit emission standard
be be = 0.05
c
> eL =
0.0482
c
. Given (A2.1), we substitute eL =
0.05
c
into the
Þrst-order condition of the high-quality Þrm (A.1.3) and then solve in eH .
This gives eH =
0.2536
c
. We then substitute both levels of quality under the
unit emission standard into equation (A.2.5) and solve in e. We Þnd that
aggregate emissions increase, that is, dE
dbe > 0, if e > 0.856c .
65The critical value ce is negative when a < 1.528.
98
List of Symbols
CS Consumer surplus
C(ei) =
c
2
e2i Cost of environmental quality
E Aggregate emissions
e¯ Unabated level of emissions per unit of production
ei Pollution abatement per unit of production, proxy of environ-
mental quality of variant i
(e¯− ei) Net emission for unit of production of variant i
pi Price of variant i
PS Producer surplus
θ Consumers taste for quality
πi ProÞts of Þrm i
Πi Indirect proÞts of Þrm i
U Consumers indirect utility
W Social welfare
xi Demand for variant i of the diﬀerentiated commodity
γ Marginal damage from pollution abatement
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5 Essay 4. Buying Green: The Social Re-
ward Trap
Chiara Lombardini-Riipinen
Abstract Is a social norm that rewards consumers who buy green ben-
eÞcial to the environment? Would a norm that punishes brown purchases
have the same impact on emissions? Using a duopoly model of vertical prod-
uct diﬀerentiation with uncovered markets, we show that even though a buy
green norm decreases emissions per unit produced, it may increases aggre-
gate emissions via increased demand and thus lead to a deterioration of the
environment. We call this phenomenon the social reward trap. The social
reward trap arises from assuming an uncovered market which allows aggre-
gate output to increase. A norm punishing the purchase of the brown good
decreases aggregate demand and, at the margin, decreases aggregate emis-
sions. Keywords: duopoly, environmental quality, pollution, social norms,
vertical diﬀerentiation. JEL ClassiÞcation: D62, L13, L15, Z13.
5.1 Introduction
Survey studies show that many consumers care about the impact of their pur-
chase decisions on the environment (Levin 1990, Roper Starch 2000). These
studies support existing anecdotal evidence that social norms are emerging
that encourage supporting environmentally conscious consumption.66 These
developments raise some important and interesting questions. What is the
contribution of social norms to the mitigation of pollution externalities? Are
they unambiguously favorable to the environment or not? Moreover, does
the type of social norm matter, that is, have informal social rewards the same
eﬀect on pollution externalities as social punishments?
Studying these questions requires that we introduce the concept of social
norm into the formal analysis. Luckily the interest of economists in social
norms is not new. The Nobel laureate Kenneth Arrow (1971) was the Þrst
to suggest that social norms may play an important role in solving market
failures due to externalities. Akerlofs seminal contributions to the economic
66Social norm in the context of this paper is deÞned as the shared expectation within a
society, organization or group as to what behavior is desirable (Coleman 1990, p. 242).
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analysis of social norms date back to the seventies and early eighties (Ak-
erlof 1976, 1980). In the last few years the literature on social norm has
ßourished.67 Nevertheless environmental economists have only infrequently
paid attention to social norms. The focus of existing analyses has been on
the relationship between environmental policy instruments and social norms
(Rauscher 1997, Hess 1998, Bratt 1999, Rege 2000, Wedner 2000).68
In this paper we develop a duopoly model of vertical product diﬀerentia-
tion (Mussa and Rosen 1978, Tirole 1988, Motta 1993) to study the eﬀects of
social rewards for buying green and of social punishments for buying brown.
In this model two variants of a product diﬀer only with respect to their
environmental quality: a green variant and a brown variant. The green,
high-quality variant is less damaging to the environment than the brown,
low-quality variant. By tailoring Akerlofs (1980) model of social norms,
we introduce interdependent preferences into the consumers indirect util-
ity function in the form of social rewards to those who purchase the green
variant.69 We assume that the higher the social support for the social norm
(as measured by the demand for the green variant) and the higher the dif-
ference in environmental quality between the green and the brown variant,
the higher the social reward for buying the green variant. Social rewards
are also an increasing function of an exogenous parameter measuring the
strength of the social norm. We investigate how changes in the strength
of the social norm aﬀect aggregate emissions. Our results suggest that the
67A good overview on the economics of social norms can be found in Ben-Ner and Put-
terman (1998). The attention of economists has been captured by very diﬀerent social
norm-related issues. To mention just a few, economists have analyzed the endogenization
of social norms (Basu 1995, Bester and Guth 1997), the eﬀectiveness of social rewards
as corrective mechanisms (Fershtman and Weiss 1998a and 1998b), the relationship be-
tween social norms and tax evasion (Cullis and Lewis 1997, Myles and Naylor 1996), the
relationship between economic incentives and social norms in the welfare stare (Lindbeck
et al. 1999 , Bird 1999). Particularly fruitful have been the application of the tools of
experimental economics in the analysis of social norms.
68Rauscher (1997) and Rege (2000) examine the possible crowding-out and crowding-in
eﬀects of economic incentives on voluntary environmentally friendly behavior. Hess (1998)
models households recycling behavior re-interpreting Akerlofs social custom approach and
Wendner (2000) studies optimal taxation in the presence of an environmental externality
when individual consumption depends on the individuals frame of reference.
69Interdependent preferences have been introduced before in models of vertical product
diﬀerentiation by Baake and Boom (2001), Grilo, Shy and Thisse (2001) and Lambertini
and Orsini (2001) in the form of bandwagon and snob eﬀects. These papers however do
not focus on the role of social norms in regulating pollution externalities.
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environmental impact of a social norm that rewards the purchase of environ-
mentally friendlier products and disregards consumption reduction, depends
crucially on whether the market for the diﬀerentiated commodity is fully or
partially covered. If the market is fully covered, the social norm unambigu-
ously beneÞts the environment. If the market is partially covered, the social
norm may be detrimental to the environment as it may induce an increase
in aggregate emissions. We show that aggregate emissions increase at the
margin with social rewards. We call this phenomenon the social reward trap.
Market power also increases. Finally, we examine a social norm which pun-
ishes the consumers who purchase the brown variant and show that, under
partial market coverage, it decreases aggregate demand and, at the margin,
aggregate emissions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section two introduces the
model and section three characterizes the unregulated Bertrand equilibrium.
In section four the impact of social rewards on aggregate emissions is studied.
Section Þve presents a model where instead of being socially rewarded for
buying green, consumers are punished for buying brown. We Þnd that such
a norm may also increase aggregate emissions. Section six concludes and
brießy discusses the endogenization of the share of believers in the norm.
5.2 The Model
Consider the following model of vertical product diﬀerentiation. There is a
physically homogeneous product produced at zero cost by a duopolistic in-
dustry.70 Production generates polluting emissions per unit of production
at level e¯ > 0. Producers can increase their products environmental qual-
ity by investing in less-polluting technologies, product design or abatement
devices so as to reduce the level of emissions associated with each unit of
production by ei, where i = H,L with eH > eL. The net level of emis-
sions per unit of production is (e¯ − ei). We assume that e¯ is always large
enough so that (e¯ − ei) > 0 always holds. The duopolists have access to
the same pollution abatement technology. The lower the Þrms net unit
emissions, the more costly the investment in pollution abatement. All envi-
ronmental quality-related costs are Þxed and are given by C(e¯ − ei) = c2e2i ,
with C 0 > 0, C > 0, and C(0) = 0 for all feasible qualities. Once the
70In this model we assume that the number of Þrms is given. We do not consider the
impact of the social norm on market structure.
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investment in the pollution abatement technology is made, production takes
place at a marginal cost that is independent of the residual level of emissions
and that is normalized to zero. The technologically feasible maximum qual-
ity is given by the pre-abatement unit level of emissions, e¯. The proÞt of the
duopolist i selling quantity xi of variant i at price pi is
πi = pixi − c
2
e2i . (1)
Competition between the duopolists takes place in two stages. In the
Þrst stage, the duopolists simultaneously choose the investment in pollution
abatement ei, with ei > 0. In the second stage, they compete in prices.
At this stage the cost of pollution abatement is sun, and zero unit costs of
production are incurred. The two-stage modelling is motivated by the fact
that changes in the abatement technology are typically long-run as opposed
to price-setting decisions, which are short-run and easier to modify.
There is a continuum of consumers whose taste for environmental quality
is identiÞed by θ, which is uniformly distributed over [0, 1]. The total number
of consumers is normalized to 1. Each consumer either buys one unit of the
diﬀerentiated commodity or nothing. All consumers are fully informed about
the environmental quality of the diﬀerentiated commodity.
The indirect utility of a consumer of type θ who buys the green variant
H of environmental quality eH at price pH is traditionally given by UH =
θeH−pH , where θeH measures the intrinsic utility a consumer of type θ derives
from consuming one unit of variant H. Now we introduce social rewards into
the utility function.
By tailoring Akerlofs (1980) model of social norms, we assume that social
rewards are present in the indirect utility function of the consumer who
purchases the green variant. Social rewards are deÞned by
S = bγ(eH − eL)xH , (2)
where b is the exogenous share of consumers who believe in the social norm;
xH is the demand for the green variant, that is, the market share of consumers
purchasing high quality. xH thus measures the degree of support for the
norm.71 γ(eH − eL) is the intensity of the positive externality from buying
71Akerlof (1980) suggests that social norms could be modelled by having the individual
utility function depend, in addition to the consumption of goods and to individual tastes,
on the individuals reputation and on whether or not he believes in the norm. Reputation
in turn is a function of whether the individual obeys the norm or not and of how large a
fraction of the population follows the norm.
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the green good, where γ is the marginal beneÞt from one unit of abatement
and (eH −eL) is the diﬀerence in the abatement level of the green and brown
variants. We call bγ the strength of the social norm. Thus the indirect utility
of a consumer of type θ who buys the green variant H of environmental
quality eH at price pH and receives social rewards for the green purchase by
S is given by
UH = θeH − pH + S. (3)
The indirect utility of a consumer of type θ who buys the brown variant
L of environmental quality eL at price pL is given by
UL = θeL − pL, (4)
as consumers purchasing the brown variant are not rewarded neither pun-
ished.72,73
To deÞne the demand for the low- and the high-quality variant, we deÞne
the critical taste parameter, θH , at which the consumer is indiﬀerent between
buying the high and low quality, and the taste parameter, θL, at which the
consumer is indiﬀerent between purchasing the low-quality product or not
72In equation (3), the taste for environmental quality (personal norm) and the proportion
of believers in the social norm are assumed to be independent of each other. This is clearly
a simpliÞcation of reality. One justiÞcation for such a simpliÞcation, beyond the fact that
it allows greater analytical tractability, is that the debate about the direction of causation
between social norms, personal norms and actual behavior is still very much open.
73The use of this utility function may appear somewhat problematic in the context of
environmental quality competition when partial coverage is assumed. In fact, it leads to
the result that the consumers with the lowest taste for environmental quality, that is those
with θ < θL, are the ones causing the smallest amount of emissions.
This problem does not emerge in an analytically equivalent re-interpretation of the same
utility function (Tirole, 1988, p. 96) which assumes that consumers have identical tastes
for environmental quality and diﬀerent incomes so that their marginal utility of income is
1
θ , with θ uniformly distributed over [0, 1] and
UH = eH − pH
θ
+
S
θ
and UL = eL − pL
θ
.
This utility function leads to the same demand functions for low and high quality as
utility function (3) and (4) and, therefore, to the same duopoly equilibrium levels of
quality. Under such a utility function, the poor and the rich pollute less than middle-
income people. Interestingly, this relationship between income and emissions is similar
to the Environmental Kutznets Curve, a inverted-U relationship between environmental
quality and per capita income Þrst suggested by Grossman and Krueger (1995).
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buying at all. The taste parameter θH is
θH =
(pH − pL)− bγ(eH − eL)
(1− bγ)(eH − eL) (5)
and given as the solution to the indiﬀerence relation between the utility from
the high-quality variant and that from the low-quality variant UH = UL.
Parameter θL is
θL =
pL
eL
(6)
and is given by the solution to the equation UL = 0.
From (5) and (6) it is clear that social rewards have a direct eﬀect on
the allocation of consumers between the green and brown variant as given
by θH , but have no direct eﬀect on the degree of market coverage, which is
determined by θL. Consumers whose taste parameter θ is such that θH ≤ θ ≤
1 purchase the high-quality variant, while consumers whose taste parameter
θ is such that θL ≤ θ < θH purchase the low-quality variant. The rest of
the consumers buy nothing Therefore, the demands for the high-quality and
low-quality variant are respectively xH = 1 − θH and xL = θH − θL, which
can be expressed via (7) as
xH = 1− (pH − pL)− bγ(eH − eL)
(1− bγ)(eH − eL) ; xL =
(pH − pL)− bγ(eH − eL)
(1− bγ)(eH − eL) −
pL
eL
.
(7)
Diﬀerentiating (7) with respect to bγ yields
∂xH
∂bγ
=
eH − eL − (pH − pL)
(1− bγ)2(eH − eL)2 ;
∂xL
∂bγ
= −eH − eL − (pH − pL)
(1− bγ)2(eH − eL)2 . (8)
We can see from (8) that when the intensity of the social norm, bγ,
increases, the demand for the high-quality variant increases and the demand
for the low-quality variant decreases, as long as long as the quality gap is
larger than the price gap.
5.3 The Price and Quality Games
The duopolists play a two-stage game. In the Þrst stage, the quality game, the
duopolists choose the products environmental quality level ei, by maximizing
πi = pixi − c2e2i in ei. In the second stage, the price game, they compete in
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prices. At this stage the cost of environmental quality has already been
sunk, and zero unit costs of production are incurred. The model is solved by
backward induction starting from stage two. We substitute the expressions
for xi0s and θ0is as in (5), (6) and (7) into the proÞt functions and have
max
pH
πH = [1− (pH − pL)− bγ(eH − eL)
(1− bγ)(eH − eL) ]pH (9)
and
max
pL
πL = [
(pH − pL)− bγ(eH − eL)
(1− bγ)(eH − eL) −
pL
eL
]pL. (10)
The Þrst-order conditions are
∂πH
∂pH
=
eH − eL − 2pH + pL
(1− bγ)(eH − eL) = 0 (11)
and
∂πL
∂pL
=
bγ(eL − 2pL)(eH − eL)− eLpH + 2eHpL
(1− bγ)(eH − eL)eL = 0. (12)
The solutions of the system of Þrst-order conditions give the equilibrium
prices. These are
pH =
[2(bγ − 1)eH − bγeL](eH − eL)
4(bγ − 1)eH − (4bγ − 1)eL ; pL =
(2bγ − 1)(eH − eL)eL
4(bγ − 1)eH − (4bγ − 1)eL ,
(13)
so that we get for the price dispersion
pH − pL = (eH − eL) 2eH(bγ − 1) + eL(1− 3bγ)
4(bγ − 1)eH − (4bγ − 1)eL . (14)
In stage one, given price competition, Þrms maximize their proÞts, πi =
pixi − c2e2i , with respect to quality. When we substitute for the equilibrium
prices we obtain the indirect proÞt functions
max
eH
ΠH =
(eH − eL)[2(bγ − 1)eH − bγeL]2
(1− bγ)[(4(bγ − 1)eH − (4bγ − 1)eL]2 −
c
2
e2H (15)
and
max
eL
ΠL =
(eH − eL)eL[((1− bγ)eH + bγeL](1− 2bγ)2
(1− bγ)[4(bγ − 1)eH − (4bγ − 1)eL]2 −
c
2
e2L. (16)
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Calculating the Þrst-order conditions ∂ΠH
∂eH
= 0 and ∂ΠL
∂eL
= 0 and substi-
tuting for eH = a ∗ eL, with a > 1 gives
∂ΠH
∂eH
=
[2a(1− bγ) + bγ][8a2(1− bγ)2 − 2a(1− bγ)(3− 10bγ)− bγ(13− 12bγ) + 4]
[(1− 4a(1− bγ)− 4bγ]3(1− bγ)
−aceL = 0 (17)
and
∂ΠL
∂eL
=
(1− 2bγ)2[4a3(1− bγ)2 − a2(7− 19bγ + 12b2γ2)− 12a(1− bγ)bγ + bγ(1− 4bγ)]
[(1− 4a(1− bγ)− 4bγ]3(1− bγ)
−ceL = 0. (18)
Solving eL from (18) gives
eL =
(1− 2bγ)2[4a3(1− bγ)2 − a2(7− 19bγ + 12b2γ2)− 12abγ(1− bγ) + bγ(1− 4bγ)]
[4a(1− bγ) + 4bγ − 1]3(1− bγ)c .
(19)
Substituting eL into (17) we obtain
∂ΠH
∂eH
= 4a4(2b2γ2−3bγ+1)2+a3(48b3γ3−92b2γ2+72bγ−23)−12a2(4b3γ3−8b2γ2+6bγ−1)
−a(16b4γ4 − 64b3γ3 + 84b2γ2 − 41bγ + 8) + bγ(192b6γ6 − 752b5γ5
+1312b4γ4 − 1268b3γ3 + 696b2γ2 − 197bγ + 19) = 0. (20)
Solving equation (20), the equilibrium degree of diﬀerentiation aN can be
found and is reported in Appendix 1. The second-order conditions and the
conditions for local stability are presented in Appendix 2. In Appendix 1 we
also show that for a duopoly equilibrium to exist it must be the case that
bγ < 1
2
. The intuition is the following. As the strength of the social norm
increases, less and less people purchase the low quality variant, the demand
for the low-quality variant decreases and falls to zero as bγ approaches 1/2.
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To get some more insight into equations (17) and (18) we apply the
envelope theorem to analyze the components of the Þrst-order conditions
evaluated at equilibrium. The indirect proÞt function can be written as a
πH = π[θH(eH , eL), eH , eL] and πL = π[θH(eH , eL), θL(eH , eL), eH , eL]. It fol-
lows that
∂πH
∂eH
=
∂π
∂eH
>0
+
∂π
∂θH
∂θH
∂eH
<0
=
2(a− 1)[2a(2bγ − 1)− bγ](2bγ − 1)
(4a(1− bγ) + 4bγ − 1)3 (21)
−2(a− 1)[2a(2bγ − 1)− bγ](2bγ − 1)
(4a(1− bγ) + 4bγ − 1)3 = 0
and
∂πL
∂eL
=
∂π
∂eL
<0
+
∂π
∂θH
∂θH
∂eL
<0
+
∂π
∂θL
∂θL
∂eL
>0
= (22)
− (a− 1)a(1− 2bγ)
2
(4a(1− bγ) + 4bγ − 1)3−
2(a− 1)a(1− 2bγ)2
(4a(1− bγ) + 4bγ − 1)3+
3(a− 1)a(1− 2bγ)2
(4a(1− bγ) + 4bγ − 1)3 = 0
The above equations show that when choosing the proÞt-maximizing level
of quality, the high-quality Þrm takes into account the fact that higher quality
has a positive direct eﬀect and a negative strategic eﬀect on proÞts. Analo-
gously, the low-quality Þrm takes into account the fact that a higher choice
of low quality has a negative direct eﬀect and a positive strategic eﬀect on
proÞts.
Finally, we study how the social norm in favor of green purchasing aﬀects
the duopolist proÞts. The equilibrium proÞts are calculated by substituting
the low-level of quality as in equation (19) and eH = a ∗ eL into the indirect
proÞt functions of (15) and (16). These are
ΠNH =
{2(a− 1)[1− 4a(1− bγ)− 4bγ][2a(1− bγ) + bγ]2a2z}z
2(1− 4a(1− bγ)− 4bγ)6(1− bγ)2c (23)
and
ΠNL =
{a[a(4a− 3)− 2] + (a− 1)[1 + a(8a− 7)]bγ − 4(a− 1)3b2γ2}z
2[1− 4a(1− bγ)− 4bγ]6(1− bγ)2c , (24)
with
z = (1− 2b)2{(7− 4a)a2 − bγ + a[12 + a(8a− 19)]bγ− 4(a− 1)3b2γ2}. (25)
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When we substitute the equilibrium degree of diﬀerentiation a as reported
in Appendix 1 into the proÞt functions (23) and (24), set c = 1, and plot
the resulting equations, we obtain that the stronger the social norm (as
measured by bγ), the higher the proÞt of the high-quality Þrm and the lower
the proÞts of the low-quality Þrm. The increase in the high-quality Þrms
proÞts dominates and the aggregate producer surplus increases as shown in
Figure 1.74
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5.4 The Social Reward Trap
Next we study the qualitative properties of duopoly equilibrium with social
rewards by means of comparative statics. More speciÞcally, we examine
how an increase in the strength of the social norm, bγ, aﬀects the emissions
produced by the duopolistic industry. We anticipate that the strength of
the social norm may aﬀect aggregate emissions through two channels: by
aﬀecting the environmental quality as well as the quantity of the output
produced by the duopolistic industry. A question of particular interest is
whether a social norm rewarding the purchase of the green variant may in
fact, rather than improve the environment, increase aggregate emissions.
74Setting c = 1 does not aﬀect the qualitative results since the indirect proÞt functions
are in the form Πi = (.)/c.
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Our analysis proceeds as follows. We Þrst assess the impact of changes
in the strength of the social norm on the equilibrium levels of quality and
on the equilibrium demands separately, and then evaluate their aggregate
impact on the duopolistic industry polluting emissions.
As for the impact of the strength of the social norm on quality levels, we
Þnd that
deH
dbγ
> 0 and
deL
dbγ
< 0.
The details are provided in Appendix 2. As they are very complicated,
it is much more illuminating to illustrate the relationship between the equi-
librium levels of quality and the strength of the social norm with the help
of graphical analysis. The equilibrium qualities as a function of the social
norm are described in Figure 2, where c has been set equal to 1. Note that
this does not aﬀect the qualitative results since the equilibrium qualities are
in the form ei = (.)/c.
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0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 b
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
eH, eL
Equilibrium qualities
Figure 2 shows that the increases in the high-level of quality is propor-
tionally greater than the decrease in the low-level of quality. Thus we can
state
Result 1 An increase in the strength of the social norm increases the
equilibrium level of high quality and decreases the equilibrium level of low
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quality. As a result, the degree of diﬀerentiation measured as the ratio of
high quality to low quality increases.
We know from the literature on vertical diﬀerentiation that Þrms can re-
duce competition and increase proÞts by diﬀerentiating their products with
respect to their quality. Firms however do not choose the maximal techno-
logically feasible degree of diﬀerentiation unless the cost of quality is zero
(Tirole, 1988). Convex costs of quality set an upper bound to the optimal
degree of diﬀerentiation. The introduction of a social norm rewarding green
purchases increases the utility from high quality in proportion to the quality
gap. This widens the scope for competition-mitigating product diﬀerentia-
tion.
Turning next to the impact of an increase in the strength of the social
norm on demand we substitute the equilibrium prices as in (13), the low level
of quality as in equation (19) and eH = a ∗ eL into the demand functions of
(7). This gives the demand for the high- and low-quality variant as a function
of the degree of product diﬀerentiation a and the strength of the social norm,
bγ, with
xH =
2a(1− bγ) + bγ
[4a(1− bγ) + 4bγ − 1](1− bγ) and xL =
[a(1− bγ) + bγ](1− 2bγ)
[4a(1− bγ) + 4bγ − 1](1− bγ).
(26)
The impact of the strength of the social norm on the demand for low
quality and high quality can now be determined by direct diﬀerentiation of
(26) to yield75
dxL
dbγ
=
∂xL
∂bγ
−
+
∂xL
∂a−
da
dbγ
+
< 0 (27)
and
dxH
dbγ
=
∂xH
∂bγ
+
+
∂xH
∂a−
da
dbγ
+
> 0. (28)
Recall that θL is the taste parameter at which the consumer is indiﬀerent
between buying low quality or not purchasing at all. As θL decreases, more
75See Appendix 4 for the exact formulas.
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consumers enter the market and output expands. We Þnd that76
dθL
dbγ
=
∂θL
∂bγ
−
+
∂θL
∂a
+
da
dbγ
+
< 0. (29)
Summing up
Result 2 The degree of market coverage and the demand for the green
variant increase while the demand for the brown variant decreases with an
increase in the strength of the social norm.
In sum, we have that an increase in the strength of the social norm
increases aggregate output, which contributes in turn to increase aggregate
emissions.
Given Result 2 and the fact that the increase in the high-level of quality is
proportionally greater than the decrease in the low level of quality (see Figure
1), it is immediately apparent that the level of average quality increases with
an increases in the strength of the norm. Given the increase in aggregate
demand and in average quality we ask what happens to aggregate emissions.
Is it possible that they may increase in response to a strengthening of a
social norm that encourages the purchase of green products? We Þnd that
this is the case: a strengthening of the social norm aimed at encouraging
green purchases may actually increase aggregate emissions. We call this
phenomenon the social reward trap. More precisely we Þnd that
Proposition 1. The Social Reward Trap
An increase in the strength of the social norm at the margin increases
aggregate emissions if e > 1.3367
c
. A suﬃcient condition for aggregate emis-
sions to increase with an increase in the strength of the social norm is that
e > 2
c
.77
Proof.
Aggregate emissions are given by each variants net emission per unit of
production multiplied by the demand for that variant, that is, by
E = (e¯− eH)xH + (e¯− eL)xL. (30)
76See Appendix 4 for the exact formulas.
77Note that this is a suﬃcient condition only. The necessary condition for aggregate
emissions to increase is that ce > ce
crit
with ce
crit0
as reported in Appendix 5, equation
(A5.4).
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By rearranging, aggregate emissions can be expressed as a function of
average quality and output E = e¯X(bγ) − ea(bγ, c), where X is aggregate
demand. Multiplying by c gives:
cE = ce¯X(bγ)− ea(bγ). (31)
As the strength of the social norm, bγ, increases, total output, X, ex-
pands (see Result 1) and average quality, ea, increases (see Result 2). When
ce¯ is high enough, the impact of the increase in output on aggregate emis-
sions outweighs that of the increase in average quality, and the environment
deteriorates.78
Given the analytical complexity of the function representing aggregate
emissions, the possibility of the social reward trap can be best seen by looking
at the total derivative of aggregate emissions with respect to the strength of
the social norm when evaluated at the margin, that is, for a = 5.2512 and
bγ = 0. In such a case we have that at the margin
dE
dbγ
bγ=0
= 0.1514e− 0.2024
c
> 0 for e >
1.3367
c
. (32)
How likely it is that the unabated level of emissions is high enough to
induce an increase in aggregate emissions? In the duopoly equilibrium, in
the absence of social rewards, the high-level and low-level of quality are,
respectively, eH =
0.2533
c
and eL =
0.0482
c
(Motta 1993). Thus, at the margin,
it is enough that the abatement eﬀort of the Þrm producing the green variant
is less than a Þfth of the unabated level of emissions, and aggregate emissions
increase.
The social reward trap can emerge in a model like ours because we as-
sume partial market coverage: some consumers do not buy the diﬀerentiated
commodity, so that the model leaves scope for changes in output. It is of
interest to examine the eﬀects of a strengthening of the social norm when
full market coverage is assumed. These are summed up in Proposition 2.
Proposition 2
When the market is fully covered, an increase in the norms strength in-
creases the equilibrium level of low quality and decreases the equilibrium level
78See Appendix 5 for the derivation of the critical value of ce above which aggregate
emissions increase.
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of high quality, so that the degree of diﬀerentiation decreases, competition is
enhanced and proÞts decrease. The demand for the green variant decreases
while that for the brown variant increases. Average environmental quality
increases.
Thus under full market coverage there is no social reward trap: all con-
sumers purchase the diﬀerentiated commodity so that changes in aggregate
emissions can be due only to changes in average quality. Average quality
increases as the social norm becomes stronger, and aggregate emissions un-
ambiguously decrease.79
Given that a social norm rewarding green purchases may be beneÞcial or
detrimental to the environment depending on the markets degree of coverage,
it is important to discuss how close to reality the assumptions of fully covered
and partially covered markets actually are.
The assumption of partial market coverage best describes markets that
are not yet saturated, where there is scope for an increase in demand, as
is typical of the markets of recently introduced products such as cellular
phones, DVD readers, etc. In such a case, a stronger social norm induces an
expansion in demand, which may lead to an increase in aggregate emissions.
However, when the market for the diﬀerentiated commodity is almost
saturated and there is little likelihood for an increase in demand, then the
stronger norm unambiguously improves the environment by increasing the
average quality of the diﬀerentiated commodity, given that total output does
not change.80
What are the policy implications of the possibility of the social reward
trap? The possibility of the social reward trap suggests that the promotion
of products as green on the basis of how much more environmentally friendly
they are as compared to their brown counterparts may be problematic: what
is just as important, if not more important, is their impact in terms of emis-
79The full coverage model assumes that the cost function is linear in quantity and
quadratic in quality. For the details of the full coverage model and its solution, see
Appendix 7.
80Interestingly, in such a case, the increase in average quality comes from an increase in
the quality of the brown variant coupled with an expansion of its demand against a decrease
in both the demand and quality of the green variant. This is because the producer of the
brown variant, in order to avoid losing market share in the presence of the norm rewarding
green consumption, is induced to increase the environmental quality of its product.
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sions.81
In sum, Proposition 1 points out to the need of some caution when re-
joicing for the emergence of social norms rewarding the purchase of green
goods. When the norm aﬀects products whose markets are not saturated, it
is possible that such a norm may have adverse eﬀects on the environment.
5.5 Social Rewards Versus Social Punishments
Now we turn to study whether aggregate emissions may increase in response
to a strengthening of a norm that, instead of rewarding those purchasing the
green variant, socially punishes those purchasing the brown variant.82
Let us assume that consumers who purchase the brown variant are socially
punished. The punishment reduces the indirect utility of the consumers
who purchase the brown variant. The punishment function is identical in
absolute value to the reward function. The indirect utility of a consumer
who purchases the brown variant thus becomes
UL = θeL − pL − bγ(eH − eL)xH . (33)
The direct eﬀect of an increase in the quality of the brown variant on the
utility of the consumer who purchases it is unambiguously positive with
∂U
∂eL
= θ +
bγ
1− bγ > 0. (34)
As we assume no rewards for those purchasing the green variant, the
indirect utility of a consumer purchasing the green variant is
UH = θeH − pH . (35)
The indiﬀerence relation between the utility from the high- and the low-
quality variant, UH = UL, is analytically identical to the model with social
81Consider, for instance, cellular phones, a product whose market is far from being
saturated in most countries. Suppose now that some Þrm develops a cellular phone which
is much less polluting that the other models in circulation. A social norm promoting the
purchase of the green cellular phone may increase emissions if the emissions associated to
the production of the green variant are high enough.
82In a model with full coverage these two norms are analytically indistinguishable and
produce the same results: a decrease in aggregate emissions. This is not so when partial
coverage is assumed.
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rewards and thus yields the same taste parameter θH , which identiÞes the
consumer who is indiﬀerent between purchasing high and low quality. This
is
θH =
(pH − pL)− bγ(eH − eL)
(1− bγ)(eH − eL) . (36)
However, parameter θL, which identiÞes the consumer who is indiﬀerent
between buying the low-quality variant or not participating in the market,
now diﬀers from the reward model, since equation UL = 0 includes the social
punishment. It yields
θL =
bγ(eH − eL) + pL
bγ(eH − eL) + eL . (37)
Diﬀerentiating (37) in bγ gives ∂θL
∂bγ
= (eH−eL)
bγ(eH−eL)+eL (1 −
bγ
bγ(eH−eL)+eL ) >
0, which implies that such a norm has the direct eﬀect of increasing the
taste parameter at which the consumer is indiﬀerent between buying and
not buying the diﬀerentiated commodity, which in turn implies a reduction
of the degree of market coverage.
As before, the duopolists play a two-stage quality-price game by maxi-
mizing πi = pixi − c2e2i in ei. The solutions of price game are
pH =
(2− bγ)eH(eH − eL)
(4− bγ)eH − (1− bγ)eL ; pL =
[eL − bγ(eH + eL)](eH − eL)
(4− bγ)eH − (1− bγ)eL , (38)
with a price gap
pH − pL = 2eH − eL(1− bγ)
(4− bγ)eH − (1− bγ)eL > 0. (39)
Diﬀerentiating (39) w.r.t.. the strength of the social norm gives ∂(pH−pL)
∂bγ
=
eH(2eH−eL)
[(4−bγ)eH−(1−bγ)eL]2 > 0, that is, a stronger norm that punishes brown pur-
chases has the direct impact of increasing the price dispersion.
In the quality game, we solve ∂ΠH
∂eH
= 0 in eL, which gives
eL=
{a[3− a(4− bγ)− 3bγ]− 2(1− bγ)}(2− bγ)2
(1− bγ)c[1− a(4− bγ)− bγ)]3 (40)
and then substitute it into ∂ΠL
∂eL
= 0 and solve in the degree of diﬀerentiation
a. The solution is reported in Appendix 6. Note that the quality game has
a solution only if the strength of the social norm is small enough.83
83A suﬃcient condition being bγ < 0.06, a restriction which is much stronger than the
initial restriction bγ < 1 imposed in the set-up of the model.
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It is important to check whether the Þrm producing the brown variant
can yield positive proÞts under such a social norm. We Þnd that the proÞts
of the Þrm producing the green variant are positive for all bγ < 1 while the
proÞts of the low-quality Þrm are positive for the range of values below the
curve depicted in Figure 3.
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In Appendix 6 we show that a norm punishing brown purchases may
lead to a monopoly unless the strength of the norm is very low. Plotting
the degree of diﬀerentiation as a function of the strength of the norm as in
Figure 4, one can see that it increases with an increase in the strength of the
social norm.
Figure 4
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Average quality Þrst increases and then decreases with an increase in
the strength of the norm while aggregate demand unambiguously decreases,
as can be seen from Figure 5 and 6, which represent average quality and
aggregate demand as a function of the norms strength.
Figure 5
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As in the case with social rewards, given the analytical complexity of the
function representing aggregate emissions, we calculate the total derivative
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of aggregate emissions with respect to the strength of the social norm and
evaluate it at the margin, that is, for a = 5.2512 and bγ = 0. This gives
dE
dbγ
bγ=0
=− 0.0893
c
−1.99872e < 0. (41)
Equation (41) tells us that at the margin a norm punishing brown pur-
chases reduces aggregate emissions.
Summing up, a social norm punishing brown purchases has a crucially
diﬀerent impact on the environment than a norm rewarding green purchases.
While the latter increases aggregate emissions at the margin, the former
reduces them. The diﬀerent environmental impact of the two norms is driven
by the norms eﬀect on aggregate demand: The buy-green norm expands
output ,while the do-not-buy-brown norm reduces it.
5.6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we analyzed the impact of a social norm that rewards con-
sumers who buy green, that is that rewards consumers who choose to buy
the environmentally friendlier variant rather than the brown variant of a
diﬀerentiated commodity. We showed that the impact of such a norm on
aggregate emissions and welfare depends crucially on whether the market
is fully covered or not. When all quality-dependent costs are Þxed and the
market partially covered, meaning that some consumers do not buy either
variant, a social norm that rewards consumers for buying green may actually
increase aggregate emissions. We called this phenomenon the social reward
trap, in that a social norm that serves to encourage green consumption and
thereby to beneÞt the environment, may actually turn out to increase pol-
lution. This suggests that social norms that encourage green purchases may
be detrimental to the environment in so far as they do not also reward con-
sumption reduction.
We also examined the possible eﬀects of a norm that punishes brown
purchases rather than rewarding green ones. We showed that in the case
of partial market coverage, this norm decreases output and, at the margin,
decreases aggregate emissions.
There are many avenues for further study. One avenue would be to endo-
genize the proportion of believers in the norm, which is given exogenously in
the model. Following Akerlof (1980), this could be done by assuming that if
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in the current time period the proportion of people following the norm (mea-
sured by the demand for the green variant) is smaller than the proportion
of believers in the norm, then the strength of the norm will be eroded. If
it is higher, the norm will be strengthened. Norm erosion will in turn lead
to a smaller proportion of believers in the next period and vice versa. It
would also be interesting to examine how our result may change if the social
norm also rewarded consumption reduction, that is, if it also rewarded the
consumers who do not participate in the market.
Finally, the model could be extended by assuming that either the propor-
tion of believers in the social norm or the upper bound of the distribution
of tastes for environmental quality depends on the level of investment in
environmental advertising done either by Þrms or by the regulator.
References
[1] Arrow, K.J., 1971. Political and Economic Valuation of Social Eﬀects
and Externalities. In: Intriligator, M. (Ed.) Frontier of Quantitative Eco-
nomics. North Holland, Amsterdam.
[2] Akerlof, G. A., 1976. The Economics of Caste and of the Rat Race and
Other Woeful Tales. Quarterly Journal of Economics 91, 599-617.
[3] Akerlof, G. A., 1980. A Theory of Social Custom of Which Unemployment
May Be One Consequence. Quarterly Journal of Economics 95, 749-775.
[4] Baake, P. and A. Boom, 2001. Vertical Product Diﬀerentiation, Network
Externalities, and Compatibility Decisions. International Journal Of In-
dustrial Organization 19, 267-284.
[5] Basu, K., 1995. Civil Institutions and Evolution: Concepts, Critique and
Models. Journal of Development Economics 46, 19-33.
[6] Ben-Ner, A. and L. Putterman, 1998. Economics, Values, and Organiza-
tion, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
[7] Bester, H. and W. Guth, 1997. Is Altruism Evolutionary Stable? Journal
of Economic Behavior and Organization 34, 193-209.
[8] Bird, E. J., 1999. Can Welfare Policy Make Use of Social Norms. Ratio-
nality and Society 11(3), 343-365.
120
[9] Bratt, C., 1999. The Impact of Norms and Assumed Consequences on
Recycling Behavior. Environment and Behavior 31, 630-657.
[10] Coleman, J., 1990. Foundations of Social Theory}, Cambridge: Harvard
University Press.
[11] Cullis, J.G., and A. Lewis., 1997. Why People Pay Taxes: From A
Conventional Economic Model to a Model of Social Convention. Journal
of Economic Psychology 18, 305-321.
[12] Fershtman, C. and Y. Weiss, 1998a. Social rewards, Externalities and
Stable Preferences. Journal of Public Economics 70, 53-73.
[13] Fershtman, C. and Y. Weiss, 1998b. Why Do We Care of What Others
Think about Us? In Ben-Ner, A. and L. Putterman, Economics, Values,
and Organization, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 133-150.
[14] Grilo, I., Shy O., and J-F. Thisse, 2001. Price Competition when Con-
sumer Behavior is Characterized by Conformity or Vanity. Journal of Pub-
lic Economics 80(3), 385-408.
[15] Grossman G. and A. B. Krueger 1995 Economic Growth and the Envi-
ronment, Quarterly Journal of Economics 110(2), 353 - 377.
[16] Hess, S., 1998. Individual Behavior and Collective Action toward the
Environment: An Economic Framework based on the Social Customs Ap-
proach. Rationality and Society 10(2), 203-221.
[17] Lambertini, L. and R. Orsini, 2002. Vertically Diﬀerentiated Monopoly
with a Positional Good, Australian Economic Papers, forthcoming.
[18] Levin, G., 1990. Consumers Turning Green: JWT Survey. Advertising
Age 61, 74.
[19] Lindbeck, A. , S. Nyberg and J. Weibull, 1999. Social Norms and Eco-
nomic Incentives in the Welfare State. Quarterly Journal of Economics
114, 1-35.
[20] Motta, M., 1993. Endogenous Quality Choice: Price vs. Quality Com-
petition. Journal of Industrial Economics 41, 113-131.
121
[21] Mussa, M. and S. Rosen, 1978. Monopoly and Product Quality. Journal
of Economic Theory 18, 301-317
[22] Myles, G. D. and Naylor, R. A., 1996. A Model of Tax Evasion with
Group Conformity and Social Customs. European Journal of Political
Economy 12, 49-66.
[23] Rauscher, M. 1997. Voluntary Emission Reductions, Social Rewards,
and Environmental Policy. Nota di Lavoro 45.97, Fondazione Eni Enrico
Mattei, Milano.
[24] Rege, M., 2000. Evolution of Peer Groups that Enforce Environmental
Norms: Green Taxation Can Crowd in Environmentally Friendly Behavior,
paper presented at the 2000 EAERE Conference, Rethymnon, Greece.
[25] Roper Starch, 2000. Green Gauge Report.
[26] Tirole, J., 1988. The Theory of Industrial Organization, Cambridge,
Mass, MIT Press.
[27] Wendner R., 2000. Environmental Externalities and Consumers Frames
of Reference. Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research Discussion
Paper No.00-10.
122
Appendix 1: Solutions of the Quality Game
Solving equation (20) in a gives four solutions, of which two are not real
numbers and one has a < 0 for 0 ≤ b < 1
2
. Therefore there is a unique
equilibrium with
a =
23− 72bγ + 92(bγ)2 − 48(bγ)3
16(1− bγ)(1− 2bγ)2
+
1
2
vuuuut w + j +
g
2∗2 23 [1−6bγ+13(bγ)2−12(bγ)3+4(bγ)4]2k 13
+ k
1
3
12∗2 13 [1−3bγ+2(bγ)2]2
+
1
2
vuuuut w − j −
g
2∗223 [1−6bγ+13(bγ)2−12(bγ)3+4(bγ)4]2k 13
− k
1
3
12∗2 13 [1−3bγ+2(bγ)2]2
+
[23−72bγ+92(bγ)2−48(bγ)3]3
16(1−bγ)3(1−2bγ)6 +
3[23−72bγ+92(bγ)2−48(bγ)3][−1+6bγ−8(bγ)2+4(bγ)3]
(1−bγ)2(1−2bγ)4
−2[−8+41bγ−84(bγ)2+64(bγ)3−16(bγ)4]
[1−3bγ+2(bγ)2]2
4
s
w + j + g
2∗2 23 [1−6bγ+13(bγ)2−12(bγ)3+4(bγ)4]2k 13
+ k
1
3
12∗2 13 [1−3bγ+2(bγ)2]2
(A1.1)
with
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k = 3(−3168 + 31608bγ − 136287(bγ)2 + 334170(bγ)3
−521199(bγ)4 + 567540(bγ)5 − 501192(bγ)6
+417888(bγ)7 − 301680(bγ)8 + 142272(bγ)9 − 29952(bγ)10 +√3vuuuuuuuuuuut
[1− 3b+ 2(bγ)2)3(13407232− 160718592bγ + 890804448(bγ)2
−3018292588(bγ)3 + 6967124835(bγ)4 − 11557198497(bγ)5
+14150444606(bγ)6 − 12902847240(bγ)7
+8708713152(bγ)8 − 4299777616(bγ)9 + 1637986272(bγ)10
−681303552(bγ)11 + 399192576(bγ)12
−186802176(bγ)13 + 39149568(bγ)14 + 131072(bγ)15]
),
(A1.2)
g = [1− 3bγ + 2(bγ)2]2[−136 + 967bγ − 2851(bγ)2 + 4464(bγ)3
−3868(bγ)4 + 1680(bγ)5 − 192(bγ)6 − 64(bγ)7], (A1.3)
w =
[23− 72bγ + 92(bγ)2 − 48(bγ)3]2
64(1− bγ)2(1− 2bγ)4 +
3[−1 + 6bγ − 8(bγ)2 + 4(bγ)3]
(1− bγ)(1− 2bγ)2 ,
(A1.4)
and
j =
1− 7bγ + 14(bγ)2 − 12(bγ)3 + 4(bγ)4
1− 6bγ + 13(bγ)2 − 12(bγ)3 + 4(bγ)4 . (A1.5)
When bγ = 0, that is, in the absence of the social norm, the degree of
diﬀerentiation a = 5.25.
Appendix 2: Conditions for the Existence of the Duopoly
Equilibrium
In this appendix we present the second-order conditions for the quality
game, the suﬃcient condition for local stability, and the calculation of the
restrictions on the value of the strength of the social norm, bγ, necessary to
guarantee that the duopoly equilibrium exists.
The second-order conditions are satisÞed. These are
∂2πH
∂e2H
= −8(1− 2bγ)[1 + 2(bγ)
2 + a(1− bγ)(5 + 2bγ)]
[1− 4a(1− b)− 4b]4eL − c < 0 (A.2.1)
124
and
∂2πL
∂e2L
= −2[7 + 8a(1− bγ) + 8b]a
2(1− 2bγ)2
[1− 4a(1− bγ)− 4bγ]4eL − c < 0. (A.2.2)
The suﬃcient condition for local stability that the determinant of the
Jacobian matrix be positive is also satisÞed with
J =
 ∂2πH∂e2H ∂2πH∂eH∂eL
∂2πL
∂eL∂eH
∂2πL
∂e2L
 , (A.2.3)
∂2πH
∂eH∂eL
=
8a(1− 2bγ)[1 + 2(bγ)2 + a(1− bγ)(5 + 2bγ)]
[1− 4a(1− bγ)− 4bγ]4eL > 0, (A.2.4)
and
∂2πL
∂eL∂eH
=
2a[7 + 8a(1− bγ) + 8bγ]a2(1− 2bγ)2
[1− 4a(1− bγ)− 4bγ]4eL > 0. (A.2.5)
Finally, the existence of the duopoly equilibrium requires that the follow-
ing conditions are satisÞed:
pH − pL > 0 and pL > 0, (A.2.6)
xH > 0 and xL > 0, (A.2.7)
and
eH > eL and eL > 0. (A.2.8)
In words, we require that the price of the brown variant is positive but
lower than that of the green variant (A.2.6), that the demand for both prod-
ucts is positive (A.2.7), and that the green variant has a higher level of
environmental quality than the brown variant (A.2.8).
We thus solve the system of inequalities (A.2.6), (A.2.7), and (A.2.8).
The solution to the system of inequalities (A.2.6) is found by substituting
into the price functions for a = eH
eL
and then solving for pH − pL > 0 and
pL > 0.84 This gives the solutions:
1 < a <
3
2
and
2a− 1
2a− 3 < bγ <
1
2
; (A.2.9)
84For this purpose we used the software Mathemathica 4 (Add-on package Inequality-
Solve).
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a =
3
2
and bγ <
1
2
; (A.2.10)
a >
3
2
and bγ <
1
2
; bγ >
2a− 1
2a− 3 . (A.2.11)
Observe that if a < 3
2
then 2a−1
2a−3 < 0. Since in the model by assumption
bγ > 0, we have that a suﬃcient condition for both inequalities to be satisÞed
is a > 1 and bγ < 1
2
.
The system of inequalities (A.2.7) xH > 0 and xL > 0 with
xH =
2a(1− bγ) + bγ
[4a(1− bγ) + 4bγ − 1](1− bγ) and xL =
[a(1− bγ) + bγ](1− 2bγ)
[4a(1− bγ) + 4bγ − 1](1− bγ)
has a solution for
a > 1 and bγ <
1
2
;
2a
2a− 1 < bγ <
4a− 1
4a− 4 . (A.2.12)
Let us now examine the solutions to (A.2.6) and (A.2.7). Which values
of bγ and a satisfy both pH − pL > 0 and pL > 0,and xH > 0 and xL > 0?
In particular let us compare condition bγ > 2a−1
2a−3 in (A.2.11) to condition
2a
2a−1 < bγ <
4a−1
4a−4 in (A.2.12). Observe that it is always the case that
2a−1
2a−3 >
4a−1
4a−4 for any a > 1. It follows that (A.2.6) and (A.2.7) are simultaneously
satisÞed only for bγ < 1
2
and a > 1.
Finally we turn to (A.2.8) and solve in a and bγ for eH > eL and eL > 0.
The system of inequalities has a solution for
1 < a ≤ 2.06777 and 1 < bγ < 4a− 1
4a− 4;
bγ >
1
8(1− a)2 (8a
2 − 11a+ 1 +√25a2 − 22a+ 1) (A.2.13)
and
a > 2.06777 and bγ <
1
2
;
1
2
< bγ <
1
8(1− a)2 (8a
2 − 11a+ 1−√25a2 − 22a+ 1);
1 < bγ <
4a− 1
4a− 4; bγ >
1
8(1− a)2 (8a
2 − 11a+ 1 +√25a2 − 22a+ 1).
(A.2.14)
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Solution (A.2.13) however is not compatible with positive prices and
demands since both 1 < bγ < 4a−1
4a−4 and bγ >
1
8(1−a)2 (8a
2 − 11a + 1 +√
25a2 − 22a+ 1) imply bγ > 1
2
. Similarly incompatible with positive prices
and demands are the solutions in (A.2.14) 1
2
< bγ < 1
8(1−a)2 (8a
2 − 11a+ 1−√
25a2 − 22a+ 1); 1 < bγ < 4a−1
4a−4 ; bγ >
1
8(1−a)2 (8a
2−11a+1+√25a2 − 22a+ 1).
Thus, combining the conditions for eH > e and eL > 0 with those for
positive demand for both variants and prices, with the price of the high-
quality variant being higher than that of the low-quality variant, gives the
condition for the duopoly equilibrium a > 2.06777 and bγ < 1
2
. Recall from
Appendix 1 that in the absence of social norms, a = 5.25 at equilibrium.
Appendix 3, shows that da
dbγ
> 0. It follows that condition a > 2.06777 is
always satisÞed. In summary, a duopoly equilibrium exists for bγ < 1
2
.
Appendix 3: Proof of Result 1
The impact of the proportion of believers on the equilibrium qualities can
be assessed by standard comparative statics by solving the system ∂2πH∂e2H ∂2πH∂eH∂eL
∂2πL
∂eL∂eH
∂2πL
∂e2L
Ã deH
deL
!
=
 − ∂2πH∂eH∂bγ 0
0 − ∂2πL
∂eL∂bγ
Ã dbγ
dbγ
!
, (A.3.1)
with
∂2πH
∂eH∂bγ
= −1
9
{ 54(1 + 2a)
2
[1− 4a(1− bγ)− 4bγ]4 +
6(1 + 2a)(10a− 1)
[1− 4a(1− bγ)− 4bγ]3
− 11 + 20(a− 2)a
[1− 4a(1− bγ)− 4bγ]2 −
1
(1− bγ)2} > 0 (A.3.2)
and
∂2πL
∂eL∂bγ
= −1
9
{− 54a(1 + 2a)
2
[1− 4a(1− bγ)− 4bγ]4 +
6(a− 1)(1 + 2a)(6a− 1)
[1− 4a(1− bγ) − 4bγ]3
+
4(5a− 1)a+ 2
[1− 4a(1− bγ)− 4bγ]2 +
1
(1− bγ)2} < 0. (A.3.3)
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The second-order derivatives and the cross derivatives are reported in
Appendix 2. Let
BH =
 ∂2πH∂eH∂bγ ∂2πH∂eH∂eL
0 ∂
2πL
∂e2L
 (A.3.4)
and
BL =
 ∂2πH∂e2H 0
∂2πL
∂eL∂eH
∂2πL
∂eL∂bγ
 . (A.3.5)
It is easy to show that DetBH > 0 and DetBL < 0. Recall from appendix
2 that DetJ > 0. It follows that deH
dbγ
= detBH
det J
> 0 and deL
dbγ
= detBL
det J
< 0.
Since high quality increases with an increase in bγ, and low quality de-
creases with an increase in bγ, it follows that the degree of diﬀerentiation
increases with an increase in bγ. This can also be seen by applying the im-
plicit function theorem to equation (22), which gives da
dbγ
= − ∂2πH
∂eH∂bγ
/ ∂
2πH
∂eH∂a
,
with
da
dbγ
= −
( 54(1+2a)
2(1+a2)
[1−4a(1−bγ)−4bγ]4 − 6(1+2a)[1+a(a(6a−7)−9)][1−4a(1−bγ)−4bγ]3 − 2a[−19+2a(5a+4)]−11[1−4a(1−bγ)−4bγ]2
− 1+a
(1−bγ)2 [1− 4a(1− bγ)− 4bγ]4(bγ − 1)
9(−8− 16a4(1− 2bγ)2(1− bγ)3 + 25bγ+
16a3(1− 2bγ)2(1− bγ)2(1− 4bγ)
−3(1− bγ)a2(1− 2bγ)2(7 + 8bγ(4bγ − 3))
−8a(1− bγ)(1− 4b2γ2)(5 + bγ(8bγ − 11))
+4b2γ2(bγ(25− 16bγ(2− bγ)))))
> 0.
. (A.3.6)
Appendix 4: Proof of Result 2
The impact of bγ on the demand for the brown variant is given by
dxL
dbγ
=
∂xL
∂bγ
−
+
∂xL
∂a−
da
dbγ
+
< 0, (A.4.1)
with
∂xL
∂bγ
= −4a
2(1− 2bγ + b2γ2)− 2a(1− 6bγ + 5b2γ2) + 1− 4bγ + 6b2γ2
[1− 4a(1− bγ)− 4bγ]2(1− bγ)2 ,
(A.4.2)
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∂xL
∂a
= − 1− 2bγ
[1− 4a(1− bγ)− 4bγ]2 , (A.4.3)
and da
dbγ
as in (A.3.6). The signs of equations (A.4.2) and (A.4.3) have been
checked with Mathematica 4, InequalitySolve and are both negative. This
can be seen also by plotting the numerator of both equations (the denomi-
nator is unquestionably positive) with respect to a and bγ. The impact of bγ
on the demand for the green variant is given by
dxH
dbγ
=
∂xH
∂bγ
+
+
∂xH
∂a−
da
dbγ
+
> 0, (A.4.4)
with
∂xH
∂bγ
=
4(a− 1)(2a+ 1)
3[(1− 4a(1− bγ)− 4bγ]2 +
1
3(1− bγ)2 , (A.4.5)
∂xH
∂a
= − 2(1− 2bγ)
[1− 4a(1− bγ)− 4bγ]2 < 0, (A.4.6)
and da
dbγ
as in (A.3.6).
Similarly, the impact on market coverage is given by
dθL
dbγ
=
∂θL
∂bγ
−
+
∂θL
∂a
+
da
dbγ
+
< 0, (A.4.7)
with
∂θL
∂bγ
= − 2(2a
2 − a− 1)
[1− 4a(1− bγ)− 4bγ]2and
∂θL
∂a
=
3(1− 2b)
[1− 4a(1− bγ)− 4bγ]2 .
(A.4.8)
Appendix 5: Proof of Proposition 1
By substituting eH = a ∗ eL and the equilibrium demands into equation
(6), we can express aggregate emissions as
E = −
(1− 2bγ)2[a(1 + 2a) + bγ − 2a(1 + a)bγ + 2(a− 1)b2γ2]
{a2(4a− 7) + bγ − a[12 + a(8a− 19)]bγ + 4(a− 1)3b2γ2}
[1− 4a(1− bγ)− 4bγ]4(1− bγ)2c
+
[2(a− 1)bγ − 3a]e
1− 4a(1− bγ)− 4bγ . (A.5.1)
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Let us now deÞne the marginal cost of abating the last unit of emissions
as ce. We multiply aggregate emissions by c so as to obtain cE = f(b, ce).
Given that c > 0 and γ > 0, then sign(dE
db
) = sign(dcE
dbγ
dbγ
db
) = γsign(dcE
dbγ
).
The impact of b on cE is given by
dcE
dbγ
= γ(
∂cE
∂bγ
+
∂cE
∂a
da
dbγ
). (A.5.2)
We calculate dcE
dbγ
and then solve the following system of inequalities with
the aid of Mathematica 4
dcE
dbγ
> 0, bγ <
1
2
, ce > 0, and a ≥ 5.25. (A.5.3)
The choice of a ≥ 5.25 is due to the fact that this is the equilibrium value of
a for bγ = 0. Since da
dbγ
> 0, it is the case that in the model a ≥ 5.25.
We obtain that dcE
dbγ
> 0 if ce > cecrit with
cecrit = ((−1 + 2bγ)(128a9)(1− 2bγ)2(−1 + bγ)6
−128a8(−1 + bγ)5(−1 + bγ(21− 52bγ + 36b2γ2))
+8a7(−1 + bγ)4(25 + 4bγ(−115 + 4bγ(156 + bγ(−265 + 143bγ))))
−8a6(−1 + bγ)3(75 + bγ(−209 + 8bγ
(−241 + bγ(1087 + 2bγ(−740 + 331bγ))))) + a5(−1 + bγ)2
(−1285 + 2bγ(4944 + bγ(−8965 + 4bγ(−4015 + bγ
(18009 + 80bγ(−259 + 99bγ))))))
−a4(−1 + bγ)2(−1367 + 2bγ(4420 + bγ(−12695 + 4bγ(1651 + bγ(8975 +
4b(−4049 + 1996bγ)))))) + bγ(12 + bγ(−96 + bγ
(389− 2bγ(442 + bγ(−701 + 4bγ(229
+4bγ(−49 + 20bγ)))))))− a2(−1 + bγ)(−12 + bγ(651 +
bγ(−557 + 2bγ(−665 + bγ(−2757 + 16bγ(889 + 2bγ(−635 + 306bγ))))))) +
4a3(−1 + bγ)(−64 + bγ(−481 + 2bγ(1581 + 2bγ(−1447 + 4bγ(−143 +
2bγ(686 + bγ(−855 + 341bγ))))))) + a(8 + bγ(−104 + bγ(885 + 2bγ(−1333 +
2bγ(1291 + bγ(−2557 + 2bγ(2007 + 16bγ(−112 + 41bγ))))))))))/
((1 + 4a(−1 + bγ)− 4bγ)3(−1 + bγ)2(4 + 16a5(−1 + bγ)3(−1 + 2bγ)
−4a4(−1 + bγ)2(−1 + 2bγ)(−11 + 14bγ) +
2a3(−1 + bγ)2(−1 + 2bγ(−27 + 32bγ))
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−2a2(−1 + bγ)(41 + bγ(−91 + 22bγ + 16b2γ2))
+bγ(−36 + bγ(79 + 8bγ(−9 + 2bγ)))
+a(−29 + 2bγ(81 + bγ(−151− 16(−6 + bγ)bγ))))). (A.5.4)
We substitute the equilibrium level of the degree of diﬀerentiation into
equation (A.5.4) and plot the value of ce above which aggregate emissions
increase with an increase in the strength of the social norm (see Figure 7).
Since ∂ce
∂bγ
> 0 and since the existence of a duopoly equilibrium requires that
bγ < 0.5, then a suﬃcient condition for aggregate emissions to increase is
that ce > ce∗ with ce∗ ' 2.
Figure 7
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Appendix 6: The Price and Quality Game in the Model with
Social Punishment
As in the model with social rewards, consumers whose taste parameter θ
is such that θH ≤ θ ≤ 1 purchase the high-quality variant, while consumers
whose taste parameter θ is such that θL ≤ θ < θH purchase the low-quality
variant. The rest of the consumers buy nothing Therefore, the demand for
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the high-quality and low-quality variant are, respectively, xH = 1− θH and
xL = θH − θL, which can be expressed via (32) as
xH = 1−(pH − pL)− bγ(eH − eL)
(1− bγ)(eH − eL) ; xL =
(pH − pL)− bγ(eH − eL)
(1− bγ)(eH − eL) −
bγ(eH − eL) + pL
bγ(eH − eL) + eL .
(A.6.1)
The duopolists play a two-stage game where, in the Þrst stage, the quality
game, the duopolists choose the products environmental quality level, ei, by
maximizing πi = pixi − c2e2i in ei and in the second stage, the price game,
they compete in prices. At this stage the cost of environmental quality has
already been sunk and zero unit costs of production are incurred. The model
is solved by backward induction starting from stage two. We substitute for
the expressions for xi0s and θ0is into the proÞt functions and have
max
pH
πH = [1− (pH − pL)− bγ(eH − eL)
(1− bγ)(eH − eL) ]pH (A.6.2)
and
max
pL
πL = [
(pH − pL)− bγ(eH − eL)
(1− bγ)(eH − eL) −
bγ(eH − eL) + pL
bγ(eH − eL) + eL ]pL. (A.6.3)
The Þrst-order conditions are
∂πH
∂pH
=
eH − eL − 2pH + pL
(1− bγ)(eH − eL) = 0 (A.6.4)
and
∂πL
∂pL
=
eH − eL − 2pH + pL
(1− bγ)(eH − eL)[bγ(eH − eL) + eL] = 0. (A.6.5)
In stage one, given price competition, Þrms maximize their proÞts, πi =
pixi − c2e2i , with respect to quality. When we substitute for the equilibrium
prices we obtain the indirect proÞt functions
max
eH
ΠH =
(2− bγ)2e2H(eH − eL)
(1− bγ)[(4− bγ)eH − (1− bγ)eL]2 −
c
2
e2H (A.6.6)
and
max
eL
ΠL =
[bγ(eH + eL)− eL]2eH(eH − eL)
(1− bγ)[(4− bγ)eH − (1− bγ)eL]2[bγ(eH − eL) + eL] −
c
2
e2L.
(A.6.7)
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We calculate the Þrst-order conditions ∂ΠH
∂eH
= 0 and ∂ΠL
∂eL
= 0. We then
substitute into the Þrst-order conditions eH = a ∗ eL,with a > 1. This gives
∂ΠH
∂eH
=
a{a[3− a(4− bγ)− 3bγ]− 2(1− bγ)}(2− bγ)2
(1− bγ)[1− a(4− bγ)− bγ)]3 − aceL = 0 (A.6.8)
and
∂ΠL
∂eL
=
1
4(1− bγ)[1− a(4− bγ)− bγ)]3[1− (a− 1)bγ]2
{4a2[a(bγ+1)−1](−7+4a+6[3−2(2−a)bγ−(a−1)(13a−15)bγ2+4(a−1)2bγ3]}
−ceL = 0 (A.6.9)
The optimal degree of diﬀerentiation is
a = Root[−8 + 32bγ − 50b2γ2 + 38b3γ3 − 14b4γ4 + 2b5γ5 + 12#1
−64bγ#1+ 123b2γ2#1− 109b3γ3#1+ 45b4γ4#1
−7b5γ5#1− 23#12 + 101bγ#12 − 177b2γ2#12
+150b3γ3#12 − 60b4γ4#12 + 9b5γ5#12 +
+4#13 − 53bγ#13 + 118b2γ2#13 − 101b3γ3#13 + 37b4γ4#13
−5b5γ5#13 ++8bγ#14 − 17b2γ2#14 +
9b3γ3#14 + 4b4γ4#14 + b5γ5#14 − 12b2γ2#15
+13b3γ3#15 − 4b4γ4#15&, 2], (A.6.10)
where Root[f, k] represents the kth root of the polynomial equation f [x] =
0. Note that a is a real number greater than one only if bγ is small enough,
a suﬃcient condition being bγ < 0.05.
Figure 8 and in Figure 9 show the plot of high and low quality, respec-
tively, as a function of the norms strength when c = 1.
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By substituting into (A.1.1) the equilibrium prices, the low-level of quality
as a function of a and eH = a ∗ eL, we can express the demand for the green
and brown variant as a function of the degree of diﬀerentiation a and the
strength of the social norm bγ as
xH =
a(2− bγ)
[a(4− bγ)− 1 + bγ](1− bγ) and xL =
a[1− (1 + a)bγ]
[a(4− bγ)− 1 + bγ](1− bγ)[1 + (a− 1)bγ] .
(A.6.11)
Demands are both positive provided that 0 < bγ < 1
1+a
. This condition
also ensures that the equilibrium prices and the price dispersion are positive
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and this condition is less stringent than the condition required for positive
proÞts of the Þrm producting the brown variant. Prices expressed as a func-
tion of the degree of diﬀerentiation a and the strength of the social norm bγ
are
pH = B(2− bγ)3 and pL = B(2− bγ)2(2a− 1 + bγ), (A.6.12)
with
B=
(1− a)a{a[3− a(4− bγ)− 3bγ]− 2(1− bγ)}
c[1− a(4− bγ)− bγ]4(1− bγ) . (A.6.13)
Substituting the equilibrium prices of (36), the low-level of quality as in
(38), and eH = a ∗ eL gives the proÞts as a function of a and bγ. These are
πH =
a3[a2(−4 + bγ)− 2(1− bγ) + 3a(1− bγ)][7− a(4− bγ)− bγ](2− bγ)4
2c[1− a(4− bγ)− bγ]6(1− bγ)2
(A.6.14)
and
πH =
2D(1− a)a[1− bγ(1 + a)]− D
1−a(4−bγ)−bγ
2c[1− a(4− bγ)− bγ]5(1− bγ)2[1− (1− a)bγ] , (A.6.15)
with
D = {a[3− a(4− bγ)− 3bγ]− 2(1− bγ)}(2− bγ)2[1− bγ(1 + a)]. (A.6.16)
Appendix 7: Proof of Proposition 2 - The Model with
Full-Market Coverage
Let the proÞt function of the duopolist be
πi = (pi − ce2i )xi with i = H,L, (A.7.1)
the market fully covered and the demand side of the model identical as in
the partial coverage case. The consumer is indiﬀerent between purchasing
the high- or the low-quality variant when UH = UL, that is, when he has a
taste parameter
θH =
pH − pL − bγ(eH − eL)
eH − eL . (A.7.2)
The demand for the high- and low quality variants are, respectively,
xH = (θ¯ − θH) and xL = (θH − θ¯ + 1). (A.7.3)
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This model has a two-stage structure. In the Þrst stage Þrms simultane-
ously choose the environmental quality level of their product by maximizing
proÞts in qualities. In stage two the Þrms compete in prices. As usual we
solve the game backwards starting from stage two, the price game. The
equilibrium prices under Bertrand competition are
pH =
(eH − eL)(1 + θ¯ + bγ) + c(2e2H + e2L)
3
and pL =
(eH − eL)(2− θ¯ − bγ) + c(e2H + 2e2L)
3
.
(A.7.4)
In stage one, Þrms maximize their proÞts with respect to quality. The
indirect proÞt functions are
max
eH
πH =
1
9
(eH − eL)(θ¯ + bγ − 2− c(eH − eL))2 (A.7.5)
and
max
eL
πL =
1
9
(eH − eL)(θ¯ + bγ + 1− c(eH − eL))2. (A.7.6)
The Þrst-order conditions of the quality game are
∂πH
∂eH
=
1
9
(θ¯ + bγ − 2 + c(eH − 3eL))(θ¯ + bγ − 2− c(eH + eL)) = 0 (A.7.7)
and
∂πL
∂eL
=
1
9
(θ¯ + bγ + 1 + c(eL − 3eH))(θ¯ + bγ + 1− c(eH + eL)) = 0. (A.7.8)
Solving the system of Þrst-order conditions gives the subgame perfect
quality levels
eNH =
4(θ¯ + bγ) + 1
8c
and eNL =
4(θ¯ + bγ)− 5
8c
, (A.7.9)
where the superscript N stands for Nash equilibrium. Observe that an in-
crease in the proportion of believers b increases both levels of quality but does
not aﬀect the diﬀerence between high and low quality. The intuition behind
this result is the following. As the proportion b of believers increases, the
Þrm producing the green variant increases the level of environmental quality
of its product to take advantage of the increase in the marginal willingness
to pay for high quality caused by the increase in b. The Þrm producing the
brown variant,on the other hand, also increases its level of quality to prevent
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a decreases in the demand for its variant to the advantage of the high-quality
variant. In fact, the indirect utility from purchasing high quality decreases as
the low-quality level increases with ∂UH/∂eL = −bγ. As a result the distance
between high and low quality, which in equilibrium is equal to 3
4c
, remains
unaﬀected by changes in b.
The equilibrium proÞts instead are not aﬀected by changes in the pro-
portion of believers.
πNH = π
N
L =
3
16c
. (A.7.10)
Both the demand for the high-quality and of the low-quality variant are
not aﬀected by the proportion of believers in the social norm. These are
xNH = x
N
L =
1
2
. (A.7.12)
Since both levels of quality increase in the proportion of believers and
equilibrium demand are unaﬀected, equilibrium average quality increases in
the proportion of believers, and aggregate emissions decrease.
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List of Symbols
a Degree of product diﬀerentiation, ratio of high to low quality
b Proportion of believers in the social norm
CS Consumer surplus
C(ei) =
c
2
e2i Cost of environmental quality
E Aggregate emissions
ea Average environmental quality
e¯ Unabated level of emissions per unit of production
ei Pollution abatement per unit of production, proxy of environ-
mental quality of variant i
(e¯− ei) Net emission per unit of production of variant i
pi Price of variant i
θ Consumers taste for quality
πi ProÞts of Þrm i
Πi Indirect proÞts of Þrm i
U Consumers indirect utility
W Social welfare
xi Demand for variant i of the diﬀerentiated commodity
γ Social valuation of the marginal damage from emissions
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